Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against DSS to enforce the Food Stamp Act's, 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9), time limits for awarding food stamp benefits. The district court certified a class consisting of all past, current, and future Connecticut food stamp applicants whose applications are not processed in a timely manner and the district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring DSS to process food stamp applications within the statutory deadlines. The court concluded that plaintiff can maintain a private lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce the statutory time limits in section 2020(e)(3) and (9). The court also concluded that federal regulations do not excuse DSS from processing food stamp applications within the statutory time limits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Briggs v. Bremby" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, hired as unpaid interns on the Fox Searchlight-distributed film "Black Swan," claimed compensation as employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and New York Labor Law. The district court granted plaintiff Glatt and Footman's motion for partial summary judgment, certified plaintiff Antalik's New York class, and conditionally certified Antalik's nationwide collective. The court agreed with defendants that the proper question is whether the intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship, and the court proposed a list of non‐exhaustive factors to aid courts in answering that question. Because the district court limited its review to the six factors in DOL’s Intern Fact Sheet, the court remanded for the district court to permit the parties to submit additional evidence. Even if Antalik established that Fox had a policy of replacing paid employees with unpaid interns, it would not necessarily mean that every Fox intern was likely to prevail on her claim that she was an FLSA employee under the primary beneficiary test, the most important issue in each case. Assuming some questions may be answered with generalized proof, they are not more substantial than the questions requiring individualized proof. Because the most important question in this litigation cannot be answered with generalized proof, the court vacated the district court’s order certifying Antalik’s proposed class and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Finally, for substantially the same reasons as with respect to Antalik’s Rule 23 motion, the court vacated the district court’s order conditionally certifying Antalik’s proposed nationwide collective action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures" on Justia Law

Defendant, a former New York State senator, pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud and two conspiracy counts. At issue on appeal was an unsettled question regarding restitution orders and the one‐year limitations period for a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion: Does the limitations period begin to run with an order affirming a conviction and sentence but remanding for recalculation of restitution, or does it begin to run only after the district court enters a revised restitution order on remand? The court held that the limitations period begins to run only when the revised restitution order becomes final. Accordingly, the May 2014 district court order is vacated and the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

The Fund filed suit against Empire under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1453, after Empire effected a "complete withdrawal" from the Fund. Steven Levine was the sole shareholder of Empire. The Fund also filed suit against Enivel to recover on its judgment against Empire, alleging that Enivel is a trade or business under common control with Empire such that it is jointly and severally liable for Empire’s withdrawal liability. At issue was whether a separate business organization can be held responsible for the liabilities of another commonly controlled entity under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended by the MPPAA. The court concluded that, although Enivel and Empire are commonly controlled, Enivel’s limited leasing and sales activity was personal in nature - not primarily for profit - and Enivel did not operate continuously and regularly. The owners did not fragment their business operations over several entities. Rather, Enivel’s mission was primarily personal and any profit it derived was incidental. Therefore, the court concluded that Enivel is not a “trade or business” for the purposes of the MPPAA and affirmed the district court's judgment for Enivel. View "UFCW Local One Pension Fund v. Enivel Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant, while in Venezuela, was convicted in absentia in Colombia of drug manufacturing and trafficking. Defendant was later extradited from Venezuela to Colombia and then the United States later transmitted a formal request to Colombia for the arrest and extradition of defendant to face the charge of conspiracy to manufacture and import five kilograms or more of cocaine into the United States. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to the conspiracy count and was sentenced to 648 months imprisonment, as well as fined $1 million. Defendant, currently 46 years old, challenged his sentence on the ground that it violates the United States government’s assurance that “a sentence of life imprisonment will not be sought or imposed” because the sentence exceeds defendant's life expectancy. The court concluded that any individual right that defendant may have under the terms of his extradition is only derivative through the state. Therefore, defendant would only have prudential standing to raise the claim that his sentence violated the terms of his extradition if Colombia first makes an official protest. Because defendant lacked prudential standing in this case, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Suarez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States seeking enforcement of a settlement agreement. At issue was whether the actions taken by the district court in 1985 - verbally expressing approval of the settlement terms, dismissing the case on the merits in a brief order, and subsequently signing and so‐ordering the parties’ settlement agreement - sufficed to retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of the agreement. The court concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement agreement because the district court’s order of dismissal failed expressly to retain jurisdiction or to incorporate the terms of the agreement, and because the district court’s so‐ordering of the settlement agreement took place after the court had already relinquished jurisdiction over the case and was thus ineffective to retain it. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Hendrickson v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a financial advisor employed by UBS, filed a putative class action and collective action against UBS, asserting wage-and-hour claims under federal and state law. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion to compel arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and from the subsequent order of the district court denying his motion for reconsideration. The court held that enforcement of the UBS Compensation Plan would not be “contrary” to Rule 13204 because the Rule bars neither the enforcement of pre‐dispute waivers of class and collective action procedures nor the arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims. Because plaintiff concedes that his claims under California's Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab. Code 2699, are untimely, the court need not decide whether this doctrine of California law is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cohen v. UBS Fin. Svc." on Justia Law

The Justice Department and 33 states and territories filed suit alleging that Apple, in launching the iBookstore, had conspired with the Publisher Defendants to raise prices across the nascent ebook market, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., and state antitrust laws. All five Publisher Defendants settled and signed consent decrees, which prohibited them, for a period, from restricting ebook retailers’ ability to set prices. The district court found that the agreement constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act and, in the alternative, unreasonably restrained trade under the rule of reason. The district court issued an injunctive order that, inter alia, prevents Apple from entering into agreements with the Publisher Defendants that restrict its ability to set, alter, or reduce the price of ebooks, and requires Apple to apply the same terms and conditions to ebook applications sold on its devices as it does to other applications. The court concluded that the district court’s decision that Apple orchestrated a horizontal conspiracy among the Publisher Defendants to raise ebook prices is amply supported and well‐reasoned, and that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court also concluded that the district court’s injunction is lawful and consistent with preventing future anticompetitive harms. The court rejected Macmillan and Simon & Schuster's argument that the portion of the injunction related to Apple’s pricing authority either unlawfully modifies their consent decrees or should be judicially estopped. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

After Lehman entered into a Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(A), liquidation, Doral submitted timely claims asserting that it was entitled to recover the profit from a repurchased agreement. The SIPA Trustee denied these claims, concluding that Doral was not a “customer” of Lehman, and therefore was not protected by SIPA. Doral promptly objected to the Trustee’s denial, but shortly thereafter transferred its claims to CarVal. The bankruptcy court affirmed the Trustee's determination that the repos did not make Doral or CarVal a customer under SIPA. The court concluded that an investor who delivers securities to a broker‐dealer as part of a repurchase agreement is not protected by SIPA because the investor did not entrust assets to the broker‐dealer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower courts' determination that CarVal is not a customer for purposes of SIPA. View "CarVal v. Giddens" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Chase, filed a putative class action alleging violations of state and federal overtime laws. The district court denied Chase's motion to compel arbitration. The court affirmed, concluding that the arbitration clause in the employment contracts cover only claims or controversies “required to be arbitrated by the FINRA Rules.” The court agreed with the district court's ruling that it thus incorporated the arbitrability restrictions of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes (FINRA Rules) and the district court's application of the current version of FINRA Rule 13204, which prohibits arbitration of claims brought as putative class or collective actions. View "Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan Chase" on Justia Law