Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Minority shareholders of an Argentine oil and gas company, previously privatized in 1993, became involved in litigation after the Argentine government expropriated a majority stake in the company in 2012. The government’s acquisition of shares was conducted without making a public tender offer to minority shareholders, a process that was explicitly required by the company’s bylaws to protect such shareholders in the event of a takeover. The plaintiffs, consisting of Spanish entities and a New York hedge fund, had acquired significant stakes in the company, and after the expropriation, they claimed that they suffered substantial financial losses due to the government’s failure to comply with the tender offer requirement.The plaintiffs sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims under Argentine law against both the Argentine Republic and the company. After extensive litigation, the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims against the Argentine Republic, awarding over $16 billion in damages, but granted summary judgment to the company, finding it had no obligation to enforce the tender offer provision. The court also dismissed the promissory estoppel claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' breach of contract damages claims against the Argentine Republic and the company were not cognizable under Argentine law, reasoning that the bylaws did not create enforceable bilateral obligations between shareholders and that Argentine public law governing expropriation precluded such claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the promissory estoppel claims and judgment in favor of the company, but reversed the judgment against the Argentine Republic, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Petersen Energía v. Argentine Republic" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner challenged the calculation of his earned time credits under the First Step Act by the Bureau of Prisons, arguing that the Bureau’s failure to properly apply these credits prevented his timely transfer from prison to prerelease custody. While the petition was pending, the prisoner was transferred to a residential reentry center, a form of prerelease custody, though he still had a significant number of unused credits. The Bureau had already used some credits to move up the start date of his supervised release, but the remaining credits were not applied.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut determined that, although his original request for transfer to prerelease custody was moot, the petition should be construed more broadly as requesting application of remaining time credits to reduce the length of his supervised release. The district court concluded that the First Step Act required such credits to be used to shorten the prisoner’s supervised release and ordered the Bureau of Prisons to calculate and communicate the remaining credits for that purpose.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the relevant statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C), allows earned time credits only to accelerate a prisoner’s move from incarceration to prerelease custody or to an earlier start of supervised release, but not to reduce the length of a term of supervised release itself. The court found that, once the prisoner was transferred to prerelease custody and his credits were applied to start supervised release early, his petition became moot. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. View "Rivera-Perez v. Stover" on Justia Law

The trustees of an ERISA-regulated pension plan invested in six classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). Three of these investments were in notes issued by Delaware statutory trusts via indenture agreements, while the other three were in regular-interest certificates issued by trusts governed under New York law and classified as REMICs for tax purposes. The trustees alleged that the mortgage servicers mismanaged the loans and engaged in self-dealing, violating ERISA fiduciary duties. They also claimed that Wells Fargo, as master servicer for some trusts, failed to adequately supervise Ocwen (another servicer) and failed to pursue litigation on behalf of the trusts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding that, under the Department of Labor’s regulation, only the RMBSs themselves—not the underlying mortgages—were plan assets for ERISA purposes. The court determined that both the notes and the regular-interest certificates were treated as indebtedness without substantial equity features, so the look-through exception did not apply. The trustees’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court agreed that the notes issued by the indenture trusts lacked substantial equity features and thus the underlying mortgages were not plan assets. However, it held that the regular-interest certificates represented beneficial interests in the REMIC trusts; under the controlling regulation, the assets of such a trust in which a plan holds a beneficial interest are themselves plan assets. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Ocwen acted as an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the mortgages underlying the REMIC trusts. View "Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine based on his role as a supplier to a lower-level dealer operating in Sunset Park, Brooklyn. The prosecution established that, beginning in late 2013 or early 2014, the defendant supplied large quantities of cocaine and heroin to his co-conspirator, knowing and assisting as the cocaine was converted into crack for resale. Law enforcement began investigating the operation in 2014, conducting controlled purchases and making several arrests of individuals involved in the conspiracy. The defendant was ultimately linked to the conspiracy through surveillance, witness testimony, text messages, and physical evidence such as drug ledgers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York presided over the trial, where the jury found the defendant guilty of conspiring to distribute at least 280 grams of crack cocaine, but acquitted him of involvement with larger quantities of heroin and powder cocaine. The court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. At sentencing, the court calculated a sentencing range of life imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines but imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. The judgement included standard conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, the district court’s jury instructions were proper, and the sentence imposed was reasonable. However, the Second Circuit found that the district court erred by imposing standard conditions of supervised release without properly notifying the defendant at sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence, vacated the standard conditions of supervised release, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "United States v. Fabian" on Justia Law

Two lender plaintiffs provided a large loan to several special purpose entities (“Borrowers”) under a Loan and Security Agreement, which secured the loan with the Borrowers’ assets. The ultimate parent companies of the Borrowers (“Guarantors”) guaranteed repayment of the loan but did not pledge any of their own assets as collateral. After the lenders received information suggesting the Borrowers’ collateral was insufficient or encumbered, they accelerated the loan and demanded immediate payment of over $609 million. When neither the Borrowers nor the Guarantors could pay, the lenders filed suit for breach of contract and requested a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to freeze the assets of both the Borrowers and the Guarantors, expressing concern that these assets would be dissipated before a judgment could be enforced.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the injunction, including against the Guarantors’ assets. The Guarantors and related parties argued that, under Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., the District Court lacked authority to freeze their assets because the plaintiffs had no lien or equitable interest in them. The District Court found Grupo Mexicano distinguishable and declined to modify the injunction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the lenders did not have a lien or equitable interest in the Guarantors’ assets, as their claim was for contract damages and not for relief giving rise to an equitable interest in specific property. The court concluded that Grupo Mexicano precluded the freezing of the Guarantors’ assets under these circumstances. The Second Circuit vacated the portion of the District Court’s preliminary injunction restraining the Guarantors’ assets and remanded for further proceedings. The court made no ruling regarding the Borrowers’ assets, as that part of the injunction was not challenged. View "Leadenhall Capital Partners LLP v. Advantage Capital Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2024, a plaintiff filed suit against three individuals, alleging that they sexually assaulted her in 2012. She brought her claims under New York City’s Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGMVPL), which, as amended in 2022, created a two-year window (from March 2023 to March 2025) for victims of sexual and gender-based violence to revive and pursue civil claims that would otherwise be time-barred. The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that the VGMVPL’s revival window was preempted by earlier state statutes—the Child Victims Act (CVA) and the Adult Survivors Act (ASA)—which had established shorter, earlier revival periods for similar claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York agreed with the defendants, holding that the state laws preempted the VGMVPL’s revival window. The district court concluded both that the CVA and ASA conflicted with the city law and that the state legislature intended to occupy the field of revival windows for such claims, rendering the city’s extension invalid. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the question of whether the city’s VGMVPL revival window is preempted by the state’s CVA and ASA raises significant issues of New York law, particularly regarding home rule principles and state-local government relations. Recognizing a lack of controlling precedent from the New York Court of Appeals and the importance of the issue, the Second Circuit deferred its decision and certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether the VGMVPL’s two-year revival window for civil claims is preempted by the CVA and ASA’s earlier revival periods. The decision on the merits is reserved pending guidance from the state’s highest court. View "Parker v. Alexander" on Justia Law

A pretrial detainee in the custody of the Vermont Department of Corrections alleged that a corrections officer sexually abused him during a purported search for contraband. The detainee asserted that while he was participating in a medication-assisted treatment program at the correctional facility, the officer grabbed, squeezed, and twisted his genitals after checking his mouth for medication, causing injury. The detainee’s version of events was supported by his own testimony and statements from other detainees who witnessed the incident. He filed administrative grievances and was interviewed by an investigator, who ultimately found the complaint unfounded, but the detainee was cleared of any disciplinary infraction.After his release, the detainee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, asserting claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as state law. The District Court granted summary judgment to the officer on some claims but denied summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment sexual abuse claim and a related state-law battery claim, concluding that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable jury could find a constitutional violation based on the detainee’s account.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed only the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that, for sexual abuse claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, the proper standard is whether the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable—not whether it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court determined that, accepting the detainee’s version, the officer’s actions violated clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court affirmed the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity, dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Russell v. Scott" on Justia Law

The plaintiff in this case, while serving a prison sentence, was diagnosed with a serious mental illness. After a period of stability on prescribed antipsychotic medication, his psychiatrist at a correctional facility discontinued the medication upon his refusal and assertion that he did not need it. Over the following weeks, the plaintiff’s mental health deteriorated. He became involved in an altercation with correctional staff, was placed in segregated housing (the Special Housing Unit or SHU), and subsequently subject to further disciplinary housing (“keeplock”). During this time, he experienced hallucinations and anxiety, though he did not report these symptoms to staff. Shortly after his release from custody, the plaintiff, while still suffering from psychosis, committed a violent assault on a family member.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, including employees of the Department of Corrections and the Office of Mental Health, finding no triable issue of fact regarding whether defendants were subjectively aware of or disregarded a serious risk to the plaintiff’s health. The District Court reasoned that, because he did not affirmatively report his hallucinations, the defendants lacked the requisite knowledge for Eighth Amendment liability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether each defendant knew of a serious risk to the plaintiff’s health and whether they disregarded that risk by their actions or inaction. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on both the conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care claims under the Eighth Amendment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Suarez v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

A woman was arrested by New York City police officers after they responded to a 911 call reporting an assault in progress related to a domestic dispute in Flushing, New York. Upon arrival, the officers spoke with the alleged victim’s son, who showed them injuries on his father’s arm and indicated that the woman had caused them by striking him with an umbrella. The father, standing beside his son, pointed to his injuries and demonstrated how the assault occurred. The officers photographed the injuries, and the woman was subsequently charged with assault and harassment. These charges were later dismissed.The woman then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including false arrest, as well as state constitutional claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on all claims except for the false arrest claim. The court denied qualified immunity to the officers on this claim, finding disputed issues of material fact regarding whether there was probable cause to arrest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. The appellate court held that the district court erred, concluding that, when viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest based on corroborated evidence: the 911 call, physical injuries, and the victim’s demonstration of the assault. The appellate court clarified that police are not required to assess the credibility of domestic violence victims more skeptically than other witnesses simply due to the familial context. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to the officers on the false arrest claim. View "Jin v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Sri Lanka, sought protection in the United States, claiming he would face persecution and torture if returned. His testimony before the immigration judge described being forcibly detained by members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a designated terrorist group, and compelled under threat to provide translation services during interrogations. After escaping LTTE custody, he was detained and allegedly beaten by the Sri Lankan army, then relocated within Sri Lanka before ultimately coming to the United States. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all relief, finding that the petitioner provided material support to the LTTE by translating during interrogations, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding. The IJ determined his asylum application was untimely, found his claims of past persecution and fear of future harm insufficiently corroborated, and concluded he had not established entitlement to relief under CAT due to lack of evidence and his ability to relocate safely within Sri Lanka. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s denial based on the material support bar, dismissing his claims for asylum and withholding without addressing their merits, but upheld the IJ’s denial of deferral of removal under CAT on substantive grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the BIA erred by not determining whether the petitioner would be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal under the INA if the material support bar did not apply, as such a determination is necessary for the petitioner to seek a waiver from the Department of Homeland Security. The court granted the petition in part and remanded to the BIA for this determination, while denying review of the agency’s denial of withholding or deferral of removal under CAT. View "Sufiyan v. Bondi" on Justia Law