Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Pierce, Colon, and Meregildo appealed their convictions for conspiracy, racketeering, murder, narcotics trafficking, and firearms offenses. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants; the admission into evidence of a rap video and images of tattoos posted on Colon's Facebook page were relevant, their probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and Colon's First Amendment rights were not implicated when the district court admitted evidence from his social media account; the court rejected Colon's claim regarding the constitutionality of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2702-2703, where he possessed the very contents he claims the Act prevented him from obtaining; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving jury instructions the uncalled witness charge and the supplemental instruction regarding the narcotics conspiracy. In regards to Pierce's sentence, the court concluded that the rule of lenity applies because the statute is silent on how Pierce's discharge conviction and possession conviction should be sequenced for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, the court vacated Pierce's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged, on statutory and constitutional grounds, the telephone metadata program under which the NSA collects in bulk "on an ongoing daily basis" the metadata associated with telephone calls made by and to Americans. The NSA aggregates those metadata into a repository or data bank that can later be queried. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs have standing to sue; the court disagreed with the district court insofar as it held that plaintiffs are precluded from bringing suit against the government and hold that they have a right of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702; on the merits, the court concluded that § 215 of the PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, section 215, does not authorize the telephone metadata collection program; the court did not address the constitutionality of the program; and the court declined to conclude that a preliminary injunction is required, leaving it to the district court to reconsider, in the first instance, the propriety of preliminary relief in light of a correct understanding of the governing law. Therefore, the district court erred in ruling that section 215 authorizes the telephone metadata collection program. The telephone metadata program exceeds the scope of what Congress has authorized and therefore violates § 215. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "ACLU v. Clapper" on Justia Law

These appeals stemmed from an opinion and order filed in March 2014 which: (1) granted summary judgment to Pandora on the issue of whether the consent decree governing the licensing activities of ASCAP unambiguously precludes partial withdrawals of public performance licensing rights and (2) set the rate for the Pandora-ASCAP license for the period of January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2015 at 1.85% of revenue. In this case, the partially withdrawn works at issue remain in the ASCAP repertory under the plain language of the consent decree. The court concluded that, since section VI of the decree provides for blanket licenses covering all works contained in the ASCAP repertory, it necessarily follows that the partial withdrawals do not affect the scope of Pandora's license. In regards to rate-setting, the court concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its evaluation of the evidence or in its ultimate determination that a 1.85% rate was reasonable for the duration of the Pandora-ASCAP license. Further, the district court's legal determinations underlying the ultimate conclusion - including its rejection of various alternative benchmarks proffered by ASCAP - were sound. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's orders. View "Pandora Media v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers" on Justia Law

Defendant and his counsel, D&B, (collectively, "petitioners") appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss their petition asserting an interest found in property found subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(2) after defendant's co-defendant was convicted. The district court determined that both parties had standing but that petitioners failed to state any claims for relief. The court concluded that because the government’s forfeiture claim qualifies it as a creditor under New York law, the government has standing to challenge D&B's assignment as a fraudulent conveyance; because the record fails to establish whether the transferor of the contested funds was insolvent at the time of the transfer so as to render D&B’s assignment a fraudulent conveyance, the petitioners have, at this stage in the proceedings, alleged a plausible interest in the property sufficient to create standing to seek an ancillary hearing; because the contested funds are subject to forfeiture as “proceeds” of the co-defendant's criminal activity and therefore only came into existence following the commission of his criminal act, petitioners cannot claim that D&B had a superior interest in those funds at the time of the offense as required by 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A); and because the criminal forfeiture statute limits a third party’s right to challenge a post‐indictment forfeiture order to the two grounds identified in 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), petitioners may not challenge the inclusion of the contested funds in the forfeiture order under § 982(a)(2). The court concluded, however, that because D&B accepted the assignment of the contested funds shortly after a Monsanto hearing in which the district court determined that the government failed to establish probable cause to restrain the contested property, and because the petition alleges no additional facts suggesting that D&B had reason to know that the property was forfeitable as a matter of law, petitioners have plausibly alleged that D&B was a bona fide purchaser reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "United States v. Watts" on Justia Law

Benihana America obtained a preliminary injunction in aid of arbitration of a dispute arising under its license agreement with Benihana of Tokyo, prohibiting Tokyo from: selling unauthorized food items at the restaurant it operates under the license agreement; using certain trademarks in connection with that restaurant in a manner not approved by the license agreement; and arguing to the arbitral panel, if it rules that Tokyo breached the license agreement, that Tokyo should be given additional time to cure any defaults. The Second Circuit affirmed with respect to the menu offering and trademark use injunctions. The court reasonably concluded that each of the relevant factors favored Benihana America. The court reversed the prohibition on arguing to the arbitral panel for an extended cure period. When a dispute is properly before an arbitrator, a court should not interfere with the arbitral process on the ground that, in its view of the merits, a particular remedy would not be warranted. Benihana America may challenge an arbitrator’s decision in court only after it has been issued. It may not subvert its agreement to arbitrate by obtaining an advance judicial determination that there are no grounds for the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. View "Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC" on Justia Law

Sellers was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 26 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Second Circuit remanded for resentencing. Application of the ACCA was error. Sellers’s 2001 state conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance did not qualify as one of the “three previous convictions” necessary to apply the ACCA because he was adjudicated as a youthful offender for that offense under New York law, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The youthful offender designation “set aside” the conviction. View "United States v. Sellers" on Justia Law

Luitpold is a New York corporation that develops and markets drugs and medical devices, including dental implant products. Geistlich, a Swiss corporation that develops and manufactures dental products, now owns the patents and trademarks for the Bio-Oss and Bio-Glide dental products, which are used to aid bone and tissue growth in patients following dental procedures. In 1994,, following failed attempts to market its products in the United States through other companies, Geistlich and Luitpold entered into interdependent commercial and license agreements to establish a distribution relationship for the sale of Geistlich’s dental products throughout the United States and Canada. The parties later entered into additional agreements and amendments. In 2010, Geistlich declared its intent to terminate the distribution relationship, without compensation to Luitpold, as of 2011. Geistlich did not allege breach of the agreements, but declared that the agreements had been in effect for a “reasonable” time and that under New York law, Geistlich could unilaterally terminate them upon reasonable notice. Luitpold sought declaratory relief, specific performance, damages, and prejudgment attachment of Geistlich patents and trademarks. The district court rejected all claims. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that material issues of fact precluded dismissal or summary judgment on certain claims. View "Luitpold Pharm., Inc. v. Ed. Geistlich Sohne A.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are individuals and entities that purchased shares in the Kingate funds and continued to hold their shares until the 2008 exposure of the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, resulting in loss most of the funds’ assets. A purported class action was filed against persons and entities affiliated with the funds. The district court dismissed, citing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 112 Stat. 3227, which bars certain state‐law‐based class actions alleging falsity in connection with transactions in six categories of “covered securities.” The Second Circuit vacated, noting the Supreme Court’s intervening ruling in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, (2014). The alleged fraud in this case is “in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security” and brings the case within SLUSA’s prohibition (assuming SLUSA’s 12 other elements are met). The state law claims that do not depend on false conduct are not within the scope of SLUSA, even if the complaint includes peripheral, inessential mentions of false conduct. Claims accusing the defendant of complicity in the false conduct that gives rise to liability are subject to SLUSA’s prohibition, while claims of false conduct in which the defendant is not alleged to have had any complicity are not. View "In re: Kingate Mgmt. Ltd. Litig." on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has regulatory authority over interstate aspects of the nation’s electric power system, but not over “facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” 16 U.S.C. 824(a). FERC entered orders adopting standards and procedures for determining which power distribution facilities are subject to the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction and which facilities fall within the statutory exception for local distribution of electric energy. The state and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York challenged the standards and procedures as an unreasonable interpretation of the agency’s statutory grant of jurisdiction and as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Second Circuit upheld the orders as reasonably interpreting the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act as amended by the Electricity Modernization Act of 2005 and supported by sufficient explanation and substantial evidence as required by the Administrative Procedure Act. View "New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Greathouse filed a retaliation claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3), 216, alleging that when he orally complained to his supervisor (Wilcox) that he had not received the pay he was due as a security guard, Wilcox responded, “I’ll pay you when I feel like it,” and, without warning, drew a gun and pointed it at Greathouse. Greathous understood that response as ending his employment. Greathouse obtained a default judgment, but the district court declined to award damages, based on precedent holding that making an informal oral complaint to a supervisor did not amount to “fil[ing a] complaint” and was not protected by the statute. The Second Circuit vacated, based on the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Kasten v. Saint‐Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., that an oral complaint can serve as a predicate to an FLSA retaliation claim. View "Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc." on Justia Law