Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal stems from a decade-long dispute over whether the County has adequately analyzed - in its applications for HUD funds - impediments to fair housing within the County’s jurisdictions. The County challenges final administrative determinations by HUD to withhold funds allocated to the County under the Community Planning and Development Formula Grant Programs (“CPD funds”) for fiscal years (“FY”) 2011, 2013 and 2014. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that HUD’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious and that 42 U.S.C. 12705 and section 12711 did “not relieve the County of its obligation to make accurate Certifications and to produce adequate analysis impediments in order to obtain CPD Funds.” The court agreed, concluding that HUD’s withholding of CPD funds did not violate federal law. However, the court vacated in part the temporary injunction issued pendente lite. HUD is authorized to reallocate the County’s FY 2013 funds forthwith. As to the County’s FY 2014 funds, however, HUD is directed to delay reallocating those funds until after the County exhausts its right to seek further review of this decision. View "City of Westchester v. HUD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, injured sailors and their spouses, filed suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq., alleging that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack of the U.S.S. Cole and that the Republic of Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda. Plaintiffs subsequently registered the default judgment and then sought to enforce it against funds held by New York banks. The district court issued three turnover orders. The court affirmed and held that (1) service of process on the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., complied with the FSIAʹs requirement that service be sent to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs, and (2) the District Court did not err in issuing the turnover orders without first obtaining either a license from the Treasury Departmentʹs Office of Foreign Assets Control or a Statement of Interest from the Department. View "Harrison v. Republic of Sudan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a whistleblower action against FRBNY, her former employer, and three of its employees. The district court dismissed the suit and determined, inter alia, that palintiff could not maintain claims against the employees under the banking agency whistleblower protection statute, 12 U.S.C. 1831j(a)(2). The court concluded that neither sharing an interest in the financial well‐being of a company nor sharing information about that company leads to a reasonable inference that the employees were performing services for the FDIC. Further, plaintiff’s allegations fall far short of plausibly showing that the employees were performing a service on behalf of the FDIC, as required under the whistleblower protection statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Segarra v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that the New York law criminalizing the possession of “gravity knives,” N.Y. Penal Law 265.00(5), 265.01(1), is unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that plaintiffs did not have standing. The court concluded that Plaintiffs Native Leather, Copeland, and Perez have standing to challenge defendants’ application of the statute because each has expressed a present intent to possess such knives (but for defendants’ challenged enforcement actions) and each has demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution based on defendants’ (a) recent enforcement actions against them, (b) express threat to prosecute Native Leather further under the terms of a deferred prosecution agreement, and (c) continued defense of the wrist‐flick test that allegedly prompted plaintiffs’ past violation charges. The court further concluded that its precedent precludes Knife Rights and Knife Rights Foundation from asserting standing on behalf of their members under 42 U.S.C. 1983; nor can these organizational plaintiffs demonstrate standing to sue on their own behalf based on claimed injury to their activities from expenditures diverted to oppose defendants’ actions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint a second time to address defects in standing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against defendants under state and federal labor laws, alleging that they were unlawfully denied various forms of compensation and benefits because defendants improperly classified them as independent contractors rather than employees. The district court denied defendants' motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained in plaintiffs' subsequent employment agreements. Plaintiffs contend that the prior Sales Agreements and the conduct of the parties reveals positive assurance that the parties did not intend for the arbitration agreement to apply to claims that arose during the time period when defendants affirmatively labeled plaintiffs as non‐employees. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration because it found positive assurance that the parties did not intend for the arbitration agreement to be retroactive. View "Holick v. Cellular Sales of New York, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his application for Social Security disability benefits (SSI). The district court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded, however, that the ALJ erred by failing to provide “good reasons” for giving little weight to the treating physician's opinion, and that this error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Greek v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Imico alleging that it failed to comply with disclosure provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., in connection with plaintiffs' attempt to purchase a condominium apartment. The court concluded that: (1) Imico complied with section 1703(a)(1)(B) by providing the property report to plaintiffs’ designated attorney; (2) Imico’s description of the lot was sufficient to meet the requirements of section 1703(d)(1); and (3) Imico is entitled to any interest that accrued on plaintiffs’ fifteen‐percent down payment while the deposit was in escrow.  Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court insofar as it held that Imico did not violate section 1703(d)(1), but reversed the judgment insofar as it held that plaintiffs were entitled to rescind their contract due to Imico’s alleged failure to comply with section 1703(a)(1)(B). View "Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against a group of airlines and security contractors seeking to recover losses after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Plaintiffs alleged that, because defendants were negligent in overseeing airport security systems, the terrorists were able to hijack American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 and to fly those planes into the Twin Towers. The district court entered judgment for defendants. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation only for the amount of value that their leasehold interests lost due to the terrorist attacks, that they cannot recover their claimed consequential damages, and that, pursuant to CPLR 4545, their insurance recoveries correspond to, and offset, their potential tort award. The court also agreed that United had no duty to supervise the security checkpoints or detect the hijackers who boarded American Airlines Flight 11. However, the court concluded that the district court erred by using an incorrect methodology when calculating the value by which plaintiffs’ leasehold interests declined, and the district court wrongly decided that prejudgment interest accrues at the federal funds rate on the diminution in value of plaintiffs’ leasehold estates. The district court should have calculated prejudgment interest using New York’s statutory prejudgment interest rate, and assessed that interest based on the final damages award. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "World Trade Center Properties LLC v. American Airlines" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaint under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, for failure to file a timely appeal because of plaintiffs' compliance with an individual calendar rule promulgated by a district judge. The court concluded that plaintiffs' dilatory motion for reconsideration failed to toll the time to appeal under FRAP 12 Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), and plaintiffs’ notice of appeal was filed more than a year after judgment entered against them. Accordingly, under FRAP Rule 4(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. 2107(a), the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear this appeal. View "Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claims against Staples for breach of contract and for violations of New York General Business Law (N.Y. G.B.L.) Sections 349 and 350 for failure to state a claim. Sections 349 and 350 prohibit deception of consumers and false advertising. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the district court erred in finding that the language of the Protection Plan Brochure (the Contract) that plaintiff purchased for his computer was unambiguous. The court concluded that plaintiff has adequately alleged both a materially misleading practice and an actual injury under N.Y. GBL Sections 349 and 350; with respect to the breach of contract claim, the district court erred in finding the Contract to be unambiguous, in requiring plaintiff to allege a “material” breach, and in finding that plaintiff had failed to adequately allege damages; construing the contract’s ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor, he has alleged Staples’s failure to perform in the first year of the contract and damages in the amount of his restitution interest; and should plaintiff seek damages beyond his restitution interest, he should amend his complaint. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Orlander v. Staples, Inc." on Justia Law