Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Indemnity Insurance Company of North America ("Indemnity") and Unitrans International Corporation ("Unitrans"). Indemnity, as the insurer of Amgen, a pharmaceutical company, paid for the loss of a pallet of pharmaceutical drugs that was damaged while being unloaded from a truck at an airport. The pallet was being transported from Amgen's facility in Dublin, Ireland to Philadelphia, and Unitrans, a logistics company, had been engaged to arrange the transportation. Indemnity, as Amgen's subrogee, sued Unitrans for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of bailment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted Unitrans's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Unitrans qualified as a contracting carrier under the Montreal Convention, and therefore, Indemnity's action was time-barred by the Convention's statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that contracting carriers are subject to the Montreal Convention, but found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Unitrans was a contracting carrier. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that a contracting carrier, as defined by Article 39 of the Montreal Convention, is a person that, as a principal, makes a contract of carriage governed by the Montreal Convention with a consignor, and an actual carrier performs the whole or part of the carriage by virtue of authority from the contracting carrier. The court found that there was enough evidence cutting both ways to create a genuine question as to whether Unitrans qualifies as a contracting carrier. View "Indemnity Inssurance Co. of North America v. Unitrans International Corp." on Justia Law

In this case handled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiff, Alexis Marquez, an attorney who represented herself, claimed that an Acting New York State Supreme Court Justice harassed her and subjected her to inappropriate behavior during her service as his court attorney. Marquez challenged two interlocutory rulings that dismissed the complaint as to one defendant and denied reconsideration. However, the district court dismissed the case as a penalty for Marquez's failure to comply with discovery orders, which Marquez did not challenge in this appeal.The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Marquez's challenge to the interlocutory orders as it was not an appeal from a final decision of the district court. The Court explained that the merger rule, which allows an interlocutory order to merge into the final judgment, does not apply when a district court enters a dismissal as a sanction. If Marquez successfully challenges the sanction dismissal, she would then have the opportunity to challenge the interlocutory orders as part of any appeal from a final judgment on the merits. In this situation, however, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Marquez v. Silver" on Justia Law

Elaine Bart, a former supermarket manager, brought a lawsuit against her former employer, Golub Corporation, alleging gender discrimination under Title VII and state law. She was fired for falsifying food logs, a violation she admitted to but argued was not the sole reason for her termination. Bart claimed that her supervisor made several remarks indicating that women were not fit for managerial roles, suggesting a gender bias.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment to Golub, reasoning that Bart's admission of the violation, which was the company's stated reason for her termination, resolved the pretext inquiry, defeating her claims. Bart appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's ruling. The Appeals Court held that a plaintiff need not necessarily show at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test that the employer’s stated justification for its adverse action was a pretext for discrimination. A plaintiff may also satisfy this burden by providing evidence that even if the employer had mixed motives, the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class was at least one motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action. Given Bart's testimony about her supervisor's remarks indicating gender bias, the court concluded that Bart met this burden, thus precluding summary judgment.Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Bart v. Golub Corp." on Justia Law

The case was a lawsuit filed by Janet and Joseph Harvey against the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations. The Harveys alleged that they were harmed by faulty renovations at the Mission's headquarters, which is located next door to their home in Manhattan. The Mission sought to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court, however, denied the Mission's motion to dismiss, holding that two exceptions to the Mission's immunity applied: the commercial activity exception and the tortious activity exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Appeals Court held that the commercial activity exception applied because the Harveys' claims were based upon the Mission's allegedly faulty contractual renovations, which is an activity that a private party can, and often does, do. The court did not need to address the tortious activity exception as the commercial activity exception was sufficient to affirm the district court's decision. The Mission, therefore, was not immune from the lawsuit under the FSIA. View "Harvey v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone" on Justia Law

The case in question involves a defendant, Saba Rosario Ventura, who was initially detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after the District Court ordered his release on bail pending his criminal trial. The District Court later dismissed the indictment against Ventura, arguing that ICE had detained him in bad faith, aiming to circumvent the bail order. The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which previously remanded the case to the District Court to clarify whether it had found that ICE's detention of Ventura was a direct violation of a federal court order releasing him under the Bail Reform Act.On remand, the District Court reasserted its claim that ICE's detention of Ventura was pretextual and in bad faith, not for removal, but to detain him pending his criminal trial. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no substantial evidence to support the District Court's assertion. The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court's finding was based on legal arguments rather than factual evidence. It also noted that, even if ICE disagreed with the District Court's assessment of Ventura's risk of flight, it was not enough to prove that ICE's detention was pretextual.The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the District Court's orders, concluding that the finding of ICE's pretextual and bad faith detention of Ventura was clearly erroneous, given the lack of factual evidence. View "United States v. Ventura" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the appellant, Brittany Jones, claimed she was sexually abused by a teacher between 2009 and 2011, when she was a high school student. She brought her claims under the Child Victims Act (CVA) of New York, which revived time-barred claims of child sexual abuse victims, and provided a two-year window from August 14, 2019 to August 14, 2021 for the filing of such claims. However, Jones filed her suit four months before the commencement of this window. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York, in a summary judgment, ruled in favor of the school district, holding that Jones's premature filing created a valid statute-of-limitations defense for the school district.This decision was appealed and the key question before the appellate court was whether the six-month waiting period created by the CVA was a statute of limitations. The appellate court concluded that neither the text of the CVA nor any precedent from New York courts provided clear guidance on this issue. Given the significant state policy interests implicated by the CVA, the appellate court decided to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether the six-month waiting period for claims under the CVA establishes a statute of limitations, a condition precedent to bringing suit, or some other affirmative defense. The court reserved its decision on the appeal pending the response from the New York Court of Appeals. View "Jones v. Cattaraugus-Little Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

The plaintiff-Appellant, Kristen King, claimed that her employer, Aramark Services Inc., subjected her to a sex-based hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed King’s claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision on the New York State Human Rights Law claims but vacated the decision on the Title VII claims.The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that the impact of Aramark’s alleged discriminatory acts were only incidentally felt in New York. Regarding the Title VII hostile work environment claim, the court found that King’s termination was not only a discrete act supporting a distinct claim for damages, but also part of the pattern of discriminatory conduct that comprises her hostile environment claim. The court held that because King’s termination occurred within the limitations period, the continuing violation doctrine rendered King’s hostile work environment claim timely. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of King’s New York State Human Rights Law claims but vacated the dismissal of King’s Title VII claims and remanded the case for further proceedings on those claims. View "King v. Aramark Services Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard an appeal by Christopher Callahan against a judgment by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The district court had granted summary judgment to Suffolk County Police Officer Thomas Wilson and the County of Suffolk on claims related to the death of Callahan's brother, Kevin Callahan, which Callahan argued violated excessive force regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The appellate court ruled that the district court violated the mandate rule by not conducting a new trial as earlier instructed by the appellate court. The court found that there were disputed issues of material fact regarding Wilson's entitlement to qualified immunity, thus summary judgment was not warranted. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of Callahan's motion to amend his complaint to add a state law claim for battery. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Callahan v. County of Suffolk" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard an appeal involving Timothy Daileader, the independent director and manager of an affiliated group of companies, collectively known as "Oaktree," which were in financial distress. Daileader was seeking coverage from his insurer, Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London Syndicate 1861 (Syndicate 1861), for his defense in litigation involving Oaktree. However, Syndicate 1861 denied Daileader’s insurance claim. Daileader subsequently sought a preliminary injunction to enforce Syndicate 1861’s duty to defend. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Daileader’s motion, and Daileader appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daileader's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that Daileader had not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. The court also found that Daileader had not made a strong showing of irreparable harm. The court concluded that the Syndicate's refusal to continue paying under its policy did not disrupt the status quo of ongoing payments between the two parties. Therefore, the court determined that Daileader's desired injunction was mandatory and not prohibitory, thus subject to a more stringent standard for relief. View "Daileader v. Certain Underwriters" on Justia Law

The case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit between Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the plaintiff-appellant, against Novartis Pharma AG and associates, the defendants-appellees. Regeneron appealed the judgment from the district court which dismissed its claims of antitrust violations and tortious interference with contract under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).Regeneron and Novartis both manufacture medications to treat overproduction of a specific protein. The crux of the dispute was whether the medications, which come in vials and prefilled syringes (PFSs), compete in the same or in different product markets. Regeneron claimed that Novartis and its co-defendant Vetter Pharma International GmbH concealed their collaboration to produce a PFS version of Novartis’s drug, thereby delaying the launch of Regeneron's own PFS version and allowing Novartis to increase its market share.The district court had granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Regeneron failed to plausibly allege that the relevant antitrust market was limited to PFSs. The court also dismissed Regeneron’s tortious interference claim as untimely.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Regeneron had provided a plausible explanation that the market for PFSs was distinct from that for vials. It also held that Regeneron adequately pleaded that Novartis was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense to the tortious interference claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG" on Justia Law