Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction of one count of racketeering conspiracy as an associate of the Bonanno crime family within the charged enterprise of La Cosa Nostra. The court held that defendant's below‐Guidelines 18‐year sentence for racketeering conspiracy is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable because the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting the government’s non‐binding 10‐year sentencing recommendation, based on the nature of defendant’s crime, which included both foreseeable felony murder and attempted murder, his longstanding participation in the Bonanno crime family, and his ongoing loansharking and firearms trafficking; the district court did not misconstrue commentary to U.S.S.G. 6B1.2(b) in concluding that defendant’s guilty plea and plea agreement did not provide justifiable reasons for imposing a sentence half the effective 20‐year Guidelines range; and an 18‐year prison term falls within the range of reasonable sentencing choices available to the district court in this case. Finally, the court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in ordering restitution with interest for income lost by the victim as a result of the armed robbery offense that ended his life. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Messina" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 2007 New York state conviction for charges including murder in the second degree. Petitioner failed to file his petition within the one‐year limitations period provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), and the district court denied equitable tolling because petitioner had not acted with reasonable diligence. The court concluded that the district court's analysis of petitioner's degree of diligence was premised on the district court's misapplication of this court's decision in Doe v. Menefee. In this case, there are significant indications that petitioner acted with reasonable diligence and these indications justified a more detailed inquiry and findings by the district court. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martinez v. Superintendent of Eastern Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the magistrate judge's order denying a petition to quash an IRS summons. The court concluded that: (i) the attorney-client privilege was not waived by appellants’ provision of documents to a consortium of banks sharing a common legal interest in the tax treatment of a refinancing and corporate restructuring resulting from an ill-fated acquisition originally financed by the Consortium; and (ii) the work-product doctrine protects documents analyzing the tax treatment of the refinancing and restructuring prepared in anticipation of litigation with the IRS. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Schaeffler v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of social security disability benefits, alleging that the Appeals Council erred by failing to provide an explanation for why it disregarded the treating physician’s opinion and that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence in light of a treating physician’s opinion. The court agreed and held that, based on the record, including the physician's opinion, the ALJ's determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lesterhuis v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Commissioner, alleging that the Commissioner's actions, which were taken pursuant to section 6 of Connecticut Public Act 13‐303 and include his awarding two power purchase agreements to Intervenors, are preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 791-828, and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. 824a-3. The court held that plaintiff cannot bring claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 to vindicate any rights conferred by PURPA because PURPA’s private right of action forecloses these remedies; plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, a prerequisite for any qualified facility to bring an equitable action seeking to vindicate specific rights conferred by PURPA; and plaintiff lacks standing to bring a preemption action seeking solely to void the contracts awarded to Intervenors Fusion Solar and Number Nine. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint on alternative grounds. View "ALLCO v. Klee" on Justia Law

Counsel for plaintiff signed a stipulation dismissing most of plaintiff's claims against defendant. Plaintiff then filed a pro se motion and attached a letter asking the district court to reopen his case because his attorney had filed the stipulation without his knowledge or consent. The district court denied the motion, relying principally on the proposition that each party is deemed bound by the acts of his or her lawyer‐agent under our system of representative litigation. The court concluded that, in this case, plaintiff's motion raised a factual dispute concerning his attorney’s authority to stipulate to a dismissal of his claims and it was necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing to address this dispute. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the dismissal of his claims for false arrest and excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Halfway through deliberations, the jury sent a note asking whether “refusal to acknowledge/respond to police questions [is] considered obstruction of governmental administration.” The district court equivocally answered that “[r]efusal to answer police questions alone, without more, would not constitute obstruction of governmental administration,” but that such a determination would “depend[] on the totality of the circumstances as you find them.” However, New York law unambiguously holds that one cannot obstruct governmental administration merely by refusing to answer police questions or to provide identification, both because such conduct is constitutionally protected, and because obstruction of governmental administration requires as an element a physical or independently unlawful act. The court vacated the verdict and remanded for a new trial because this prejudicial error was indisputably preserved. View "Uzoukwu v. Krawiecki" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, contending that they were entitled to Frederica Thea's Trust's assets and seeking declaratory and equitable relief. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion seeking leave to file a second amended complaint. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the claims alleged in the proposed second amended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss. In this case, plaintiffs lacked standing to sue in their individual capacities. Further, a California statute with a one-year statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs claims and, while the district court did not apply the statute of limitations to plaintiffs' individual claims, all of plaintiffs' claims on behalf of the estate are time-barred. View "Thea v. Kleinhandler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging violation of his due process rights and that defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously by terminating his employment. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff does not have a private right of action under the Due Process Clause of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Therefore, the court concluded that this claim was properly dismissed. However, the court found that the district court erred in determining that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Atterbury v. U.S. Marshals Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in district court seeking correction of his military records, a retroactive promotion, and back pay. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Secretary moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and plaintiff cross-appealed to correct his brief on appeal. The court concluded that, because plaintiff's counsel did not timely complete the electronic filing process that was established by the Eastern District’s Local Rules, the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss, denied as moot the cross-motion, and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Franklin v. McHugh" on Justia Law