Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, authors of published books under copyright, filed suit against Google for copyright infringement. Google, acting without permission of rights holders, has made digital copies of tens of millions of books, including plaintiffs', through its Library Project and its Google books project. The district court concluded that Google's actions constituted fair use under 17 U.S.C. 107. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Google. The court concluded that: (1) Google’s unauthorized digitizing of copyright-protected works, creation of a search functionality, and display of snippets from those works are non-infringing fair uses. The purpose of the copying is highly transformative, the public display of text is limited, and the revelations do not provide a significant market substitute for the protected aspects of the originals. Google’s commercial nature and profit motivation do not justify denial of fair use. (2) Google’s provision of digitized copies to the libraries that supplied the books, on the understanding that the libraries will use the copies in a manner consistent with the copyright law, also does not constitute infringement. Nor, on this record, is Google a contributory infringer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Authors Guild v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against the Department and others. While the litigation was pending, plaintiff was represented by non-party appellees, whose motion is before the court. Appellees withdrew their representation and were replaced. The case was ultimately settled. Before the parties announced their intention to settle, appellees sought an order directing plaintiff to pay their unpaid attorney’s fees out of the proceeds of the settlement. The district court later entered a final judgment in favor of plaintiff. On February 12, 2014, the district court issued a decision and order on motions for attorneys' fees. On May 21, 2014, the district court filed a decision and order determining that replacement counsel was entitled to attorney fees and ordered payment to her. On June 22, 2014, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the orders entered on February 12, 2014, and May 21, 2015. On July 14, 2015, appellees filed a motion requesting dismissal of plaintiff's appeal and seeking sanctions. The court denied the motion to dismiss as untimely an appeal from the district court's order and denied the motion for sanctions. View "Cole-Hoover v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of defendant, filed suit alleging three claims under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐552a et seq. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment and the district court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appealed. The court certified the following question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the exemption of post-garnishment residual wages from further execution: Do Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐361a and 52‐367b, read together, exempt post‐garnishment residual wages held in a third party’s bank account from further execution, so that they become freely transferable under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52‐552a et seq.? View "Cadle Co. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

This appeal involves a dispute over the copyright in the musical composition “Santa Claus is Comin’ to Town." Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that either a notice of termination served on EMI in 2007 or another such notice served in 2012 will, upon becoming effective, terminate EMI’s rights in the Song. The district court granted summary judgment to EMI, holding that its rights in the Song will subsist through the entire remaining copyright term - which, under current law, is scheduled to expire in 2029 - pursuant to a 1951 agreement that plaintiffs are powerless to terminate. The court concluded, however, that EMI owns its rights in the Song not under the 1951 Agreement but instead under a subsequent contract executed in 1981; and that the 2007 Termination Notice will terminate the 1981 Agreement in 2016.  Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment in their favor. The court reversed and remanded. View "Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims under, inter alia, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794; and 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of the Due Process Clause. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on these claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims because a trier of fact could find that defendants did not grant the accommodation plaintiff requested for his mental‐health condition and failed to provide a “plainly reasonable” alternative or attempt to show that plaintiff’s proposed modification was unreasonable. The court concluded, however, that having received notice of potential termination from the program and a“careful and deliberate” decision plaintiff was, as a matter of law, provided the procedural process due for an academic dismissal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Medicine and Biomedical Sciences" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of a Vessel General Permit (VGP) issued by EPA to regulate the discharge of ballast water from ships under section 402(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1342(a). The court concluded that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing parts of the 2013 VGP. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review with respect to (1) EPAʹs decision to set the technology‐based effluent limits (TBELs) at the IMO Standard, (2) EPAʹs failure to consider onshore treatment for ballast water discharge, (3) EPAʹs decision to exempt pre‐2009 Lakers from the TBELS in the 2013 VGP permit, (4) EPAʹs narrative standard for water quality‐based effluent limits (WQBELs), and (5) the monitoring and reporting requirements established by EPA for WQBELs. The court remanded for further proceedings in these respects. The court denied the petition for review with respect to TBELs for viruses and protists and the monitoring and reporting requirements established by EPA for TBELs. View "NRDC v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials violated his procedural due process rights in connection with a disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel in his appeal from the district court's dismissal of his complaint. The court extended its reasoning in Bedoya v. Coughlin and concluded that an inmate may likewise implicitly waive the right to attend his disciplinary hearing by refusing to attend after receiving notice and being given an opportunity to attend. Accordingly, the court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal as frivolous. View "Smith v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that she was the victim of an identity theft scheme perpetrated by employees of Chase, and seeks to hold Chase liable for this identity theft under the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. 380-1, 380-s. At issue was whether plaintiff's suit is preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. The court held that 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts only those claims that concern a defendant’s responsibilities as a furnisher of information under the FCRA. The court concluded that, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the complaint advances claims against Chase for identity theft under N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. 380‐l and 380‐s based on acts of identity theft perpetrated by Chase employees, as distinct from any erroneous or otherwise wrongful actions by Chase in furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies. These identity theft claims are not preempted because they do not concern Chase’s responsibilities as a furnisher. The court further concluded that, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint seeks relief based on Chase’s erroneous or otherwise improper furnishing of information to consumer reporting agencies, those claims are preempted. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud. At issue was whether United States Customs officers at an international airport may lawfully and without a warrant examine and photocopy a document that belongs to a traveler, defendant in this case, entering the United States if the officers have reasonable suspicion on the basis of information supplied from another federal agency that the traveler is engaged in criminal activity unrelated to contraband, customs duties, immigration, or terrorism. The court held that such a search is lawful under the border search doctrine and that the district court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Levy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that New York General Business Law Section 518 violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and is void for vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Section 518 provides that “[n]o seller in any sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or similar means.” The district court entered a final judgment declaring Section 518 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The court reversed, concluding that Section 518 does not violate the First Amendment as applied to single-sticker‐price sellers. And, because it is unclear whether the law applies outside that specific context, there is no basis for the court to conclude that the law violates the First Amendment in any of its applications, much less on its face. The district court also erred in holding that Section 518 is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Having concluded that Section 518 enjoys a core set of applications in which it is not unconstitutionally vague - namely, its application to sellers who post single sticker-prices - the court found abstention appropriate in this context also, and therefore did not reach the balance of plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge. The court remanded for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman" on Justia Law