Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff, the author of "Point Break Live!", filed suit against defendants, asserting claims for copyright infringement, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contract. At issue on appeal was whether an unauthorized work that makes “fair use” of its source material may itself be protected by copyright. The court held, for substantially the reasons stated by the district court that, if the creator of an unauthorized work stays within the bounds of fair use and adds sufficient originality, she may claim protection under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 103, for her original contributions. The court also rejected defendant’s challenges to the district court’s jury charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keeling v. Hars" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident (LPR), and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was convicted of drug related offenses, sentenced to probation, and taken into custody by ICE agents pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). Petitioner then sought habeas relief, contending that he was eligible to apply for bail because the mandatory detention provision of section 1226(c) did not apply to him because he had not been taken into custody “when released” and that indefinite incarceration without an opportunity to apply for bail violated his right to due process. The district court granted the petition. The court deferred to the BIA's interpretation that detention need not be immediate in order to be mandatory. The court held, however, that to avoid the constitutional concerns raised by indefinite detention, an immigrant detained pursuant to section 1226(c) must be afforded a bail hearing before an immigration judge within six months of his or her detention. Following the Ninth Circuit, the court also held that the detainee must be admitted to bail unless the government establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the immigrant poses a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the community. In this case, petitioner is neither a risk of flight nor dangerous where he is the primary caretaker of his two-year-old son who was placed in foster care while petitioner was in detention, he has no arrest record, and he has been gainfully employed for over two decades. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Lora v. Shanahan" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that CUNY violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000‐e et seq., and that the individual defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), N.Y. City Admin. Code 8‐107. Plaintiff alleged that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her race, gender, and national origin, and retaliated against her for an internal complaint that she filed. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The court concluded that the district court was correct that, assuming plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation, CUNY offered a non-retaliatory explanation for its reappointment decision and plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the desire to retaliate was the but‐for cause of CUNY’s action. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that either their views or CUNY’s employment decisions were more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination. Finally, after conducting a separate analysis of plaintiff's NYCHRL claims, the court concluded that the district court's grant of summary judgment to the individual defendants was correct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ya-Chen Chen v. City University of New York" on Justia Law

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Defendants Binday, Kergil, and Resnick, insurance brokers, appealed their convictions stemming from their involvement in an insurance fraud scheme where they induced insurers to issue life insurance policies that defendants sold to third‐party investors, by submitting fraudulent applications indicating that the policies were for the applicants’ personal estate planning. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence that defendants contemplated a cognizable harm under the mail and wire fraud statutes; the indictment was not constructively amended because the allegations in the indictment and the government’s proof at trial substantially correspond; and some aspects of the defendants’ challenge to the jury instruction are waived, while the remainder fail on the merits. The court rejected defendants' remaining challenges to their sentences and to the obstruction of justice convictions. The court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Binday" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims of false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and use of excessive force. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that the complaint was properly dismissed to the extent that it alleged claims of false arrest and retaliatory arrest, and that the pleaded claim for use of excessive force must be remanded for further proceedings, despite the district court’s justifiable misunderstanding that this claim was either not pleaded or not being pursued. View "Shamir v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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This appeal stemmed from the disputed assignment of certain construction work on the Tappan Zee Hudson River Crossing Project. UBC appealed the district court's conclusion that a May 4th arbitration award was not final and that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by issuing a May 12th arbitration award. Under a heightened standard of deference, the court concluded that it must defer to the arbitrator’s interpretation of Article 10, Section 3(D) of the Project Labor Agreement (PLA) as allowing him to alter the short‐form award when rendering his written opinion. The PLA does not define the term “short‐form,” nor does it specifically require that the second decision echo the result of the first.  The court concluded that, absent any such definitions or provisions, the arbitrator had the authority to interpret Article 10, Section 3(D) as allowing him to change or alter the first award in order to ensure full consideration of the three criteria required under Article 5, Section 8 of the National Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry. Accordingly, the court confirmed the May 13th Award and vacated the May 4th Award. View "United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging a claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112-12117, and seeking damages. Plaintiff's claim is based on her employer’s decision to reduce her discretionary bonus after she was absent from work for four months. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. The court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that denial or reduction of a bonus could not constitute an adverse employment action solely because the employer had discretion whether to pay a bonus. The court further concluded that, despite this error, the district court correctly determined that, even if plaintiff established an adverse employment action, she failed to present evidence that would support the necessary finding of discriminatory motivation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Edu." on Justia Law

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These two appeals challenge gun-control legislation prohibiting the possession of certain semiautomatic “assault weapons” and large‐capacity magazines. The district courts granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that the core provisions of the New York and Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semiautomatic assault weapons and large‐capacity magazines do not violate the Second Amendment, and that the challenged individual provisions are not void for vagueness; the particular provision of New York’s law regulating load limits, however, does not survive the requisite scrutiny; and Connecticut’s prohibition on the non‐semiautomatic Remington 7615 unconstitutionally infringes upon the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the judgment of the district court insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines; reversed in part its holding with respect to the Remington 7615; reversed in part certain vagueness holdings; and otherwise affirmed the judgment insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines and invalidated the load limit. View "New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Yemen, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding of removeability based on procurement of admission through fraud and denial of petitioner's request for a waiver of inadmissibility. The BIA determined that the government had demonstrated petitioner’s removability by clear and convincing evidence because petitioner, who was admitted to the United States as an unmarried son of a United States citizen, was married at the time of his admission. The court granted the petition for review because the BIA failed to consider petitioner's marriage certificate, which stated that he first married five years after his admission. The court also concluded that the BIA erred when it applied the standards for determining credibility articulated in the REAL ID Act, INA 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), to assess petitioner’s testimony concerning his removability. On remand, the BIA is instructed to articulate the standard it applies when assessing the credibility of an individual who testifies on matters concerning removability in a contested removal proceeding. View "Ahmed v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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TAG filed suit against the City, arguing that the City's zoning policies perpetuated racial segregation and had a disparate impact, thus violating the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. In 2010, a jury returned a verdict in favor of TAG on the disparate impact claim, but the district court granted the City's motion for a new trial. In 2012, a second jury returned a verdict in favor of the City on both TAG's perpetuation of segregation and disparate impact claims. The court held that TAG’s lost upfront economic expenditures on a detailed development proposal for a specific piece of property, coupled with the denial of a necessary special use permit, constitute injuries-in-fact that are fairly traceable to the City’s actions, thus affording TAG standing to maintain this action. The court also held that the City waived its argument regarding the inconsistency of the jury verdict; the district court should not have reached the merits of that argument, and it therefore erred when it ordered a new trial on that ground. Further, having concluded that the district court erred in ordering a new trial, and that the City has waived its remaining claims of error relating to the 2010 trial, the court reinstated the 2010 judgment in favor of TAG on its disparate impact claim; remanded with instructions that the district court grant a new trial limited only to the issue of damages unless TAG agrees to a remittitur reducing its award to $100,000; and denied reassignment on remand. View "The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs" on Justia Law