Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lavellous Purcell operated a commercial sex business from 2012 to 2017, recruiting women from across the United States to work as prostitutes and coordinating their interstate travel. He resided primarily on Long Island, New York, and the women involved traveled to at least fourteen states. The government’s case focused on documentary evidence regarding one victim, Samantha Vasquez, showing her work for Purcell in various locations, but not in the Southern District of New York.Purcell was indicted in 2018 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on five counts related to sex trafficking. After a jury trial, he was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment. On direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, his conviction on Count One (enticement to engage in unlawful sexual activity) was reversed for lack of venue in the Southern District of New York, but his conviction on Count Two (transporting a victim in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution) was affirmed because his appellate counsel did not challenge venue for that count. The district court reimposed the original sentence after remand. Purcell then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding appellate counsel’s performance reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the denial of Purcell’s habeas petition de novo. The court held that Purcell’s appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge venue as to Count Two, as the omitted argument was significant and obvious and likely would have resulted in reversal of that conviction. The court declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and found Purcell was prejudiced by counsel’s omission. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Purcell’s § 2255 petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Purcell v. United States" on Justia Law

Steven Douglas Coleman, a well-known jazz saxophonist, brought a defamation claim under New York law against his former pupil, Maria Kim Grand. The dispute arose from a seven-page letter Grand circulated privately to friends and colleagues in the music industry, describing her complex sexual and professional relationship with Coleman from 2011 to 2016. In the letter, Grand recounted various incidents and interactions, characterizing Coleman’s conduct as sexual harassment and describing situations where she felt pressured to be intimate with him in exchange for mentorship and professional opportunities. Grand used a pseudonym for Coleman and stated her intent was to contribute to the broader conversation about sexism in the music industry.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Grand, finding that Coleman failed to present facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Grand acted with actual malice. The court also determined that the statements in Grand’s letter were non-actionable opinions rather than demonstrably false factual assertions, and that the letter disclosed the underlying facts supporting Grand’s opinions.On appeal, Coleman argued that the district court misapplied New York law, erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding actual malice, and incorrectly classified the challenged statements as non-actionable opinion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the statements Coleman challenged were Grand’s subjective opinions supported by disclosed facts, and thus not actionable as defamation under New York law. The court concluded that none of the statements at issue were defamatory and affirmed the dismissal of Coleman’s claim. View "Coleman v. Grand" on Justia Law

A man committed several felonies in New York and Virginia between 2000 and 2001. After serving his prison sentences, he was subject to both state and federal post-release supervision. He repeatedly violated the terms of his supervision, resulting in multiple periods of reincarceration. In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Earley v. Murray that New York’s practice of administratively imposing post-release supervision without a judicial pronouncement was unconstitutional. The state legislature responded in 2008 by authorizing corrections officials to initiate resentencing proceedings. The plaintiff was incarcerated in New York from June 2007 to February 2008 for violating post-release supervision, and again in 2010, before being resentenced without post-release supervision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for damages related to his 2010 incarceration, finding the defendants acted reasonably at that time, but allowed claims related to the 2007-08 incarceration to proceed to trial. At trial, the defendants were barred from introducing evidence that legal and administrative obstacles prevented them from initiating resentencing for the plaintiff during 2007-08. The jury awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in compensatory and $750,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial and rejected their qualified immunity defense for the 2007-08 period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of impediments to resentencing and erred in denying a new trial for the 2007-08 period. The court reversed the denial of a new trial for that period, vacated the dismissal of the 2010 claims on qualified immunity grounds, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also held that qualified immunity was properly denied for both periods under existing precedent. View "Santiago v. Fischer" on Justia Law

A high school senior in New York posted a photo on social media after school hours and off school grounds, depicting a friend kneeling on his neck with the caption “Cops got another.” The image resembled the murder of George Floyd, and although the student claimed he did not intend this resemblance, he removed the post within minutes after receiving negative reactions. However, another student took a screenshot and shared it more widely, leading to public outcry, in-school discussions, a student demonstration, and a school investigation. The school superintendent suspended the student and barred him from extracurricular activities for the rest of the school year.The student initially filed suit in New York State Supreme Court, alleging that the school’s disciplinary actions violated his First Amendment rights. After the state court granted limited injunctive relief allowing him to attend graduation, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the school district, finding that the student’s off-campus speech caused substantial disruption in school and thus was not protected by the First Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. Applying the standards from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., the Second Circuit held that the school’s disciplinary actions violated the student’s First Amendment rights. The court found that the off-campus nature of the speech, its lack of threatening content, and the school’s interests did not justify the punishment imposed. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Leroy v. Livingston Manor Central School District" on Justia Law

Three U.S. citizens each sponsored a close family member for an immigrant visa to the United States. After their petitions were approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the family members applied for visas at the U.S. Consulate General in Guangzhou, China. Following interviews, the consular officers denied the visa applications, citing fraud or misrepresentation as the basis for inadmissibility. The U.S. citizen sponsors challenged these denials in federal court, alleging that the decisions were not facially legitimate or bona fide, were issued in bad faith, and that the notices were untimely.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the claims. It found that one plaintiff’s claim was brought in an improper venue and dismissed it without prejudice. The remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which generally bars judicial review of consular visa decisions. The district court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of State v. Muñoz, U.S. citizens do not have a constitutional right to reunite with parents or siblings through visa sponsorship, and thus no constitutional right was burdened by the denials. The court also found the allegations of bad faith insufficient and rejected the timeliness argument as a repackaged merits challenge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability precludes judicial review of the visa denials because the plaintiffs did not have a constitutional right implicated by the denials. The court also agreed that the plaintiffs’ alternative arguments lacked merit and that the consular officers’ decisions were insulated from judicial review. View "Chen v. Rubio" on Justia Law

A physician specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation was employed by a medical practice under a three-year contract that anticipated partnership if not terminated. After patient and staff complaints about her conduct, the practice proposed a new one-year contract without a partnership track, which she refused to sign. She was then terminated with 90 days’ notice. The physician alleged that her termination was due to age and sex discrimination, as well as retaliation for stating her intent to file an EEOC complaint, and also brought a breach of contract claim.After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. A Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The District Judge reviewed the report and recommendation (R&R) only for clear error, concluding that the physician’s objections were improper because they repeated arguments made before the Magistrate Judge, and adopted the R&R in full. The physician appealed, arguing that her objections were timely and specific, and that the District Judge should have conducted de novo review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the District Court erred in applying only clear error review, as the physician’s objections were proper and required de novo review. However, the appellate court found this error harmless because it reviews summary judgment decisions de novo. On its own review, the Second Circuit concluded that the physician failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on her preserved claims of sex discrimination, aiding and abetting discrimination, and retaliation. The court also found that her age discrimination and breach of contract claims were not preserved for appellate review. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Nambiar v. The Central Orthopedic Group, LLP" on Justia Law

Nearly a million barrels of crude oil owned by a U.S. company were seized from a vessel in Venezuelan waters by Venezuelan authorities under threat of force. The oil was insured under a marine cargo reinsurance policy that covered losses arising from war-related risks, including “insurrection.” The insured company claimed that the political turmoil in Venezuela, including the contested presidency and violent suppression of opposition, constituted an insurrection as defined by the policy. The reinsurers denied coverage, arguing that the events did not meet the policy’s definition of insurrection, leading to litigation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court found the term “insurrection” in the policy to be ambiguous and, applying New York law and the doctrine of contra proferentem, construed the ambiguity in favor of the insured. The court held that the Maduro regime’s actions constituted an insurrection within the meaning of the policy. The case proceeded to trial on causation and damages, where the jury found in favor of the insured on most issues, awarding over $54 million in damages plus interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered challenges to the district court’s summary judgment ruling, judicial notice orders, and jury instructions on causation. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in any of the challenged rulings. It affirmed that the policy’s “arising from” language required only but-for causation, not proximate causation. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects, upholding the award to the insured. View "CITGO Petroleum Corp. v. Ascot Underwriting Ltd." on Justia Law

The case concerns a former CEO of a brand-management company who was prosecuted for allegedly orchestrating a scheme to inflate company revenues through secret “overpayments-for-givebacks” deals with a business partner. The government alleged that the CEO arranged for the partner to pay inflated prices for joint ventures, with a secret understanding that the excess would be returned later, thereby allowing the company to report higher revenues to investors. The CEO was also accused of making false filings with the SEC and improperly influencing audits. The central factual dispute was whether the CEO actually made these undisclosed agreements.In 2021, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a jury trial. The jury acquitted the CEO of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, make false SEC filings, and interfere with audits, but could not reach a verdict on the substantive charges, resulting in a mistrial on those counts. The government retried the CEO in 2022 on the substantive counts, and the second jury convicted him on all charges. The CEO moved to bar the retrial, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded it because the first jury’s acquittal necessarily decided factual issues essential to the government’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the first jury’s acquittal on the conspiracy charge necessarily decided that the CEO did not make the alleged secret agreements, which was a factual issue essential to the substantive charges. Because the government’s case at the second trial depended on proving those same secret agreements, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s issue-preclusion doctrine barred the retrial. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the CEO’s convictions, and ordered dismissal of the indictment. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

A citizen of Ecuador who had been living unlawfully in the United States since 1997 was placed in removal proceedings after multiple convictions, including for driving under the influence. He conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his deportation would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his three U.S.-citizen children. At the time of his application, all three children were minors. During a hearing before an immigration judge, he and his eldest daughter testified about the potential hardship his removal would cause. The judge ultimately denied his application, finding he lacked good moral character and had not shown the required level of hardship to his children.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, specifically agreeing that the petitioner had not demonstrated the necessary hardship to his children. The petitioner did not seek judicial review of this decision. Later, he filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, submitting new evidence—a psychological evaluation of his eldest daughter, who was then almost 20 years old—arguing that this showed she would suffer the requisite hardship. Nearly two years later, the BIA denied the motion, concluding that the new evidence would not change the outcome because the daughter had turned 21 while the motion was pending and thus no longer qualified as a “child” under the relevant statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), a qualifying “child” must be under 21 at the time the application for cancellation of removal is adjudicated, not at the time of filing or when evidence is presented. The court also found that the petitioner was not barred from raising this issue on appeal, as the BIA had raised it sua sponte. The petition for review was denied. View "Yupangui-Yunga v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A law firm sought defense and indemnification from its professional liability insurer after being sued in New York state court by a judgment creditor of its client. The creditor alleged that the firm facilitated the sale of the client’s diamond ring and received a portion of the proceeds to satisfy past fees and as a retainer for future services, despite a restraining notice prohibiting the client from transferring assets due to an unpaid judgment. The state court complaint accused the firm of fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with judgment collection, and contempt of court.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the law firm’s claims for defense and indemnification and denied its motion for partial summary judgment regarding the insurer’s duty to defend. The district court found that the policy’s misappropriation exclusion applied, concluding that the firm’s handling of the sale proceeds was unauthorized in light of the restraining notice, regardless of the client’s consent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. Applying New York law, the Second Circuit held that the allegations in the underlying complaint involved the provision of professional services by the law firm and did not constitute “misappropriation” as commonly understood, since there was no allegation that the firm acted without its client’s authorization. The court found the term “misappropriation” ambiguous and construed it in favor of the insured. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal, reversed the denial of partial summary judgment on the duty to defend, and remanded with instructions to enter partial summary judgment for the law firm on the insurer’s duty to defend. The court did not address other policy exclusions or the insurer’s ultimate duty to indemnify. View "Marcus & Cinelli, LLP v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law