Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff a practicing Baptist, was incarcerated in the Green Haven Correctional Facility from 2002 until 2018. After prison officials failed to update the Protestant services “call-out list,” Wiggins was excluded from all religious services for over five months. He sued Green Haven officials Thomas Griffin, M. Kopp, D. Howard, and Dr. G. Jebamani under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that (1) Defendants did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion, (2) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) if there were a constitutional violation, Kopp was not personally involved in it.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. First, the court concluded that Defendants’ failure to update the Protestant services call-out list, which prevented Plaintiff from attending worship services for over five months, substantially burdened his religious exercise. Second, because disputed issues of material fact remain, qualified immunity cannot shield Defendants from liability at this juncture. Third, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged Kopp’s personal involvement in a First Amendment violation by pleading that Kopp took no action even after she was informed that Plaintiff’s rights were being infringed. Finally, the court held that a Section 1983 free exercise claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights. View "Wiggins v. Griffin, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative shareholder class action complaint in New York State Supreme Court, alleging Maryland state law claims on behalf of himself and all similarly situated preferred stockholders of Cedar Realty Trust, Inc. (“Cedar”), a New York-based corporation incorporated in Maryland, following its August 2022 merger with Wheeler Real Estate Investment Trusts, Inc. (“Wheeler”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The complaint alleged Cedar and its leadership breached fiduciary duties owed to, and a contract with, shareholders such as Plaintiff and that Wheeler both aided and abetted the breach and tortiously interfered with the relevant contract. The Defendants collectively removed the case, invoking federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), but the district court remanded the case to state court after Krasner argued that an exception to CAFA jurisdiction applied to his claims.   The Second Circuit dismissed Defendants’ appeal and concluded that the “securities-related” exception applies. The court explained that here, the securities created a relationship between Cedar and Plaintiff that gave rise to fiduciary duties on the part of Cedar and the potential for additional claims against those parties who aid and abet Cedar’s breach of those duties. Thus, the aiding and abetting claim—and by the same logic, the tortious interference with contract claim—“seek enforcement of a right that arises from an appropriate instrument.” As such, the securities-related exception applies, and the district court properly remanded the case to state court. View "Krasner v. Cedar Realty Trust, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff class participates in “403(b)” retirement plans administered by Cornell University (“Cornell”). Plaintiffs brought this suit against Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries alleging a number of breaches of their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Plaintiffs appealed from entry of judgment in Defendants’ favor on all but one claim, which was settled by the parties. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged: (1) the dismissal of their claim that Cornell entered into a “prohibited transaction” by paying the plans’ recordkeepers unreasonable compensation, (2) the “parsing” of a single count alleging a breach of fiduciary duty into separate sub-claims at the motion to dismiss stage, (3) the award of summary judgment against Plaintiffs for failure to show loss on their claim that Defendants breached their duty of prudence by failing to monitor and control recordkeeping costs, and (4) the award of summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims that Cornell breached its duty of prudence by failing to remove underperforming investment options and by offering higher-cost retail share classes of mutual funds, rather than lower-cost institutional shares.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ prohibited transactions claim and certain duty-of-prudence allegations for failure to state a claim and did not err in granting partial summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining duty-of-prudence claims. In so doing, the court held as a matter of first impression that to state a claim for a prohibited transaction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a)(1)(C), it is not enough to allege that a fiduciary caused the plan to compensate a service provider for its services. View "Cunningham v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks a review of an April 20, 2022, decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering her removal and denying her application for cancellation of removal after determining she had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). That conviction, for abuse of a corpse in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated (“ACA”) Section 5-60-101, stemmed from concealing her child’s body in a closet after he was murdered. In her petition for review, Petitioner argued that the BIA and IJ erred because her conviction under ACA Section 5-60-101 is not categorically a CIMT.   The Second Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA’s order of removal and remanded. The court explained that the language of ACA Section 5-60-101(a)(1) allows someone to be convicted if he or she knowingly “removes” or “disinters” a corpse, no matter the reason and without regard to whether it is done in a manner offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities. The court explained that the broad language makes it clear that one can be convicted under the statute for conduct that is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Thus, because ACA Section 5-60-101 criminalizes conduct that is not invariably vile or depraved, a conviction under the statute cannot categorically be considered a CIMT. The BIA did not conduct an elements-based categorical inquiry. Instead, it applied an inapposite “realistic probability” test. View "Giron-Molina v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant Klarna, Inc. ("Klarna") provides a "buy now, pay later" service that allows shoppers to buy a product and pay for it in four equal installments over time without incurring any interest or fees. Plaintiff paid for two online purchases using Klarna. Plaintiff incurred $70 in overdraft fees. Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated consumers, alleging that Klarna misrepresents and conceals the risk of bank-overdraft fees that consumers face when using its pay-over-time service and asserting claims for common-law fraud and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act ("CUTPA"). Klarna moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied Klarna's motion.   The Second Circuit reversed he district court's order and remanded with instructions to grant Klarna's motion to compel arbitration. The court explained that when Plaintiff arrived at the Klarna Widget, she knew well that purchasing the GameStop item with Klarna meant that she was entering into a continuing relationship with Klarna, one that would endure at least until she repaid all four installments. The Klarna Widget provided clear notice that there were terms that would govern this continuing relationship. A reasonable internet user, therefore, would understand that finalizing the GameStop transaction, entering into a forward-looking relationship with Klarna, and receiving the benefit of Klarna's service would constitute assent to those terms. The court explained that Plaintiff was on inquiry notice that her "agreement to the payment terms," necessarily encompassed more than the information provided on the Klarna Widget, and the burden was then on her to find out to what terms she was accepting. View "Najah Edmundson v. Klarna Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment of conviction entered by the district court convicting him on his plea of guilty to possession and receipt of child pornography, and (b)(1), and obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2), contending that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a probation officer’s search of his cell phone and a further search by New York State Police and that the trial court erred in failing to allow him allocution at sentencing.   The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction but rejected the government’s argument and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Defendant argued that resentencing is required because he was not afforded his right to allocute. He argued that the court’s failure to provide allocution calls for automatic resentencing, even under plain error review, given that he made no objection during the sentencing proceeding. The government’s brief focuses on enforcement of his waiver of appeal and advances no argument against ordering resentencing in the event we do not enforce the appeal waiver. The court concluded that it should remand for resentencing, as Defendant has made a reasonable argument that he is entitled to resentencing, and the government has made no argument to the contrary. Because the government makes no argument to the contrary, the court explained that it does so without ruling as to the appropriate standard of review for an unpreserved claim of failure to grant allocution. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate his sentence and resentence, affording him the right of allocution. View "United States v. Lajeunesse" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Aron Govil engaged in several fraudulent securities offerings through his company, Cemtrex. Pursuant to a settlement agreement with Cemtrex, Govil agreed to pay back the proceeds of his fraud in part by surrendering his Cemtrex securities to the company. The district court later granted a motion by the SEC for additional disgorgement. The district court concluded that disgorgement was authorized and that the value of the securities Govil surrendered to Cemtrex should not offset the disgorgement award. Govil argues that neither U.S.C. Section 78u(d)(5) nor 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7) authorize disgorgement here.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to determine whether the defrauded investors suffered pecuniary harm. The court explained that the Second Circuit recently held that the disgorgement remedies under Section 78u(d)(5) and Section 78u(d)(7) are subject to the “traditional equitable limitations” that the Supreme Court recognized in Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020). SEC v. Ahmed, 72 F.4th 379, 396 (2d Cir. 2023). One of those equitable limitations is that disgorgement must be “awarded for victims.” Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1940. Further, the court wrote that a wrongdoer makes a payment in satisfaction of a disgorgement remedy when he returns the property to a wronged party. Accordingly, if on remand, the district court decides that disgorgement is authorized, it must value the surrendered securities and credit that value against the overall disgorgement award. View "SEC v. Govil" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a partial final judgment of the district court dismissing his Connecticut state law claims for defamation and tortious interference with contract against Defendant, who accused Plaintiff of sexual assault in 2015 while the two were students at Yale University. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding (1) Defendant to enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity for statements made at the 2018 Yale disciplinary hearing that resulted in Plaintiff’s expulsion from the university and (2) Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims based on Defendant’s original 2015 accusations to be untimely. On preliminary review, the Second Circuit was unable to determine whether Connecticut would recognize the Yale disciplinary hearing at issue as a quasi-judicial proceeding supporting absolute immunity in this case. Accordingly, the court certified questions pertinent to that determination to the Connecticut Supreme Court. That court responded that absolute immunity does not apply in this case because Yale’s disciplinary hearing was not a quasi-judicial proceeding in that it lacked procedural safeguards associated with judicial proceedings.   In response, The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that while the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the possibility for participants in such a hearing to be shielded by qualified immunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Defendant is not presently entitled to dismissal on that ground because Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently pleads the malice necessary to defeat such immunity. With this guidance as to Connecticut law, the court concluded on this appeal that Plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed against Defendant except as to his tortious interference claim based on 2015 statements, which is untimely. View "Khan v. Yale Univ." on Justia Law

This case presents the questions of what Defendant must prove to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and New York Labor Law Section 194(1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Culinary Institute of America, violated these equal-pay laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary Institute responded that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Plaintiff argued that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job and her colleague’s job. The district court did not consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and Section 194(1) when assessing Plaintiff’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the Section 194(1) claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job-related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA indicates the opposite. The court held that to establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex. But Plaintiff’s position is correct as to New York Labor Law Section 194(1). A recent amendment to Section 194(1) explicitly added a job-relatedness requirement. View "Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the forty-five-year sentence imposed by the district court following her guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to sexually exploit a child and two substantive counts of sexual exploitation of a child. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred when it (1) predetermined her sentence at the outset of the sentencing proceeding, (2) failed to verify at sentencing whether she and her counsel had read and discussed the presentence investigation report, (3) miscalculated her offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and (4) imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Defendant’s contentions that the district court predetermined her sentence and imposed a substantively unreasonable term of imprisonment. The court also rejected Defendant’s claim that the district court’s purported miscalculation of her offense level under the Guidelines warrants remand in this case. With respect to Defendant’s remaining argument, the court agreed that the district court failed to verify whether she and her counsel had read and discussed the PSR in advance of sentencing, as is required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A). The court concluded that the error was not prejudicial. View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law