Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, and the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., alleging that defendant, her former boyfriend, had gained access to her e-mail and Facebook accounts without her permission and therefore in violation of the CFAA and the SCA. Plaintiff discovered that she could not log on to her AOL e-mail account on or about August 1, 2011 and plaintiff discovered that she could not log into her Facebook account on February 24, 2012. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as untimely. While the CFAA and the SCA provided a civil cause of action, the statute of limitations to file under each statute is two years. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims relating to defendant's alleged unlawful access to her e-mail account are time-barred because she filed suit on January 2, 2014, after the two year statute of limitations had expired. However, the court concluded that plaintiff's claims relating to the alleged unlawful access of her Facebook account were timely filed, less than two years from the date they accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sewell v. Bernardin" on Justia Law

The City filed timely proofs of claim for property taxes owed by a Chapter 11 debtor with respect to quarters of the 2009 tax year that had been billed pre‐petition, but did not file proofs of claim with respect to property tax bills for later quarters that were billed during the bankruptcy proceedings.  A single lien secured payment of the entire tax burden - both taxes that were the subject of claims and those that were not. The bankruptcy court ruled that the now-confirmed plan extinguished the lien and the district court affirmed. The court held that a lien is extinguished by a Chapter 11 plan if: (1) the text of the plan does not preserve the lien; (2) the plan is confirmed; (3) the property subject to the lien is “dealt with” by the terms of the plan; and (4) the lienholder participated in the bankruptcy proceedings. The court concluded that all four requirements are satisfied when applied to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "City of Concord, N.H. v. Northern New England Telephone Operations" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are commercial trucking companies, their national trade association, and a putative class of commercial truckers. Plaintiff filed suit against the Thruway Authority under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Thruway Authority charges excessive tolls in violation of the Commerce Clause because it diverts excessive highway tolls to fund maintenance and improvements of unrelated projects. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join the State of New York as a necessary party under Rule 19. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion because the State of New York is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a). View "Am. Trucking Ass'n v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her parents filed suit against the Hotchkiss School after plaintiff contracted tick-borne encephalitis on a school-organized trip to China. The jury found the school negligent and awarded plaintiff $41.5 million in damages, $31.5 of which were non-economic damages. Although the court agreed with plaintiffs that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find plaintiff’s illness foreseeable, the court was unable to determine whether public policy supports imposing a legal duty on the school. Because this case implicates important and unresolved issues of Connecticut state law and public policy, the court certified two questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court: (1) Does Connecticut public policy support imposing a duty on a school to warn about or protect against the risk of a serious insect‐borne disease when it organizes a trip abroad? (2) If so, does an award of approximately $41.5 million in favor of the plaintiffs, $31.5 million of which are non‐economic damages, warrant remittitur? View "Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and three supervisors at ACS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and disparate treatment based on race, and retaliated against because of complaints about such discrimination. Plaintiff also alleged that she was sexually harassed in violation of Title VII. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court vacated the district court's judgment granting defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's disparate treatment and retaliation claims against the City under Title VII; plaintiff's disparate treatment claim against Defendant Baker under sections 1981 and 1983 where only Baker was involved in the decision to demote plaintiff; and plaintiff's retaliation claim against Baker under section 1981 where she alleged facts that would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court affirmed as to the other claims. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Littlejohn v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals employed by the DSNY, filed a putative class action under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and New York State and City human rights laws, alleging that defendants discriminated against them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race and/or national origin in the DSNY's promotional practices. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. The court concluded that the district court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection and section 1981 claims is affirmed. The court held that, to show discriminatory intent in a section 1981 or Equal Protection case based on statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege statistics that meet these standards. Furthermore, the fact that each of the plaintiffs has been promoted at some point undermines their allegations of discrimination in the promotion of sanitation workers to supervisors. The court also concluded that the Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals employed by the DSNY, filed a putative class action under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and New York State and City human rights laws, alleging that defendants discriminated against them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race and/or national origin in the DSNY's promotional practices. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. The court concluded that the district court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection and section 1981 claims is affirmed. The court held that, to show discriminatory intent in a section 1981 or Equal Protection case based on statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege statistics that meet these standards. Furthermore, the fact that each of the plaintiffs has been promoted at some point undermines their allegations of discrimination in the promotion of sanitation workers to supervisors. The court also concluded that the Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and the New York labor Law (NYLL). After plaintiffs prevailed, the district court awarded plaintiffs' counsel $514,284.00 in attorneys’ fees and $68,294.50 in costs. Of that amount, it awarded $10,425 to reimburse plaintiffs' counsel for costs incurred retaining an expert accountant for plaintiffs' affirmative case against defendants. Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court’s award of fees and costs constituted an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that because section 216(b) does not explicitly authorize awards reimbursing plaintiffs for expert fees, the district court erred in granting such an award pursuant to this provision. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s award of $10,425 in costs for expert fees and remanded to the district court to consider whether the NYLL authorizes the award of such fees and, if so, whether to award them pursuant to the NYLL. In a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part as to defendants' other challenges. View "Gortat v. Capala Bros." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the United States under 26 U.S.C. 7426, seeking a judgment of $2,915,000 in compensation for an alleged wrongful levy by the IRS. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's section 7426 claim was time barred because she filed it more than nine months after the IRS served her with the relevant notice levy, and that plaintiff could not have brought a claim under 28 U.S.C. 1346 because claims for a tax refund are unavailable to plaintiffs who could have brought a claim under section 7426 but for the expiration of the statue of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mottahedeh v. United States" on Justia Law

After the district court found plaintiff's state law claims against Verizon to be arbitrable, the district court compelled arbitration but denied Verizon's request to stay proceedings. The court held, however, that the text, structure, and underlying policy of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.1 et seq., requires a stay of proceedings when all claims are referred to arbitration and a stay requested. The court further concluded that plaintiff's various constitutional challenges to the FAA are meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Katz v. Cellco P'ship" on Justia Law