Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In December 2019, the defendant and a co-conspirator robbed a woman in a Bronx hotel room, taking $4,000 in cash, credit cards, cell phones, and a watch. The victim, a prostitute, had earned the cash through her business. The defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act Robbery and Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs Act Robbery after a jury trial.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced the defendant to two concurrent 96-month terms of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, based on the defendant's alleged false testimony about his drug use at a suppression hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act offenses and the obstruction of justice enhancement. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding sufficient evidence that the robbery affected interstate commerce by depleting the victim's business assets. However, the court vacated the obstruction of justice enhancement, noting that the district court did not make a sufficient finding that the defendant's false testimony was willful. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the defendant acted with willful intent to provide false testimony. View "United States v. Orelien" on Justia Law

In 2020, East Fork Funding LLC filed a quiet title action against U.S. Bank, N.A., regarding a mortgage recorded against East Fork’s property. The mortgage had been subject to three foreclosure actions, two of which were voluntarily discontinued by the mortgagee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of East Fork, holding that under the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), enacted in December 2022, the voluntary discontinuances did not reset the six-year statute of limitations for bringing a foreclosure action. Consequently, the statute of limitations continued to run from the commencement of the first foreclosure action in 2010 and expired six years later, entitling East Fork to quiet title.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of East Fork. The court held that FAPA applied retroactively to the voluntary discontinuances, meaning they did not reset the statute of limitations. Therefore, the statute of limitations began running with the filing of the 2010 action and expired before East Fork commenced the quiet title action. The court also found that retroactive application of FAPA did not violate the U.S. Constitution and that even under pre-FAPA law, the statute of limitations had expired.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is currently reviewing the case. The main issue on appeal is whether FAPA applies retroactively to voluntary discontinuances that occurred before its enactment. The court has certified this question to the New York Court of Appeals, as it is a novel question of state law necessary to resolve the appeal. The Second Circuit seeks clarification on whether Sections 4 and/or 8 of FAPA apply to a unilateral voluntary discontinuance taken prior to the Act’s enactment. The court retains jurisdiction pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "E. Fork Funding LLC v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Varian Lefebvre pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl and possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The case began when Vermont State Police responded to a 911 call reporting an assault at a Holiday Inn in Rutland, Vermont. Officers located Lefebvre at the hotel and transported him to the nearby Vermont State Police barracks for identification by the purported victims, where he was then arrested. Lefebvre argued that all physical evidence seized from his backpack after his arrest should have been suppressed, claiming that his seizure ripened into a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause when he was transported to the police barracks.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied Lefebvre’s motion to suppress the physical evidence. The court found that the seizure did not rise to the level of a de facto arrest and was supported by probable cause. Lefebvre entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Lefebvre’s seizure did not become a de facto arrest when he was transported to the police barracks because the transportation was a reasonable and non-dilatory investigative step given the unique circumstances. The court also found that even if the transportation did rise to the level of an arrest, it was supported by probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances, including the 911 call, witness descriptions, and Lefebvre’s behavior. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States of America v. Lefebvre" on Justia Law

Reporters from Bloomberg L.P. and Dow Jones & Company, Inc. requested aggregated, anonymized change-of-address (COA) data from the United States Postal Service (USPS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). They intended to use this data for reporting on population movement trends during the COVID-19 pandemic. USPS denied the requests, citing FOIA Exemption #3, which allows withholding of "information of a commercial nature" under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. USPS argued that the data was intended for a commercial product called "Population Mobility Trends."The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of USPS. The court found that the COA data was indeed "information of a commercial nature" and that USPS had met its burden of proof under FOIA Exemption #3. The court noted that USPS had previously provided similar data but had since decided to monetize it through the Population Mobility Trends product.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the COA data was "of a commercial nature" because it had monetary value derived from USPS's core business of delivering mail. The court also found that under good business practice, a private business would not disclose such valuable data for free if it intended to sell it. Therefore, USPS was justified in withholding the data under FOIA Exemption #3 and the Postal Reorganization Act. The court emphasized that Congress had granted USPS broad exemptions to operate more like a business, including the ability to withhold commercially valuable information. View "Bloomberg L.P. v. United States Postal Service" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in a scheme to defraud the City of West Haven, Connecticut, of COVID-19 relief funds. The defendant, along with co-conspirators, submitted fraudulent invoices for equipment and services that were never provided. The City paid over $400,000 based on these false invoices. The defendant was the only one among his co-defendants to go to trial, while the others pled guilty.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut convicted the defendant of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court sentenced him to 96 months in prison, which was above the recommended guidelines range. The defendant appealed, challenging the sentence as substantively unreasonable, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court’s evidentiary rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had provided a detailed explanation for the above-guidelines sentence, emphasizing the severity of the crime, the defendant’s financial gains, and the need for deterrence. The court also noted that the defendant did not receive a trial penalty, as the district court had explicitly stated that the sentence was not influenced by the defendant’s decision to go to trial. The court further found that the evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction.The Second Circuit concluded that none of the defendant’s challenges had merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Trasacco" on Justia Law

A coalition of organizations and individuals, led by the Chinese American Citizens Alliance of Greater New York, filed a lawsuit against New York City's Mayor and Department of Education Chancellor. They challenged the revised admissions policy for the Discovery Program in the Specialized High Schools (SHSs), alleging it was intended to discriminate against Asian-American applicants by reducing their admission rates. The plaintiffs argued that the new policy, which included an Economic Need Index (ENI) criterion, negatively impacted Asian-American students.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an aggregate disparate impact on Asian-American students, as required under Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. The court held that without showing a group-wide effect, the plaintiffs could not establish the necessary discriminatory effect for an equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed, for the purpose of the appeal, that the plaintiffs could prove the policy changes were made with discriminatory intent. The court concluded that the district court erred in requiring an aggregate disparate impact to establish discriminatory effect. Instead, the court held that if discriminatory intent is proven, a negative effect on individual Asian-American students would suffice to trigger strict scrutiny review. The court found that the exclusion of economically disadvantaged Asian-American students from certain middle schools due to the new ENI criterion constituted a sufficient discriminatory effect. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chinese Am. Citizens All. of Greater N.Y. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Eric Tompkins was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and possessing child pornography. During his arrest, a Samsung cellular phone with an SD card was seized. A search warrant was obtained to examine the phone for evidence related to his failure to register. During the search, child pornography was found on the SD card. A second warrant was then obtained to search the phone and SD card specifically for child pornography, leading to the discovery of additional images.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Tompkins's motion to suppress the images found on the SD card, ruling that the search was conducted in good faith. Tompkins argued that the initial search warrant did not specifically authorize the search of the SD card, making the search unlawful and tainting the subsequent search.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the initial search warrant, which authorized the search of the cellular phone for electronically stored information, included the SD card as it is a form of electronic storage. The court concluded that the search of the SD card fell within the scope of the warrant. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting Tompkins's argument that the search was unauthorized. View "United States v. Tompkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michelle Rubin applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits in 2019, citing major depressive disorder as her disabling condition. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her claim, concluding that Rubin was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Rubin exhausted the administrative appeals process and subsequently challenged the final decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which affirmed the denial of benefits.The ALJ found that Rubin had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date and had a severe impairment of major depressive disorder. However, the ALJ determined that Rubin did not meet the criteria for a listed impairment and had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a full range of work with certain nonexertional limitations. The ALJ partially discounted the opinion of Rubin’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Paul, who had opined that Rubin met the criteria for a listed impairment and was unable to work full-time. The ALJ also found that Rubin could not perform her past relevant work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the ALJ had misinterpreted the medical and lay evidence, failing to appreciate the consistent narrative that supported Dr. Paul’s opinion. The court concluded that the ALJ erred in determining that Rubin did not meet the criteria for a listed impairment, particularly the paragraph C criteria of Listed Impairment 12.04. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings, including a fuller consideration of the existing evidence and the results of a consultative examination. View "Rubin v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

American Girl, LLC, a manufacturer of dolls and related products, sued Zembrka, a Chinese entity operating through websites, for selling counterfeit American Girl products. American Girl alleged that Zembrka's websites sold and shipped counterfeit products to New York, using American Girl's trademarks. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.The District Court granted Zembrka's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, emphasizing that American Girl failed to show that Zembrka shipped the counterfeit products to New York. The court concluded that without evidence of shipment, the "transacting business" requirement under New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), was not met. American Girl's motion for reconsideration, which included new evidence of New York customers purchasing counterfeit products, was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that American Girl had adequately demonstrated that Zembrka transacted business in New York. Evidence showed that Zembrka accepted orders from New York, sent order confirmations, and received payments, which constituted purposeful activity within the state. The court held that actual shipment of goods was not necessary to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). The court also determined that exercising jurisdiction over Zembrka was consistent with due process, given New York's strong interest in protecting its consumers and businesses from counterfeit goods.The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka" on Justia Law

Ghislaine Maxwell was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and sex trafficking of a minor. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 60 months, 120 months, and 240 months, respectively, followed by concurrent terms of supervised release. Maxwell appealed her conviction on several grounds, including the applicability of Jeffrey Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), the statute of limitations, jury impartiality, constructive amendment of the indictment, and the reasonableness of her sentence.The District Court denied Maxwell’s motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that Epstein’s NPA with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida did not bar her prosecution by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. The court also found that the second superseding indictment complied with the statute of limitations, as the relevant statute extended the time to bring charges of sexual abuse for offenses committed before its enactment. Additionally, the District Court denied Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in its handling of a juror’s erroneous answers during voir dire. The court also rejected Maxwell’s claim that its response to a jury note resulted in a constructive amendment of, or prejudicial variance from, the indictment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Epstein’s NPA did not bind the Southern District of New York, the indictment was timely, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, and the response to the jury note did not result in a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance. The court also found Maxwell’s sentence to be procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law