Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The plaintiff, Detrina Solomon, a subscriber to a digital video streaming service operated by Flipps Media, Inc. (doing business as FITE), alleged that her rights under the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) were violated when FITE disclosed her streaming history to Facebook (now Meta Platforms, Inc.). The disclosed information included the titles and URLs of the videos she watched and her Facebook ID (FID), which is linked to her Facebook profile.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Solomon's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that she failed to plausibly allege that FITE disclosed her personally identifiable information as defined by the VPPA. The district court also denied her leave to amend the complaint, noting that she had multiple opportunities to propose amendments but did not do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court adopted the "ordinary person" standard, which holds that personally identifiable information under the VPPA includes information that would allow an ordinary person to identify a consumer's video-watching habits. The court concluded that the information disclosed by FITE, consisting of video titles and FIDs, did not meet this standard because an ordinary person would not be able to use this information to identify Solomon's video-watching habits without additional effort or technological expertise.The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend, as Solomon's request was made only in a footnote and lacked any proposed amendments to address the deficiencies in her complaint. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Solomon v. Flipps Media, Inc." on Justia Law

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AMTAX Holdings 227, LLC ("AMTAX") filed a lawsuit against CohnReznick LLP ("CohnReznick") in federal court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, unjust enrichment, and fraud. The dispute arose from CohnReznick's calculation of a purchase price for a property under a right of first refusal agreement, which AMTAX claimed excluded exit taxes required by Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code. AMTAX argued that this exclusion violated the agreement and federal law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed AMTAX's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court applied the Grable-Gunn test to determine whether the state-law claims presented a substantial federal issue that would warrant federal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that AMTAX's claims did not meet the criteria for federal question jurisdiction, as they did not necessarily raise a substantial federal issue and allowing federal jurisdiction would disrupt the federal-state balance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's application of the Grable-Gunn test, finding that AMTAX's claims were primarily based on contract interpretation rather than federal tax law. The court held that the federal issue was not substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction and that exercising jurisdiction would disrupt the balance of state and federal judicial responsibilities. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "AMTAX Holdings 227, LLC v. CohnReznick LLP" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Board of Trustees of a multiemployer pension plan primarily benefitting unionized bakery drivers in New York City, which applied for Special Financial Assistance (SFA) in 2022. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) denied the application, citing the plan's termination in 2016 as a disqualifying factor. The Fund, asserting it was in "critical and declining status," sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the PBGC, agreeing that the plan's termination made it ineligible for SFA. The court also concluded that a terminated plan could not be restored under ERISA, thus affirming the PBGC's denial of the Fund's application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the SFA statute does not exclude plans based solely on a prior termination. The court found that the statute's reference to "critical and declining status" incorporates the definition from 29 U.S.C. § 1085(b)(6) without importing limitations from other sections. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for the Fund, vacate the PBGC's denial of the SFA application, and remand to the PBGC for reconsideration. View "Bd. of Trs. of the Bakery Drivers Loc. 550 v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation" on Justia Law

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In spring 2020, Czigany Beck, a full-time student at Manhattan College, paid tuition and a comprehensive fee for the semester. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the college transitioned to remote learning in March 2020, and Beck received only 46% of her education in person. Beck filed a class action lawsuit against Manhattan College, claiming breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment for not refunding a portion of her tuition and fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Beck's claims. The court found that the college's statements were not specific enough to constitute a promise for in-person classes or access to on-campus facilities. The court also ruled that the comprehensive fee was nonrefundable based on the college's terms, and thus Beck's unjust enrichment claim for fees was barred. The court granted summary judgment to Manhattan College on Beck's remaining unjust enrichment claim for tuition, concluding that the college's switch to online instruction was reasonable given the pandemic.Beck appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court's judgment should be reversed based on the decision in Rynasko v. New York University. Manhattan College countered with decisions from the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division, which supported affirming the district court's judgment. The Second Circuit identified a split between federal and state courts on New York contract-law principles and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether New York law requires a specific promise to provide exclusively in-person learning to form an implied contract between a university and its students regarding tuition payments. The Second Circuit reserved decision on Beck's appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Beck v. Manhattan College" on Justia Law

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In 2019, Xin “Chris” Gu, a protégé of Qing Ming “Allen” Yu, was shot and killed. Yu, angered by Gu's departure from his company and subsequent competition, conspired with Zhe Zhang and others to murder Gu. Yu promised Zhang business connections in exchange for his participation in the murder. Zhang, along with other conspirators, planned and executed the murder, with Zhang acting as the getaway driver. Both Yu and Zhang were charged with conspiracy to commit murder for hire and murder for hire under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicted both defendants on both counts and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The defendants appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of an agreement involving pecuniary value, a mid-trial change in the government's theory, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, and an erroneous interpretation of the mandatory minimum sentence under section 1958(a).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the promise of business connections constituted something of pecuniary value, thus supporting the jury's finding of guilt. The court found no basis in precedent for the defendants' claim of a due-process right against surprise by the government's theory. The court also determined that the withheld evidence was not material and did not prejudice the defendants. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that section 1958(a) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the convictions and life sentences of both defendants. View "United States v. Zhang" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Ms. Shela Linton participated in a sit-in protest at the Vermont statehouse on January 8, 2015, against the governor's perceived lack of support for universal healthcare. When the statehouse closed at 8 p.m., law enforcement warned the demonstrators to leave or face arrest. Linton and others remained, linking arms and singing. During her arrest, Sergeant Jacob Zorn used a "rear wristlock" pain compliance technique, causing Linton to cry out in pain and suffer permanent injuries to her left wrist and shoulder. Linton later alleged that she was diagnosed with PTSD, depression, and anxiety due to the incident.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont granted summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Zorn, concluding that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that no clearly established law put Zorn on notice that his actions might violate Linton's Fourth Amendment rights. Linton appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its interpretation of relevant case law and failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the case Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford clearly established that the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques on a passively resisting protestor constitutes excessive force. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the degree of Linton's resistance and the appropriateness of Zorn's use of force. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve these factual disputes. View "Linton v. Zorn" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Rights
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Neysha Cruz, on behalf of her son O.F., filed a lawsuit against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Cruz rejected the DOE's education plan for O.F., who has multiple disabilities, and sought reimbursement for his private school tuition. Cruz argued that the DOE's placement of O.F. in a twelve-student classroom violated a New York regulation requiring students with highly intensive management needs to be placed in classes of six or fewer students. The DOE acknowledged the regulation but argued that another regulation allowing a maximum of twelve students for those with severe multiple disabilities also applied, giving them discretion in class size placement.An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) initially found that the DOE offered O.F. a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) but that the recommended school could not implement the IEP due to scheduling issues. The IHO ordered partial reimbursement for private tuition. The State Review Officer (SRO) reversed the IHO's finding on the school's ability to implement the IEP and concluded that the DOE provided a FAPE, thus denying reimbursement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the SRO's decision, agreeing that the DOE could choose between the two class size regulations. Cruz appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit found that the case hinged on interpreting New York's education regulations and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals. The court sought clarification on whether the DOE must satisfy both class size regulations or if it can choose between them when both apply to a student. The Second Circuit retained jurisdiction pending the state court's response. View "Cruz v. Banks" on Justia Law

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Darrell Robinson was convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), after law enforcement officers found six firearms in his vehicle during a search. Robinson pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 50 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The district court also imposed a special condition of supervised release that allowed for the search of Robinson’s electronic devices upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of a condition of supervision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) without modification and imposed the special search condition as recommended in the PSR. Robinson did not object to the PSR or the special condition during sentencing but later moved to correct the judgment, arguing that the electronic search condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing. The district court denied the motion, finding that it had met its obligation by referencing the PSR.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Robinson’s appeal, where he argued that the electronic search condition was not orally pronounced, was procedurally unreasonable, and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that the district court’s reference to the PSR was sufficient to impose the special condition, and the need for the condition was self-evident given Robinson’s extensive criminal history and dishonesty with law enforcement. The court also held that the condition, which required reasonable suspicion, did not violate Robinson’s Fourth Amendment rights due to his diminished expectation of privacy while on supervised release.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the special condition of supervised release allowing for the search of Robinson’s electronic devices. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

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The case involves Salifou Conde, who was convicted of wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit both frauds. The fraudulent activities were related to the theft of rent assistance checks from New York City's Human Resources Administration (HRA). These checks, intended for qualifying individuals' landlords, were often returned as undeliverable and subsequently misappropriated by Conde and his co-conspirators. The fraudulent checks were deposited into various bank accounts, including Conde's, and used to pay for services such as cable and internet.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Conde was found guilty on all counts following a jury trial. He was sentenced to 55 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. The evidence against him included bank records, ATM surveillance footage, and an electronically generated record from a telecommunication company showing payments for services linked to the fraudulent bank accounts.Conde appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the telecommunication company's record was improperly admitted as a self-authenticating business record, violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The appellate court reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion and found no error. The court held that the record was admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 902(11) as a business record, and its admission did not violate Conde's confrontation rights. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Conde" on Justia Law

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Mirsad Kandic, a legal permanent resident of the United States, relocated to Syria in 2013 to serve as a foreign fighter for ISIS. He later moved to Turkey, where he became a recruiter and emir for ISIS media, using social media to spread propaganda and assist recruits. Kandic also ran an online weapons market, smuggled money into Syria, created false passports, and provided intelligence to ISIS leadership. He recruited Jake Bilardi, an Australian teenager, who later became a suicide bomber, resulting in over 30 deaths. Kandic was arrested in Sarajevo in 2017 and extradited to the Eastern District of New York.A grand jury indicted Kandic on six counts, including conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS and substantive violations of providing material support. The district court denied Kandic's motion to dismiss the conspiracy count, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. The jury also found that the conspiracy resulted in the death of Jake Bilardi and other individuals. Kandic was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment and four concurrent terms of 20 years' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Kandic argued that the conspiracy count was impermissibly duplicitous, the remaining counts were multiplicitous, and the district court abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence. The Second Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that the conspiracy count was not impermissibly duplicitous because the jury was properly instructed on unanimity and the special verdict sheet ensured a unanimous verdict. The court also found that the remaining counts were not multiplicitous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the hearsay evidence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "U.S. v. Kandic" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law