Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order staying his action for, inter alia, injunctive relief under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12182 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that retail property owned by defendants does not comply with the ADA's accessibility requirements. The court held that the district court's stay order is neither “final” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291, nor an appealable collateral order, nor a clear abuse of discretion warranting mandamus relief. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction. View "Range v. 480-486 Broadway, LLC" on Justia Law

The NYTimes challenged the district court's decision and order regarding requests for disclosure of information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, related to targeted killings by the use of drone aircraft. On a prior appeal, the court ordered disclosure of a 2010 document known as the "OLC-DOD Memorandum," advising as to the legality of the targeted drone attacks. In this appeal, the court concluded that all the OLC documents at issue shall remain undisclosed, except Exhibit K (the redacted version of Exhibit 15 B), which the district court has authorized to be disclosed; that the redacted portions of the district court’s opinion shall remain undisclosed, except for the three paragraphs on page 9, which the district court wishes disclosed; and that the redactions from the transcript of the June 23 hearing may remain undisclosed. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment, authorized the district court to disclose the three redacted paragraphs on page 9 of its opinion, and maintained undisclosed the redacted portions of the district court’s opinion and the June 23, 2015, transcript. View "The New York Times Co. v. US DOJ" on Justia Law

Keepers appealed, and the City cross-appealed, from partial summary judgment awards. At issue are two questions related to Chapter 2.3 of Milford’s municipal code, which regulates “adult‐oriented establishments.” First, whether the district court improperly considered the affidavit of the police chief in granting partial summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the district court did not “abuse its discretion” in considering the affidavit and therefore affirmed as to this issue. Second, whether the City’s requirement that sexually oriented businesses publicly post the names of their operators, officers, and significant owners violates the First Amendment. The court concluded that the district court should not have reached the merits of that issue, nor does this Court do so, because Keepers’ First Amendment challenge does not present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Even if Keepers originally had standing to challenge the public‐posting requirement based on its asserted right against compelled speech, the case has become moot on appeal. Therefore, the court vacated as to this issue and remanded with directions. View "Keepers Inc. v. City of Milford" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder and drug possession, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, alleging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleged that counsel was ineffective because his attorneys failed to argue on direct appeal that the admission at trial of a co-defendant's grand jury testimony violated petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because the state court's decision was not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal and Supreme Court law. In this case, the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington where petitioner failed to show that any fairminded jurist would conclude that appellate counsel’s omission of a challenge to the admission of the grand jury testimony - which petitioner expressly acquiesced to at trial - fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Chrysler v. Guiney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a physician and airplane pilot, filed suit contending that LabCorp and other drug testing companies, engaged to administer a random drug test in accordance with federal regulations governing aviation safety, mishandled the test. The court reserved decision and certified the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals: whether drug testing regulations and guidelines promulgated by the FAA and DOT create a duty of care for drug testing laboratories and program administrators under New York negligence law; and whether a plaintiff may establish the reliance element of a fraud claim under New York law by showing that a third party relied on a defendantʹs false statements resulting in injury to the plaintiff. View "Pasternack v. Laboratory Corporation" on Justia Law

The FHFA filed a summons with notice in state court asserting breach of contractual obligations to repurchase mortgage loans that violated representations and warranties and then Quicken removed the action to federal court. Plaintiff, as trustee of the subject residential mortgage‐backed securities trust, took control of the litigation and filed the complaint. Quicken moved to dismiss the suit. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that (1) the statute of limitations ran from the date the representations and warranties were made; (2) the extender provision of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act,12 U.S.C. 4617(b)(12), did not apply to the Trustee’s claim; and (3) the Trustee’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was duplicative. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l v. Quicken Loans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692k, as untimely. The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that the FDCPA violation “occurred” when defendant sent the restraining notice. The court held instead that where a debt collector sends an allegedly unlawful restraining notice to a bank, the FDCPA violation does not “occur” for purposes of Section 1692k(d) until the bank freezes the debtor’s account. Because the record is unclear as to when the freeze actually took place, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Benzemann v. Citibank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three health-benefit plans (HBPs), filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and state laws, claiming that Aventis engaged in a pattern of mail fraud by failing to disclose the true risks of the antibiotic drug telithromycin, marketed as “Ketek.” The district court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify a class of all HBPs that paid for Ketek prescriptions on the theory that such HBPs were injured as a result of paying for Ketek prescriptions that would not have been written if Aventis had not concealed Ketek’s safety risks. The court concluded that UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Zyprexa) does not foreclose class certification for all RICO mail‐fraud claims brought against a drug manufacturer. However, the court concluded that Zyprexa’s reasoning applies to this case, and bars plaintiffs’ attempt to certify a class. While it may be possible for a class of plaintiffs to prove the causation element of a pharmaceutical fraud claim such as this one with generalized proof, plaintiffs have failed to offer such proof here. Therefore, class certification was correctly denied. The court's certification decision necessarily disposes of the summary judgment question as well: if plaintiffs’ RICO claims cannot be proved by generalized proof and plaintiffs have adduced no individualized proof, plaintiffs' claims cannot survive summary judgment. Further, the court agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the state‐law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sergeants Benevolent Ass'n v. Sanofi-Aventis US" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of an electrical union, appealed the dismissal of their claims against their union. Plaintiff alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.621 et seq., violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411 et seq., the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 141 et seq., and the union’s duty of fair representation (DFR), as well as unlawful retaliation for complaints. The court concluded that the district court erroneously ruled that a union official’s expressions of resentment of plaintiffs’ claims of age discrimination could not evince retaliatory animus existing prior to the time the resentful statements were made. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with respect to the ADEA claims to which the magistrate judge’s recommendation of dismissal was based solely on the fact that the referral occurred prior to the February 2009 union meeting. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Kazolias v. IBEW" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed for divorce against his wife and sought custody of their two children. During the divorce proceedings, plaintiff filed suit against justices of the Matrimonial Parts of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the New York laws that authorize State judges to order parents to pay for attorneys appointed for their children. In this appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on the Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine. The court affirmed the decision of the district court in light of Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs. The court concluded that the circumstances of this case clearly fall within Sprint’s third category: pending State civil proceedings involving orders “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” View "Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Parts of the Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cnty." on Justia Law