Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case being summarized involves two subclasses of current and former tipped employees at two New York City restaurants, who filed suit against the restaurants and their owners for violations of the New York Labor Law (NYLL) and the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Prior to the trial, the parties agreed to present only the NYLL claims to the jury. The defendants appealed the partial final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ NYLL claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that because the plaintiffs’ federal claims were never formally dismissed, and the partial final judgment did not contain a disposition as to the federal claims, the matter had to be remanded to the district court. The purpose of the remand was to allow the district court to clarify the record as to the status of the FLSA claims. The court concluded that the lack of clarity concerning the FLSA claims impaired its ability to review the defendants’ challenges, leading to questions about the validity of the district court’s judgment certifying the appeal. The mandate was issued forthwith, with jurisdiction restored to the panel without the need for a new notice of appeal if, within thirty days, either party informed the court by letter that the district court had supplemented the record to clarify the status of the FLSA claims. View "Zivkovic v. Laura Christy LLC" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Defendant-Appellant Kevin Delvalle appealed his sentence, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary as he believed he would receive a sentence below the Guidelines range. Delvalle had pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to conspiracy to distribute and possess crack cocaine. The district court imposed a 420-month sentence, within the Guidelines range stipulated in the plea agreement. On appeal, Delvalle contended that he expected to receive a lesser sentence than he ultimately received.The Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendant, stating that during the plea colloquy, the lower court had confirmed that Delvalle had not been promised any particular sentence, and that he understood that a below-Guidelines sentence was only a possibility, not a guarantee. The court held that a defendant's guilty plea is not rendered involuntary simply because he subjectively expected to receive a lower sentence than he ultimately did. It also emphasized that a defendant's guilty plea is not involuntary merely because he has a mistaken expectation of what his sentence will be, even if this expectation is based on his lawyer’s erroneous prediction about the sentence. Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Delvalle" on Justia Law

The case originates from an Application for Judicial Assistance under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 by Frasers Group PLC ("Frasers"), a British retailer group. Frasers requested to obtain documentary and testimonial evidence from James Patrick Gorman, the former CEO of Morgan Stanley, for use in a lawsuit started in the UK. The district court denied the application, and Frasers appealed this decision.The dispute revolves around a series of transactions Frasers entered into with Saxo Bank A/S related to shares of the fashion company Hugo Boss. Concurrently, Saxo Bank engaged in trades with Morgan Stanley & Co. International PLC, a subsidiary of Morgan Stanley. A margin call was issued by Morgan Stanley, leading to a dispute and the commencement of the lawsuit in the UK.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The court considered the factors established by the Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., which guide district courts when determining whether to grant domestic discovery for use in foreign proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). The court found that the first factor—whether “the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding”— and the fourth factor—whether the discovery request is “unduly intrusive or burdensome”— weighed against granting the Application. Consequently, the court upheld the denial of the Application. View "FRASERS GROUP PLC v. MORGAN STANLEY" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the plaintiff, Cindy L. Moll, who made allegations of gender-based discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer of her job site, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of her employment against her former employer, Telesector Resources Group Inc., in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State Human Rights Law. She also claimed she was paid less than her male co-workers for similar work, violating Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated parts of the district court's judgment and remanded for trial.Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case. The Court of Appeals noted the district court's failure to take all the circumstances into account and to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.In relation to the retaliatory transfer claim, the Court of Appeals held that the district court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the transfer of the plaintiff's job site to Syracuse was not an adverse employment action and found that the district court ignored evidence that could support a finding of causation.As for the discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment claim, the Court of Appeals found that the district court did not adhere to the summary judgment principles. It concluded that the record revealed genuine issues as to all of the elements of the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's decision to transfer her job site to Syracuse violated Title VII's prohibition against retaliation.Finally, concerning the Equal Pay Act claim, the Court of Appeals held that there were genuine issues of material fact to be tried. It pointed out that the district court failed to adequately account for the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of some of the plaintiff's other claims but vacated the judgment as to the claims of hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer, discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment, and the Equal Pay Act claim as to one of the plaintiff's identified comparators. The case was remanded for trial. View "Moll v. Telesector" on Justia Law

In this case, plaintiff-appellant John Kowalchuck sued his former employer, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries he sustained while clearing snow at an MTA property. The MTA requested a pre-motion conference to discuss its anticipated motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the request, and at the pre-motion conference, it deemed the MTA's motion as having been made and denied it. However, two years later, and only four days before the trial was set to begin, the district court reconsidered its previous denial of the motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the MTA, dismissing the complaint. Kowalchuck was not given an opportunity to submit papers in opposition to the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court erred when it sua sponte reconsidered its denial of summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the MTA, without giving Kowalchuck notice or an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals emphasized the need for procedural safeguards such as notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court can grant summary judgment sua sponte. The court also noted that Kowalchuck was procedurally prejudiced by the district court's use of a truncated or expedited procedure, as he was surprised by the district court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment and that surprise resulted in his failure to present evidence in support of his position. View "Kowalchuck v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a decision from the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. The defendant, Cory Johnson, had been convicted for the production of child pornography and challenged his conviction on the basis of a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss the indictment.The evidence in question was a video depicting the sexual abuse of a toddler, which had been found following a review of digital data seized from Johnson's devices. This review had taken place after his sentencing for an earlier prosecution. Johnson argued that this review violated his Fourth Amendment rights, as it had taken place after the sentencing and had looked for evidence of a new crime. The court disagreed, ruling that the review was within the scope of the original search warrant and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.Johnson also argued that his second prosecution was barred by his earlier plea agreement. He contended that the plea agreement prohibited future prosecution for offenses "known to the United States as of the date it signed the agreement." The court, however, found that the government had not been aware of Johnson’s sexual abuse of his daughter and his production of child pornography at the time of the agreement. Thus, the plea agreement did not preclude his subsequent prosecution for these crimes.In conclusion, the court affirmed Johnson's conviction. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the case revolves around the appeal of Gregory Thomas, who alleges ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file an appeal from his resentencing. Thomas was convicted in 2006 on various counts, including murder for hire, drug-trafficking offenses, and mail fraud. In 2020, he was resentenced to approximately 24 years of imprisonment. No appeal was filed post-resentencing, which Thomas claims was against his explicit instructions to his counsel. He subsequently filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied by the district court without conducting any fact-finding.The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred by denying Thomas's petition without conducting a fact-finding inquiry. Citing the precedent set in Campusano v. United States, the court highlighted the necessity of a factual inquiry when a habeas petitioner alleges that his counsel failed to file a requested notice of appeal. The court emphasized that the right to appeal is sacrosanct, especially in cases involving the loss of an entire appellate proceeding. As a result, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a fact-finding inquiry into Thomas's allegations. View "Thomas v. United States" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York's dismissal of a lawsuit brought by BMG Monroe I, LLC. BMG, a developer, had sued the Village of Monroe, New York, alleging that the Village's denial of its applications for building permits on five lots violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Protection Clause due to a discriminatory animus towards the Hasidic Jewish community. The Village denied the applications due to non-compliance with the architectural criteria established in the Smith Farm Project's approval conditions. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the claims were unripe because BMG had not exhausted its administrative remedies. In order to satisfy the finality requirement under ripeness doctrine, BMG needed to appeal the adverse planning-board decision to a zoning board of appeals and submit at least one meaningful application for a variance. BMG could not claim that further actions were futile based on the Village's indication that it would likely not be receptive to a variance request that had yet to be made. View "BMG Monroe I, LLC v. Village of Monroe" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs were U.S. investors who purchased Mexican government bonds. They alleged that the defendants, Mexican branches of several multinational banks, conspired to fix the prices of the bonds. The defendants sold the bonds to the plaintiffs through non-party broker-dealers. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the District Court granted the motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction as the alleged misconduct, price-fixing of bonds, occurred solely in Mexico.Upon appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case. The court found that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with New York as they had solicited and executed bond sales through their agents, the broker-dealers. The plaintiffs' claims arose from or were related to these contacts. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the alleged wrongdoing must occur in the jurisdiction for personal jurisdiction to exist, stating that the defendants' alleged active sales of price-fixed bonds through their agents in New York sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re: Mexican Government Bonds Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Dr. Misty Blanchette Porter, had been a staff physician at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center (DHMC) since 1996. She specialized in reproductive medicine and was highly regarded in her field. In November 2015, Dr. Porter developed a medical condition that required her to take a medical leave of absence and subsequently work reduced hours. In 2017, DHMC decided to close the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Division (REI) where Dr. Porter worked and terminate her employment. Dr. Porter claimed that her termination was due to her disability and her whistleblowing activity, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the laws of Vermont and New Hampshire.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to DHMC. The court found that there was direct evidence that the decision to terminate Dr. Porter's employment was based, in whole or in part, on her disability. The court also found that a jury could reasonably infer that Dr. Edward Merrens, the chief decision-maker in the termination, was aware of Dr. Porter's whistleblowing activity. The case was affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. View "Porter v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center" on Justia Law