Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nursing Personnel appealed the district court's partial judgment awarding plaintiff $185,962.12 in attorneys' fees under the attorneys' fees provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1). Nursing Personnel filed the appeal to challenge time entries in plaintiff's fee petition. The court held that Nursing Personnel waived its challenge to the time entries by failing to raise this objection before the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for the limited purpose of awarding plaintiff appellate attorneys' fees. View "United States ex rel. Keshner v. Nursing Personnel Home Care" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3) by retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment right as a member of the Inmate Liaison Committee (ILC) at a correctional facility. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held, however, that action as a member of an ILC, i.e. the filing or voicing of grievances on behalf of a prison population, qualifies as constitutionally protected conduct under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and that retaliation for such conduct is therefore actionable under Section 1983. The court further concluded that the district court properly dismissed the conspiracy claim because plaintiff failed to allege membership in a class protected under Section 1985(3). The court appointed plaintiff counsel in the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dolan v. Connolly" on Justia Law

In 2002, knowing that Plaintiff‐Appellant Natasha Davis was a Type I diabetic, Defendant‐Appellee Bombardier Transportation Holdings (USA) Inc. hired her as a Customer Service Agent (later renaming the position as an Air Train Agent or "ATA"). In 2007, Davis went on disability leave for diabetic retinopathy. Davis underwent at least six eye surgeries during her leave. In August, Davis notified Bombardier that she was prepared to return to work, and submitted to a physical. Bombardier informed Davis that she failed the physical and eye exams, but Davis contended she passed. Bombardier thereafter determined that Davis could no longer operate as an "ATA II." On September 1, 2007, Bombardier “demoted” Davis to the ATA I position, which paid 75 cents less per hour than the ATA II position. Davis filed suit against Bombardier, bringing claims of disability-based employment discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted Bombardier's motion for summary judgment, finding (in relevant part) that Davis' demotion-based claim was time barred. On appeal, Davis argued that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 applied to and revived her claims. The Ledbetter Act made it unlawful to apply a discriminatory compensation decision to an employee and starts a new statute of limitations clock with each paycheck that reflected that decision. Davis argued that Bombardier’s demotion decision was made with disability‐based discriminatory intent and, as a result, reduced her compensation. Thus, she contended that her claim was timely when measured from her last paycheck and not the date of her demotion. After review, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed judgment in favor of Bombardier, concluding that the Ledbetter Act did not encompass a claim of a discriminatory demotion decision that results in lower wages where, as here, the plaintiff had not offered any proof that the compensation itself was set in a discriminatory manner. A plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of a pay-discrimination claim to benefit from the Ledbetter Act’s accrual provisions. View "Davis v. Bombardier Transp. Holdings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful termination claims because the court concluded that an affidavit attached as an exhibit to a complaint is not a "written instrument" that is deemed part of the complaint under Rule 10(c); affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint, a motion which was first made following the entry of the final judgment. View "Smith v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, borrowers who failed to purchase hazard insurance on their mortgaged properties, as required by the terms of their loan agreements, filed suit alleging that they were fraudulently overbilled. Plaintiffs' loan servicer, GMAC, bought lender-placed insurance (LPI) from Balboa at rates that were approve by regulators. GMAC then sought reimbursement from plaintiffs at the same rates. Plaintiffs alleged that the rates they were charged did not reflect secret "rebates" and "kickbacks" that GMAC received from Balboa through Balboa's affiliate, Newport. The court held that a claim challenging a regulator-approved rate is subject to the filed rate doctrine whether or not the rate is passed through an intermediary. The claim is therefore barred if it would undermine the regulator’s rate-setting authority or operate to give the suing ratepayer a preferential rate. In this case, plaintiffs' claims are barred under the filed rate doctrine and the court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the case. View "Rothstein v. Balboa Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in 2009 and was sentenced to 151 months' imprisonment. Petitioner seeks leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that, although petitioner's section 2255 motion challenging the legality of his 2009 conviction and sentence was previously denied on the merits, his proposed section 2255 motion is not “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) because it seeks only to reinstate his direct-appeal rights and therefore does not challenge the legality of the sentence imposed. Accordingly, the court denied the successive motion as unnecessary and transferred the matter to the district court with instructions that petitioner's section 2255 motion be accepted for filing. View "Carranza v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against defendant, an attorney representing National Grid, a company providing natural gas to plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant's debt collection practices concerning an alleged theft of natural gas violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. The court held that money owed as a result of theft is not an “obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction” and, therefore, does not constitute a “debt” for purposes of the FDCPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Beauvoir v. Israel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a physician, filed suit alleging that his employer Montefiore denied him severance benefits in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that on the facts alleged in the complaint, the severance policy at issue is a "plan" governed by section 1002(1) of ERISA. The court considered Montefiore's remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Okun v. Montefiore Medical Center" on Justia Law

Applicant appealed the district court's denial of her application to compel discovery from respondent under 28 U.S.C. 1782. Applicant sought discovery from respondent to plead and to prove a contemplated defamation suit against him in her home country of the Netherlands. The district court denied the application on the ground that the materials sought were not “for use” in the Dutch proceeding, as required by section 1782, because they were not necessary for applicant to draft an adequate complaint. The court concluded that the district court's conclusion was erroneous because an applicant may satisfy the statute’s “for use” requirement even if the discovery she seeks is not necessary for her to succeed in the foreign proceeding and because the discovery need not be sought for the purpose of commencing a foreign proceeding in order to be “for use” in that proceeding. That is so even where a section 1782 applicant is a private litigant who has yet to commence the foreign proceeding for which discovery is sought, so long as the proceeding is within reasonable contemplation. A section 1782 applicant, such as the case here, satisfies the statute’s “for use” requirement by showing that the materials she seeks are to be used at some stage of a foreign proceeding. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Mees v. Buiter" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut rule restricting the use of certain teeth‐whitening procedures to licensed dentists. Specifically, the rule stated that only a licensed dentist could shine a light emitting diode (“LED”) lamp at the mouth of a consumer during a teeth‐whitening procedure. The court concluded that the rule does not violate either due process or equal protection given that at least some evidence exists that LED lights may cause some harm to consumers, and given that there is some relationship between the rule and the harm it seeks to prevent. The court joined the Tenth Circuit and concluded that economic favoritism is rational for purposes of its review of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if the only conceivable reason for the LED restriction was to shield licensed dentists from competition, the court would still be compelled by an unbroken line of precedent to approve the Commission’s action. The court concluded that there are a number of constitutionally rational rounds for the rule and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, Dr." on Justia Law