Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the antitrust implications of a settlement agreement between Forest Laboratories, a brand manufacturer of the high-blood pressure drug Bystolic, and seven manufacturers of generic versions of Bystolic. The settlement agreement was reached after Forest Laboratories initiated patent-infringement litigation against the generic manufacturers. As part of the settlement, Forest Laboratories entered into separate business transactions with each generic manufacturer, paying them for goods and services.The plaintiffs, purchasers of Bystolic and its generic equivalents, filed a lawsuit against Forest Laboratories and the generic manufacturers, alleging that the payments constituted unlawful “reverse” settlement payments intended to delay the market entry of generic Bystolic. The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed twice by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that any of Forest’s payments were unjustified or unexplained, instead of constituting fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. The court also held that the district court’s application of the pleading law was appropriate. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that Forest’s payments were a pretext for nefarious anticompetitive motives rather than payments that constituted fair value for goods and services obtained as a result of arms-length dealings. View "In re Bystolic Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Jason Doherty, a former student at Purchase College, State University of New York, who has Asperger Syndrome, sued several administrators of the college under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for declaratory and injunctive relief and emotional distress damages. The lawsuit was initiated after the college issued no-contact orders against Doherty at the request of three other students during his freshman orientation in August 2017.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Doherty's claims, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief since they were moot, and that Doherty failed to state a claim for damages because emotional distress damages are not available under Title II of the ADA. The district court based its decision on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., which held that emotional distress damages are not available under the Rehabilitation Act, a law that Title II of the ADA explicitly tracks.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Doherty's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot given that the no-contact orders were not disciplinary actions, were not part of his permanent record, and expired upon his graduation. The court also agreed that emotional distress damages are not available under Title II of the ADA, which explicitly tracks the remedies, procedures, and rights available under the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, the court ruled that Doherty had forfeited any claims for other damages. View "Doherty v. Bice" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Marina Soliman, filed a lawsuit against Subway Franchisee Advertising Fund Trust, Ltd. ("Subway"), alleging that a marketing text message she received on her cell phone violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The text message was sent by an automated system using a pre-existing list of telephone numbers. Soliman argued that the text message constituted a call made using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, both of which are prohibited under the TCPA.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed Soliman's complaint. The court concluded that the TCPA only bars the use of a dialing system that randomly or sequentially generates telephone numbers, not a system that relies on a stored list of pre-existing telephone numbers. The court also held that the TCPA's prohibition on the use of an "artificial or prerecorded voice" did not apply to text messages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the TCPA does not apply to a system that dials numbers from a pre-existing list, as such a system does not generate telephone numbers. The court also agreed that a text message does not constitute an "artificial voice" under the TCPA. The court's decision was based on the text of the TCPA, the context in which the words appear, and the Supreme Court's decision in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid. View "Soliman v. Subway Franchisee Advertising Fund Trust, Ltd." on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who filed a class-action lawsuit against KIND, LLC, a snack food company. The plaintiffs alleged that the phrase "All Natural" on the labels of KIND's products was deceptive and misleading. They sought damages on behalf of themselves and three classes, based on common law fraud, as well as consumer protection and false advertising laws in New York, California, and Florida.The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted KIND's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish how a reasonable consumer would understand the term "All Natural." The court held that this was fatal to the plaintiffs' claims because without showing how a reasonable consumer understood the term, the plaintiffs could not explain how or why they were materially deceived. The court also granted KIND's motion to preclude two of the plaintiffs' expert opinions from the summary judgment record and to decertify the classes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the opinions of the plaintiffs' experts. The court also held that because the plaintiffs failed to present admissible evidence of what a reasonable consumer would expect of KIND products labeled "All Natural," the District Court did not err in concluding that there was no triable issue of fact as to whether reasonable consumers would be misled by the "All Natural" labeling. The court further held that the plaintiffs' arguments regarding class decertification were moot because the District Court's grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "In re: Kind LLC "Healthy and All Natural" Litigation" on Justia Law

The case involves Ramon Dejesus Cedeno, an employee of Strategic Financial Solutions, LLC, and a participant in its Strategic Employee Stock Ownership Plan. Cedeno sued the company, its trustee Argent Trust Company, and other defendants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), alleging that a transaction caused the Plan to incur substantial losses and that Argent breached fiduciary duties owed to Plan participants. The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), pointing to a provision in the Plan’s governing document that required Plan participants to resolve any claims related to the Plan in arbitration.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion, reasoning that the agreement was unenforceable because it would prevent Cedeno from effectuating rights guaranteed by Congress through ERISA, namely, the plan-wide relief available under Section 502(a)(2) to enforce the rights established in ERISA Section 409(a).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the arbitration provision is unenforceable because it would prevent Cedeno from pursuing the Plan-wide remedies Sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2) unequivocally provide. The court concluded that the entire arbitration provision is null and void due to a non-severability clause in the Plan. View "Cedeno v. Sasson" on Justia Law

Antonio Ortiz, while on supervised release for a drug-trafficking conviction, was accused of repeatedly raping his teenage daughter. The district court found Ortiz guilty of three release violations related to the rapes and revoked his supervised release. Ortiz was sentenced to the statutory maximum of sixty months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to any state court sentence he might receive.Ortiz appealed, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the evidentiary hearing and that the sentence imposed by the district court was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He claimed his counsel failed to present medical evidence that would have corroborated his testimony that he was physically incapable of raping his daughter due to injuries from previous motorcycle accidents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Ortiz's arguments. The court noted that Ortiz had not shown that the purportedly deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced his defense. The court also concluded that the rationale for the sentence was evident from the record and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing it. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

This case involves Commerzbank AG, a German bank, and U.S. Bank, N.A., an American bank. Commerzbank sued U.S. Bank, alleging that it had failed to fulfill its duties as a trustee for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that Commerzbank had purchased. The case revolved around three main issues: whether Commerzbank could bring claims related to trusts with "No Action Clauses"; whether Commerzbank's claims related to certificates held through German entities were timely; and whether Commerzbank could bring claims related to certificates it had sold to third parties.The district court had previously dismissed Commerzbank's claims related to trusts with No Action Clauses, granted judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on the timeliness of Commerzbank's claims related to the German certificates, and denied Commerzbank's claims related to the sold certificates. Commerzbank appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on the timeliness of the German certificate claims and the denial of the sold certificate claims. However, it vacated the district court's dismissal of Commerzbank's claims related to trusts with No Action Clauses and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that Commerzbank's failure to make pre-suit demands on parties other than trustees could be excused in certain circumstances where these parties are sufficiently conflicted. View "Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen, Maalik Alim Jones, pleaded guilty to terrorism-related charges for his involvement with al-Shabaab, an Islamist military organization in Kenya and Somalia. The district court accepted his plea and sentenced him to 25 years of imprisonment. Jones challenged his plea agreement and sentence, arguing that a prior mandate of the court precluded the government from charging him in a superseding indictment, that the language of his plea agreement was ambiguous and inapplicable to him, and that his sentence was based on erroneous factual findings and constitutionally impermissible factors.Jones was initially indicted on five counts related to his support and training with al-Shabaab. He later consented to a superseding information, which reduced the charges to three counts. Jones pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment. However, following a Supreme Court ruling that found a section of the law under which Jones was charged to be unconstitutionally vague, Jones appealed his conviction on one of the counts. The court vacated this conviction and remanded for resentencing on the remaining counts. On remand, the district court denied the government's motion to reinstate the initial indictment but did not preclude the government from seeking a superseding indictment. The government subsequently filed a superseding indictment, which Jones moved to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected Jones's arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the mandate did not preclude a superseding indictment, and that the plea agreement unambiguously allowed for new charges if a conviction was vacated. The court also found that Jones's sentence was not based on erroneous factual findings or constitutionally impermissible factors, and that his challenges were barred by the appeal waiver in the plea agreement. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2021, New York enacted the Affordable Broadband Act (ABA), which required internet service providers to offer broadband internet to qualifying households at reduced prices. A group of trade organizations representing internet service providers sued, arguing that the ABA was preempted by federal law. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted a preliminary injunction barring New York from enforcing the ABA. The parties later requested that the district court enter a stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the ABA was not field-preempted by the Communications Act of 1934 (as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996), because the Act does not establish a framework of rate regulation that is sufficiently comprehensive to imply that Congress intended to exclude the states from entering the field. The court also concluded that the ABA was not conflict-preempted by the Federal Communications Commission’s 2018 order classifying broadband as an information service. The court reasoned that the order stripped the agency of its authority to regulate the rates charged for broadband internet, and a federal agency cannot exclude states from regulating in an area where the agency itself lacks regulatory authority. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the permanent injunction. View "New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

The case involves Jane Doe, who sued the Franklin Square Union Free School District on behalf of herself and her minor daughter, Sarah Doe. The lawsuit was filed after the school district refused to grant Sarah an exemption from a school mask mandate implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Jane Doe argued that the school district violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Jane Doe's constitutional claim, concluding that the school district's conduct survived rational basis review. The court also dismissed her federal statutory claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the school district did not violate Jane Doe or Sarah’s constitutional rights by denying their request for an accommodation. However, the court agreed with Jane Doe that she was not required to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA and held that the district court erred in dismissing Jane Doe’s ADA and § 504 claims. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Franklin Square Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law