Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant-appellant, Alex Oliveras, was sentenced to sixty-three months' imprisonment and a three-year supervised release term for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. On appeal, Oliveras challenged the imposition of a special condition of his supervised release that allowed for suspicionless searches by a probation officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the "special needs" doctrine of the Fourth Amendment permits, when sufficiently supported by the record, the imposition of a special condition of supervised release that allows suspicionless searches of the defendant's person, property, vehicle, place of residence, or any other property under their control by a probation officer. However, the court also found that the district court exceeded its discretion in imposing that special condition here. The court explained that the district court failed to make the individualized assessment required to support the special condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), including a sufficient explanation as to how the condition was reasonably related in this particular case to the applicable statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and involved no greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary under those factors. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the Search Condition and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of whether it is necessary to impose the Search Condition in this particular case and, if so, for the district court to explain the individualized basis for imposing the Search Condition. View "United States v. Oliveras" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of September 8, 2018, Mabior Jok was standing outside a bar in Burlington, Vermont, when Joseph Corrow, an officer of the Burlington Police Department, approached the group. The details of what happened next are fiercely disputed, but it's agreed that Corrow took Jok to the ground, resulting in Jok hitting his head, losing consciousness and being taken to the hospital. Jok was charged with disorderly conduct, but the charge was later dismissed. Subsequently, Jok brought a lawsuit against Corrow and others, alleging, among other things, that Corrow used excessive force against him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.Corrow moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied the motion, concluding that there were genuine disputes of material fact and hence, summary judgment could not be granted on the basis of qualified immunity. Corrow then filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial.The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit found that Corrow failed to establish appellate jurisdiction because he continued to assert disputes of fact, and no pure question of law was presented for review. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity as the denial was based on the presence of disputed material facts. Therefore, the interlocutory appeal was dismissed due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Jok v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

The case in question involves a dispute over the use of the term "red gold" in the marketing of wristwatches. The plaintiff-appellant Solid 21, a luxury jewelry and watch business, owns a trademark in RED GOLD® since 2003. Defendant-appellee Breitling, a luxury watch manufacturer, uses the term “red gold” in its advertisements, product listings, and catalogues. Solid 21 argued that Breitling's use of the term amounted to trademark infringement, claiming it was likely to cause confusion, leading customers to mistakenly believe that Solid 21 was affiliated with Breitling’s products.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment for Breitling, finding that the company used the term “red gold” permissibly under the Lanham Act’s fair use defense. Solid 21 appealed this decision, insisting that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment for Breitling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court reasoned that Breitling used the term "red gold" in a descriptive sense, not as a mark, and in good faith. The court also pointed out that Solid 21 failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Breitling was acting in bad faith while using the term “red gold.” View "Solid 21, Inc. v. Breitling USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff-appellant, Maurice Cotton, an inmate, filed a civil rights lawsuit against corrections officials at the Green Haven Correctional Facility. He alleged that he was wrongfully denied a transfer to another prison facility and retaliated against for filing grievances related to the transfer request. Cotton sought permission to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows indigent prisoners to pay filing fees through a structured payment plan linked to their prison accounts. The district court denied Cotton's IFP request, concluding that he had accumulated "at least three" strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) due to previous lawsuit dismissals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's decision, ruling that the district court erred in its interpretation of the three previous lawsuits. According to the appellate court, not all of Cotton's previous lawsuits counted as PLRA strikes. The court further explained that a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey does not automatically count as a PLRA strike, arguing that the key consideration is whether the dismissal is based on the merits of the case or if it was merely a matter of timing or sequencing. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the district court incorrectly denied Cotton's request for IFP status, warranting a remand for further proceedings. View "Cotton v. New York State Office" on Justia Law

This case arose from a Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement action against Mohammed Ali Rashid, a former senior partner at the private equity firm Apollo Management L.P. Rashid was accused of breaching his fiduciary duties to the Apollo-affiliated private equity funds he advised by submitting fraudulent expense reports, which were eventually paid by the funds. The district court held that Rashid was not liable under § 206(1) of the Investment Advisers Act because he was not aware that the funds, rather than Apollo, would pay for his expenses. However, the court found Rashid liable under § 206(2) of the Act, concluding he was indifferent and therefore negligent as to which entity would pay for his expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that it was not reasonably foreseeable to Rashid that the funds would pay for his expenses, concluding that Rashid did not breach his duty of care to the funds or proximately cause their harm. The court noted that while Rashid's actions were serious and likely criminal, they did not constitute fraud against the funds as required under § 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act. The court also found that Rashid did not breach his duty of care to the funds, as he could not have reasonably known that the funds would cover his expenses. The court concluded that Rashid did not proximately cause the funds' harm, as Apollo's intervening actions in overbilling the funds were not reasonably foreseeable to Rashid. View "SEC v. Rashid" on Justia Law

The case in question involves an appeal by Joseph William Foley against the United States Tax Court's dismissal of his deficiency protest due to untimeliness. Foley filed a protest against a notice of deficiency issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the 2014 and 2015 tax years, but his filing came 1,393 days after the 90-day deadline.Foley's petition was filed under small tax case procedures, which is a less formal process meant for cases where the deficiency amount is under $50,000. The IRS moved to dismiss Foley’s petition for redetermination due to its untimeliness. Foley then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the Tax Court's decision was made on jurisdictional grounds, not on merit, and therefore should not be impeded by the non-reviewability provision of the small tax case procedures.The Court of Appeals disagreed with Foley's argument. It held that the Tax Court's dismissal of his petition did constitute a "decision", as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Appeals explained that a "decision" includes a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, which was the case for Foley’s petition. Therefore, according to the language of the Internal Revenue Code, jurisdictional dismissals like Foley's are indeed unreviewable under small tax case procedures.The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Foley's alternative argument that his case never became a "small case" due to the Tax Court's jurisdictional dismissal, and thus falls outside of the non-reviewability provision. The court noted that Foley had initially requested small-case procedures, and despite the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss his petition as untimely, Foley never moved to rescind his small-case election. Hence, the Tax Court dismissed a case that was subject to small tax case procedures, and the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review Foley's appeal. Consequently, the court granted the Commissioner's motion and dismissed Foley’s appeal. View "Foley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In this case, five former customers of Peregrine Financial Group, Inc., a defunct futures commission merchant, filed a class action lawsuit against various defendants, including JPMorgan Chase Bank and National Futures Association. They claimed that their investments were wiped out due to fraudulent activities by Peregrine's CEO. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the federal claims as time-barred and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The main issue addressed by the Second Circuit was whether a party could compel a district court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction on a theory of jurisdiction that the party raised untimely.The Court held that a party may not do so. The Court distinguished between objecting to a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction, which a party could do at any stage in the litigation, and invoking the district court’s jurisdiction, which can be forfeited if not raised timely. Therefore, although federal courts must ensure they have jurisdiction, there is no corresponding obligation to find and exercise jurisdiction on a basis not raised by the parties. The Court concluded that the district court was within its discretion to decline to consider the untimely raised theory of jurisdiction. View "Behrens v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs, Ben and Hank Brinkmann and their company Mattituck 12500 LLC, had alleged that the Town of Southold, New York's use of eminent domain to take their land for public park purposes was a pretextual and bad faith exercise of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the real motive was to prevent them from constructing a hardware store on the property.The Court of Appeals ruled that if a property is taken for a public purpose, in this case, the creation of a park, courts do not inquire into alleged pretexts and motives. The court found that a public park serves a public purpose, and thus, the taking of the property was permissible under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations of pretext and bad faith did not violate the Takings Clause as the intended use of the property was for a public park. The court stated that a pretextual taking would only violate the Takings Clause if the actual purpose of the taking was for a non-public (i.e., private) use, which was not the case here. View "Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, New York" on Justia Law

In the case of Rafael Jimenez v. Tina M. Stanford, Chairperson of the New York State Board of Parole, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Jimenez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.In 1992, Rafael Jimenez was convicted of second degree murder. The prosecution relied on the testimonies of two eyewitnesses, Rafael Jimenez and Carmen Velazquez. Over two decades later, one of the eyewitnesses, Rafael Jimenez, recanted his testimony and two alibi witnesses came forward. Despite these developments, the court denied post-conviction relief.Jimenez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming actual innocence and Brady violations. The district court found that Jimenez had cast enough doubt on his guilt to excuse his untimely petition, but ultimately denied relief on the merits.On appeal, Jimenez argued that the district court erred in deferring to the State court's conclusions, held his actual innocence claim to an impossibly high standard, and contravened factual findings made following an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that Jimenez's newly discovered evidence does not satisfy the substantially higher standard of proof required to prove actual innocence. The Court further concluded that there is no merit to Jimenez’s Brady claim. View "Jimenez v. Stanford" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard a case initiated by Adam Hart, who filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against pharmaceutical distributor McKesson. Hart alleged that McKesson provided business management tools to its customers for free in exchange for commitments to purchase drugs, which he claimed violated the federal anti-kickback statute (AKS) and several analogous state laws. The district court dismissed Hart's FCA claim, determining he failed to allege McKesson acted "willfully" as required by the AKS.On appeal, the Second Circuit held that to act "willfully" under the AKS, a defendant must knowingly act in a way that is unlawful. The court found that Hart failed to provide sufficient facts to meet this standard. However, the court disagreed with the district court's assertion that Hart's state claims were premised solely on a violation of the federal AKS. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Hart’s federal FCA claim, vacated the dismissal of the remaining state claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States, ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp." on Justia Law