Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a film director, producer, and editor, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a film production company, on its copyright and state-law claims related to the film entitled "Heads Up." At issue was whether a contributor to a creative work whose contributions are inseparable from, and integrated into, the work maintain a copyright interest in his or her contributions alone. Determining that the court had jurisdiction over the merits of the appeal, the court concluded that, on the facts of the present case, the Copyright Actʹs, 17 U.S.C. 102, terms, structure, and history support the conclusion that defendantʹs contributions to the film do not themselves constitute a ʺwork of authorshipʺ amenable to copyright protection. The court concluded that a directorʹs contribution to an integrated ʺwork of authorshipʺ such as a film is not itself a ʺwork of authorshipʺ subject to its own copyright protection. Therefore, defendant did not obtain and does not possess a copyright in his directorial contributions to the finished film. The court agreed with the district court that in this case, plaintiff was the dominant author of the film and concluded that plaintiff owns the copyright in the finished film and its prior versions, including the disputed ʺraw film footage.ʺ Finally, the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that defendant's interference with plaintiff's planned screening and post-screening reception constituted tortious interference under New York law. Rather, the court concluded that the undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in defendantʹs favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions and for the district court to reexamine its award of costs and attorneyʹs fees, and for such other proceedings as are warranted. View "16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin" on Justia Law

The Board appealed the district court's holding that the Board violated the stay-put provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415(j), and awarding reimbursement to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cross-appealed. The court held that the appropriate equitable relief for a stay-put violation is reimbursement or compensatory education (or both) for the full value of services that the educational agency was required to fund, not the (lesser) value of services the parent was able to afford. The court further held that an educational agency’s obligation to maintain stay-put placement is triggered when an administrative due process proceeding is initiated, not when an impasse is reached. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in most respects, but vacated the award of reimbursement and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. East Lyme Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction of enticement and coercion of others to travel in interstate and foreign commerce to engage in sexual activity, forced labor and attempted forced labor, fraud in foreign labor contracting, importation of aliens for immoral purposes, inducement of an alien to illegally enter and reside in the United States, and unlawful employment of aliens. On appeal, defendant principally argued that his right to be present at trial was violated by the district court's refusals to adjourn the trial for more than one day or to grant him a mistrial or a new trial, based on its finding that he had waived that right because he intentionally overdosed on prescription medication and was hospitalized, and that his absence was voluntary. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to proceed with the trial in defendant's absence where the district court weighed defendant's "right to be here if he wanted to be here" and the fact that the proceedings had been completed through the presentation of evidence, closing arguments, and the finalization of the instructions to be given to the jury, as well as the district court's assessment that defendant would have nothing to contribute for the final stages of the district court's delivery of instructions and jury deliberations. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial. The court rejected defendant's claim of prejudicial publicity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Yannai" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims of discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law, 26 N.Y. Exec. Law 296 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as his defamation claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court except with respect to the discrimination claims, as to which there are genuine disputes as to material facts that preclude summary judgment based on plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff submitted evidence that the principal of the school changed the person who conducted plaintiff's year-end evaluation without providing notice to plaintiff, that the principal relied on the 2008-2009 evaluations at issue in isolation, and that the unsatisfactory performance reviews were aberrational. These irregularities, when combined with the principal's alleged remarks, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "Tolbert v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a New York corporation, filed suit attempting to collect money owed to it under defaulted Sub Notes issued by a now-dissolved entity, Hellas. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting defendantsʹ motion to dismiss its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff also argued that the district court erred in failing to grant to it the opportunity to cure any standing defect under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3). The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff has not carried its burden of showing a valid assignment of a claim. Nor has plaintiff pointed to anything in the assignment, or to other evidence in the record, suggesting that title to claims arising under the Sub Notes was assigned to it. Although the court determined that plaintiff did not forfeit its rights under Rule 17, the court concluded that the district courtʹs decision to deny relief under that rule was not an abuse of discretion because neither of the requests made by plaintiff in its effort to cure the standing problem would have been consistent with Rule 17(a)(3). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecommunications" on Justia Law

Defendant, the former CEO and chairman of the board of directors at CUC and former chairman of CUC's successor, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and two counts of making false statements in SEC filings. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. Applying United States v. Owen, the court concluded that the former CUC chief financial officer's testimony did not constitute newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Forbes" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and health care fraud, as well as substantive counts of these offenses, and one count of making false statements. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their roles in a decades-long scheme to defraud the United States Railroad Retirement Board into awarding fraudulent disability annuity payments to Long Island Railroad retirees. The court concluded that the government presented sufficient evidence as to venue, that defendants cannot succeed on a theory that venue was improperly manufactured, and that no “substantial contacts” inquiry is required where (as here) the defendants did not argue to the district court that prosecution in the Southern District of New York caused them hardship, prejudice, or otherwise undermined the fairness of their trial. The court applied the ordinary rule that the receipt of profits from an economically motivated conspiracy (here, disability pension payments) constitutes an overt act in furtherance thereof, and rejected application to this case of the limited exception, articulated in United States v. Grimm. The court rejected defendants’ challenges to the jury instructions and defendants remaining challenges. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rutigliano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who self-identifies as male but was born biologically female, filed suit against defendants, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of sex and retaliated against him for filing an earlier action against them. The district court construed plaintiff’s complaint as stating federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., and related state‐ and city‐law claims. The district court dismissed the complaint based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in determining that plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction over his Title VII claims; plaintiff has stated a federal claim under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq., for the Local’s breach of its duty of fair representation; and therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree robbery, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner alleged that counsel's failure to raise the trial court's refusal to give a requested charge to the jury - that to find petitioner guilty of first-degree robbery by using or threatening the immediate use of a dangerous instrument, it had to find that petitioner actually possessed a dangerous instrument at the time of the crime - was error. The court concluded that counsel's failure to raise that issue and her decision instead to raise weaker issues that were unlikely to succeed fell below prevailing norms of professional conduct; given the weakness of the evidence that petitioner in fact possessed a weapon during the robbery, the instructional error was not harmless, and there is a reasonable probability that, had counsel raised the issue, the state appellate court would have reversed the conviction on the most serious count; and, applying the correct standard, and in light of the evidence at trial and the pattern of the jury’s verdicts, the court concluded that the state courts’ dismissal of petitioner’s claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and that his appellate counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lynch v. Superintendent Dolce" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight male, "out-of-status" aliens who were arrested on immigration charges and detained following the September 11th attacks, filed a putative class action asserting various claims arising out of the discriminatory and punitive treatment they suffered while confined at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) or the Passaic County Jail (Passaic). The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the DOJ defendants, against Hasty with regard to both official and unofficial conditions, and against Sherman with regard to official conditions only, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (2) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an equal protection claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (3) the free exercise claim is dismissed as to all defendants; (4) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Hasty and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (5) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; and (6) the MDC plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any claims against Zenk.  The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought by the Passaic plaintiffs. View "Turkmen v. Hasty, et al." on Justia Law