Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves nine lawsuits filed in Connecticut state court, each asserting state-law personal injury claims related to the use of Zantac. The plaintiffs, represented by the same firm, structured their complaints to avoid federal jurisdiction by including fewer than 100 plaintiffs per suit and ensuring that each suit included a Connecticut plaintiff. The plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate these actions, citing Connecticut Practice Book § 9-5, which the defendants argued proposed a joint trial, thus triggering federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut remanded the cases to state court, finding that the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate was intended only for pretrial purposes, not for a joint trial. The district court noted that the plaintiffs' motion cited authority that could be used for either pretrial management or a joint trial but concluded that the context indicated a pretrial purpose, especially given the plaintiffs' efforts to avoid federal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that CAFA requires a determination of whether the plaintiffs intended to seek a joint trial. The court found that the plaintiffs' motion, when read in context, proposed only pretrial consolidation. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' consistent efforts to avoid federal jurisdiction supported this interpretation. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the defendants did not meet their burden to demonstrate that federal jurisdiction existed under CAFA. View "Bacher v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

T.W., a Harvard Law School graduate with disabilities, sued the New York State Board of Law Examiners for denying her requested accommodations on the New York State bar exam in 2013 and 2014. She alleged violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. T.W. claimed that the Board's actions caused her to fail the bar exam twice, resulting in professional and financial harm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially denied the Board's motion to dismiss, finding that the Board had waived its sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Board was immune from suit under Section 504. On remand, the district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss T.W.'s Title II claim, ruling that the Board was an "arm of the state" and entitled to sovereign immunity. The court also held that Title II did not abrogate the Board's sovereign immunity for money damages and that T.W. could not seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Board is an arm of the state and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. It further concluded that Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate sovereign immunity in the context of professional licensing. Additionally, the court found that the declaratory relief sought by T.W. was retrospective and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court also ruled that the injunctive relief sought by T.W. was not sufficiently tied to an ongoing violation of federal law, making it unavailable under Ex parte Young. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of T.W.'s claims for compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief. View "T.W. v. New York State Board of Law Examiners" on Justia Law

Webuild S.P.A., an Italian investment company, formed a consortium with other companies to work on the Panama Canal expansion project. After the project's completion, Webuild initiated an arbitration against Panama under the ICSID, alleging that Panama breached its obligations under a bilateral investment treaty by providing incomplete information and making unfair financial demands. Webuild sought discovery from WSP USA, which had acquired the project's engineering consultant, Parsons Brinkerhoff.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York initially granted Webuild's ex parte application for discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., which limited § 1782 to governmental or intergovernmental tribunals, the district court vacated its order and quashed the subpoena. The court concluded that the ICSID arbitration tribunal did not qualify as a governmental or intergovernmental entity under § 1782.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that the ICSID tribunal did not exercise governmental authority as required by § 1782. The court noted that the tribunal was formed specifically for the arbitration, funded by the parties, and its members had no official governmental affiliation. Thus, the ICSID tribunal did not meet the criteria established by the Supreme Court in ZF Automotive for a "foreign or international tribunal" under § 1782. View "Webuild v. WSP USA Inc." on Justia Law

Arjun KC, a native and citizen of Nepal, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. He claimed that Maoist partisans in Nepal threatened to kill him unless he supported their party. KC argued that these threats constituted past persecution and that this past persecution should give rise to a presumption of future persecution if he were to return to Nepal.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found KC credible but concluded that he had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ denied his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. KC appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the IJ and BIA. The court held that death threats alone do not automatically constitute past persecution. Instead, such threats must be sufficiently imminent, concrete, or menacing to qualify as persecution. The court found that the threats against KC were not sufficiently imminent or concrete to constitute past persecution. Additionally, KC did not provide other evidence to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, the court denied KC's petition for review and affirmed the BIA's decision ordering his removal. View "KC v. Garland" on Justia Law

Maximo Robert Vera Punin, a citizen of Ecuador, was ordered removed by immigration authorities after being convicted in state court of multiple counts involving the rape of a young child. He is currently serving a 25-year prison term and faces deportation upon completion of his sentence. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served him with a notice to appear in September 2020, charging him with being a removable alien under various sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act. DHS submitted a Form I-213 to prove his alienage, which listed detailed personal information and his previous removal from the United States.The Immigration Judge (IJ) admitted the I-213 over Vera Punin’s objection, finding it sufficient to prove his alienage by clear and convincing evidence. The IJ sustained the charges of removability and ordered Vera Punin removed to Ecuador. Vera Punin appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the I-213 was unreliable and should not have been admitted. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the I-213 was inherently trustworthy and sufficient to establish his alienage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Vera Punin did not exhaust his argument that the agency failed to explain its reasoning, and thus lacked authority to consider this claim. The court held that the I-213 is presumptively reliable and capable of proving alienage by clear and convincing evidence, and Vera Punin did not rebut that presumption. The court also found that the presumption of reliability afforded to an I-213 does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof away from the government. Additionally, the court determined that the temporary Appellate Immigration Judge was properly appointed by the Attorney General. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Punin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Rashawn Wynn pleaded guilty to racketeering conspiracy in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, based on his involvement with the 110 Gang, a violent drug-trafficking group in Syracuse, New York. Wynn admitted to participating in the gang’s drug trafficking operations and personally selling 42.2 grams of crack cocaine. The Probation Office calculated his advisory sentencing range as 92 to 115 months of imprisonment. Wynn requested a mitigating role adjustment, arguing he was a minor participant, but the district court denied this request and sentenced him to 92 months in prison.Wynn appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court had not adequately addressed factors that might support a mitigating role adjustment. On remand, the district court provided a more detailed explanation but again denied the adjustment and reimposed the 92-month sentence. Wynn appealed once more, arguing that the district court erred in denying the adjustment and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Wynn was not substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal enterprise. The court also found that Wynn’s 92-month sentence was substantively reasonable given his criminal conduct and history. The court noted that Wynn had a long-standing involvement with the 110 Gang and had benefited from the gang’s criminal activities. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wynn" on Justia Law

Betim Kaziu was convicted for his involvement in a plan to join and aid foreign terrorist organizations. He and his friend traveled to Cairo, Egypt, intending to join a terrorist group and fight jihad. After his friend returned to the U.S., Kaziu continued to Kosovo to formulate a plot to kill Americans but was arrested before he could act. He was convicted on four counts, including conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and conspiracy to use a firearm. He was sentenced to 27 years in prison.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially sentenced Kaziu to 27 years. Kaziu later filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that two of his convictions were unlawful based on new Supreme Court precedent. The district court vacated his conviction on Count Four and reduced his sentence on Count One by two years, from 27 to 25 years, without a full in-person resentencing proceeding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court exceeded its discretion by not conducting a full de novo resentencing. The appellate court noted two key factors: the resentencing judge was not the original sentencing judge, and Kaziu presented plausible allegations of changed circumstances, including his reform during imprisonment. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full de novo resentencing, ensuring that Kaziu would receive the full procedural protections of a standard sentencing. View "Kaziu v. United States" on Justia Law

Laura Henry filed a lawsuit against Olakunle Oluwole and their former employer, Bristol Hospital, alleging that Oluwole had sexually assaulted her. Shortly after the complaint was filed, Oluwole was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident, which he claimed prevented him from receiving timely notice of the action. Oluwole did not initially appear in court, leading the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut to enter a default judgment against him. Five years later, Oluwole appeared and moved to set aside the default judgment, but the district court denied his motion. The case against Bristol proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict that Henry had failed to prove that Oluwole sexually assaulted, assaulted, or battered her. Following the jury verdict, the district court vacated the default judgment against Oluwole for the assault and battery claims but left it in place for other claims.The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut initially entered a default judgment against Oluwole due to his failure to appear. After Oluwole eventually appeared and moved to set aside the default judgment, the district court denied his motion, finding his default willful and that setting it aside would prejudice Henry. The jury trial against Bristol resulted in a verdict in favor of Bristol, finding no proof of sexual assault, assault, or battery by Oluwole. Consequently, the district court vacated the default judgment against Oluwole for the assault and battery claims but maintained it for other claims, including false imprisonment and emotional distress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in denying Oluwole’s motions to set aside the default judgment. The appellate court held that the district court should have set aside the default judgment based on the factors established in Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the entire default judgment should have been vacated following the jury verdict, as maintaining it was inconsistent with the jury’s findings, pursuant to the principle in Frow v. De La Vega. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Oluwole. View "Henry v. Oluwole" on Justia Law

Emilee Carpenter, a wedding photographer, filed a preenforcement challenge against New York’s public accommodations laws, which prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Carpenter argued that these laws violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by compelling her to provide photography services for same-sex weddings, which she claimed conflicted with her religious beliefs. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the laws against her.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed all of Carpenter’s claims. The court found that Carpenter had not sufficiently pled that the public accommodations laws violated her rights to free speech, free association, free exercise of religion, or the Establishment Clause. The court also rejected her claims that the laws were unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Consequently, the court denied her request for a preliminary injunction as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, the appellate court agreed that Carpenter had plausibly stated a free speech claim. However, the court denied her request for a preliminary injunction at this stage, remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings to develop a factual record. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Carpenter’s other claims, including those related to free association, free exercise of religion, the Establishment Clause, and vagueness. The court concluded that the public accommodations laws were neutral, generally applicable, and did not provide for individualized exemptions that would undermine their general applicability. The court also found that Carpenter had waived her overbreadth claim due to inadequate pleading and briefing.The Second Circuit thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Carpenter v. James" on Justia Law

Manoucheka Francois, a train conductor for Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company, was injured in a car crash while being transported by a taxi hired by her employer. The taxi driver, Michael Cellante, had consumed four to five shots of alcohol before picking her up. As a result, the taxi crashed, and Francois sustained injuries.Francois sued Metro-North under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging both direct liability for negligently hiring the impaired taxi driver and vicarious liability for the driver’s negligence. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Metro-North on both theories. The court found no evidence that Metro-North could have foreseen the driver’s intoxication, thus negating direct liability. It also concluded that the driver’s act of drinking removed him from the scope of his agency, precluding vicarious liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding direct liability, agreeing that Metro-North had no reason to foresee the driver’s intoxication. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on vicarious liability. It held that whether the driver acted within the scope of his agency while driving Francois, despite being impaired, presented a triable issue of fact. The court emphasized that in FELA cases, plaintiffs enjoy a relaxed burden of proof, and issues of agency and foreseeability should generally be decided by a jury.The Second Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s ruling on direct liability, vacated the ruling on vicarious liability, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Francois v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co." on Justia Law