Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This derivative action arose out of the London Whale trading debacle. Plaintiff, a JPMorgan shareholder, filed suit seeking to compel JPMorgan to take action, up to and including suing the alleged wrongdoers. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that plaintiff had not pleaded facts showing that the JPMorgan Board of Directors had wrongfully refused the demand for action. The court noted that the abuse‐of‐discretion standard of review for the dismissal of derivative action cases should be retired, and that dismissals of derivative actions should be reviewed under the same de novo standard that the court followed in all other similarly situated cases. However, because the court is bound by the rule of the Circuit, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing this derivative action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. Finally, the district court did not err by denying plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. View "Espinoza v. Dimon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, incarcerated for 18 years for a murder he did not commit, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state common law, for damages. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning violations of due process where plaintiff alleged that investigating police officers used unconstitutionally suggestive identification procedures and coerced witnesses. The court concluded, however, that there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning malicious prosecution because no facts in dispute support a lack of probable cause to charge him with the relevant crime. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bermudez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the production of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motions to suppress the searches of his residence and his computer. At issue was whether a search warrant affidavit that relied upon evidence generated by an automated software program provided a substantial basis for a magistrate judge’s conclusion that there was probable cause that child pornography would be found on defendant’s computer. The court held that the affidavit at issue sufficiently established probable cause and that defendant’s motions to suppress were properly denied. Based upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances, there existed sufficient “indicia of reliability” to permit a reasonable person to conclude that probable cause existed in these circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the administration of the internal revenue laws. On appeal, defendant argued that he should have been granted a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence of juror bias. The court reversed the district court's denial of the motion where, in this case, the juror at issue aligned herself with the government, lied pervasively in voir dire for the purpose of avoiding dismissal for cause, believed prior to the presentation of any evidence that the defendants were "'crooks,'" and expressly mentioned defendant as a target of her efforts to persuade the other jurors to convict. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to convict him and that the jury instructions were not erroneous. The remaining claims are moot or without merit. The court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Parse" on Justia Law

Defendant and others were charged with narcotics conspiracy. After the unsealing of the indictment, the others were promptly arrested but federal agents were unable to find defendant until his arrest during a traffic stop 27 months later. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because the pre‐arrest delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court granted defendant's motion and the government appealed. The court concluded that the entire pre‐arrest delay cannot be attributed to the government’s negligence, and defendant did not adequately show prejudice. In this case, the court concluded that the district court misapplied the second and fourth Barker v. Wingo factors, and thereby abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the indictment. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of possessing child pornography. On appeal, the government challenged the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that law enforcement agents exceeded the scope of the warrant when they searched an apartment other than the one approved by the magistrate judge. The court affirmed, concluding that the search of defendant's apartment was not objectively reasonable and that the agents could not have relied on the warrant in good faith. Further, the court held that the benefits of deterring the agentsʹ unlawful conduct outweigh the costs of suppressing the evidence obtained. View "United States v. Bershchansky" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in 2005 and sought to file another such motion in 2014. Petitioner argued that the district court erred in treating his present section 2255 motion as second or successive because, after his first section 2255 motion, the court entered an amended judgment to correct clerical errors in the original judgment, and petitioner's present section 2255 motion is his first such motion since the entry of the corrected judgment. The court concluded that Magwood v. Patterson does not extend judgments amended only to correct clerical errors. The court considered all of petitioner's arguments in support of his contention that his present section 2255 motion should not be considered second or successive and have found them to be without merit. Therefore, the court denied petitioner's motion for a certificate of appealability. Further, construed as a motion for retransfer to the district court, the motion is denied. View "Marmolejos v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Kennedy, alleging that Kennedy’s attempts to collect a debt from plaintiffs violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The district court dismissed the amended complaint. The court concluded that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Kennedy where Kennedy's three purposeful contacts with New York meet the minimum contacts test; Kennedy can easily defend itself in New York; New York has a manifest interest in the suit; and plaintiffs have an interest in adjudicating their case in the state where they reside. In regards to the FDCPA claim, the court concluded that plaintiffs’ alleged obligation to pay the $8,000 balance exists only because of the exchange of nursing home services for money and accordingly constitutes a debt under the FDCPA. However, plaintiffs have failed to allege that Kennedy's debt collection activities are actionable under the FDCPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offices" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 63 months' imprisonment for bank robbery. The court concluded that Application Note 5 to 6 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, not Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), provides the proper standard for applying the enhancement based on a co‐defendant’s conduct. In this case, the district court plainly erred in applying the Section 3C1.2 sentencing enhancement based solely on a finding that defendant reasonably could have foreseen that his co‐defendant would recklessly endanger others while fleeing from the scene of his bank robbery. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. McCrimon" on Justia Law

The Hospital filed an interpleader action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., to resolve competing claims by Barbara Nicholls and Clair Nicholls to certain funds held in the four retirement and pension plans of the late Harold Nicholls. Barbara is Harold's surviving spouse and Claire is Harold's former spouse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Claire because the divorce settlement agreement constitutes a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The court found that the divorce settlement agreement does not constitute a QDRO because the agreement fails to comply with the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C); however, the nunc pro tunc orders constitute valid QDROs that assign funds to Claire from the three retirement and pension plans named in the orders; but because the nunc pro tunc orders do not clearly specify the fourth plan, the orders do not assign funds from that plan to Claire. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Nicholls" on Justia Law