Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that he co-created the song “All the Way Up,” but that he has not been properly credited or compensated for his contribution. He filed this action in the district court asserting claims under the Copyright Act, as well as various tort claims. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff assigned away any rights he may have had in the song, but the agreement has never been produced, and the parties disagree about its content and effect. The district court admitted a draft version of the missing agreement as a duplicate, and then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without allowing Plaintiff to conduct discovery.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the draft admissible as a duplicate original under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, but properly admitted the draft as “other evidence of the content” of the original under Rule 1004. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s request to conduct discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment and erred in concluding that no genuine dispute of material fact existed based on the current record. View "Elliott v. Cartagena, et al." on Justia Law

Catholic Health System of Long Island (“CHS”) brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of its motion to dismiss a qui tam action brought by a former employee (“Relator”) on behalf of the United States and the State of New York under the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), and the New York False Claims Act (“NYFCA”). According to Relator, CHS and certain of its affiliates falsely certified their compliance with federal law, in violation of the FCA and NYFCA, when they submitted Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims without disclosing their ongoing violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7b(a)(4) (the “Benefits Conversion Statute”). After the Department of Justice and the New York Attorney General declined to intervene in the suit, the district court denied CHS’s motion to dismiss these claims but granted its motion to certify an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) on the grounds that the case presented an issue of first impression.   The Second Circuit reversed. The court held that the Benefits Conversion Statute is not violated where, as here, the recipient of a reimbursement payment is under no obligation to utilize the funds in any particular way, Relator has failed to plead an FCA or NYFCA claim. The court explained that because the Medicare and Medicaid payments at issue here were reimbursements for services already provided, with no forward-looking conditions that they be used in any particular way, Defendants’ alleged conduct did not violate the Benefits Conversion Statute. Relator’s claims based on section 1320a-7b(a)(4) therefore fail as a matter of law. View "U.S. ex rel. Quartararo v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners appealed from orders of the district court denying their petitions for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, following their 2012 convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence – specifically, the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy – that caused the death of another person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) and (j). On appeal, Petitioners contend that the district court erroneously enforced the collateral-attack waivers in their plea agreements, which they argue are unenforceable in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).   The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal and explained that subsequent changes in the law do not allow Petitioners to back out of their valid agreements with the government; the waivers are enforceable. The court explained that a waiver of the right to bring a postconviction challenge is presumptively enforceable, even after the legal landscape shifts. A defendant who wishes to maintain his right to collaterally attack his conviction in the event of unforeseen legal developments may, of course, attempt to negotiate more favorable waiver terms with the government before pleading guilty. But where the waiver itself is clear, unambiguous, knowingly and voluntarily entered, and supported by consideration – here, the government’s agreement not to pursue charges or arguments that could have resulted in a much higher sentence – the terms of the plea agreements must be enforced. View "Cook v. United States" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs, former employees of a high-end fashion retailer in New York, allege that their regularly scheduled workweek included more than forty hours per week of work. Plaintiffs claim that they were entitled to an overtime premium under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law, and that their employer misclassified them as managerial employees and failed to pay them an overtime premium. The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims for failure to allege the specific number of hours they worked. It then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.   The Second Circuit vacated. The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ complaint adequately states a claim under the FLSA because it alleges that their regularly scheduled workweek exceeded forty hours of work and that the Plaintiffs were denied overtime as a result of being misclassified as managers. The court explained that various Plaintiffs have necessarily plausibly pleaded similar, if not identical, allegations about their regular schedule. In context, the individualized facts giving rise to each Plaintiff’s action – namely, when each Plaintiff worked the regular schedule at issue – are adequately and specifically alleged. View "Abbott v. Comme Des Garcons, Ltd." on Justia Law

New York brought this action against the National Marine Fisheries Service—the federal agency responsible for the summer flounder fishery—and several related federal entities. New York argues the current quotas fail to account for the long-term movement of summer flounder northward, closer to New York’s shores. New York claims the quotas violate the Magnuson-Stevens Act as well as the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court rejected that argument; it granted summary judgment to the Fisheries Service.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that in setting each state’s summer flounder quotas, the Fisheries Service properly weighed the relevant statutory considerations. The court explained that the NMFS adopted a rule that sought to “balance preservation of historical state access and infrastructure at recent quota levels, with the intent to provide equitability among states when the stock and quota are at higher levels.” The court explained that it could not say that this adjustment to the previous rule—the result of balancing ten different national standards—lacked a rational basis articulated in the administrative record. The court therefore concluded that the NMFS did not violate the MSA or the APA when it set summer flounder quotas through the 2020 Allocation Rule. View "State of New York v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

New York has a merit time allowance system in which prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for certain non-violent offenses can earn “merit time allowances” to reduce their minimum sentences by one-sixth. Plaintiff claims that New York prison officials revoked his merit time allowance and rescinded his merit-based parole release date without a hearing in violation of his procedural due process rights. The district court dismissed Petitioner's petition, finding that the prison official were entitled to qualified immunity because Petitioner's rights were not clearly established. Petitioner appealed.Recognizing that Petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his expected release date once it was granted by the Parole Board, the Second Circuit nevertheless concluded that the prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity because Petitioner's rights were not clearly established at the time of the prison officials’ conduct. View "Steven Bangs v. Walter William Smith, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision (1) affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. The BIA rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, declined No. 21-6043 2 to remand for consideration of additional hardship relating to his cancellation application, and declined to remand to await adjudication of his U visa application. Petitioner argued that the BIA (1) applied an incorrect standard when reviewing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (2) overlooked and mischaracterized his new hardship evidence, and (3) failed to follow precedent when denying his request for remand while awaiting the adjudication of his U visa application.   The Second Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded. The court explained that it agrees with Petitioner that the BIA improperly imposed a heightened standard when evaluating whether Petitioner was prejudiced by prior counsel’s deficient performance. The court explained that on remand, the BIA should differentiate between two types of hardship evidence presented by Petitioner in his appeal and motion to remand: (1) hardship evidence that was available to prior counsel and (2) evidence that was not previously available to prior counsel, for which Petitioner must show that the evidence “would likely change the result in the case.” View "Paucar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendants Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, LLP and its subsidiary, The Bank of New York Mellon (collectively, “BNYM”), retained Plaintiff as an independent contractor to work on an investment valuation project. Plaintiff developed the so-called Pauwels Model. At various times between 2014 and the end of his working relationship with BNYM in 2018, Plaintiff shared spreadsheets derived from the Pauwels Model with various employees and executives at BNYM. In 2016, BNYM retained Defendants Deloitte LLP, Deloitte Tax LLP, and Deloitte USA LLP (collectively, “Deloitte”) to take over the work that Plaintiff had been performing for BNYM. Plaintiff alleged that Deloitte used the spreadsheets to reverse engineer the Pauwels Model and was using the model to conduct the services it provided to BNYM. Plaintiff brought suit against BNYM and Deloitte, alleging, among other claims, that the Pauwels Model embodied a trade secret that they misappropriated.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. The court affirmed the remainder of the judgment. The court explained that misappropriation is not an element of a claim for unjust enrichment under New York law. Therefore, a plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment does not necessarily rise or fall with a claim of trade secret misappropriation. The court explained that because Plaintiff’s theory of liability is distinct from those underpinning Plaintiff’s claim for trade secret misappropriation, his claim for unjust enrichment should not have been dismissed as duplicative of his claim for trade secret misappropriation. View "Pauwels v. Deloitte LLP" on Justia Law

While riding a bicycle, Plaintiff ran into an open car door being operated by a recruiter for the U.S. Marines. Plaintiff brought a claim for negligence against the United States, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found the United States liable but concluded Plaintiff was also negligent and, therefore, partially liable.On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the evidence of Plaintiff's negligence was "dubious," and, even if Plaintiff was negligent, the district court failed to make the findings necessary to any holding that the plaintiff’s negligent conduct sufficiently caused the collision so as to make Plaintiff 40% responsible for the damages. View "Dooley v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction on charges including attempted murder in aid of racketeering and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Defendant argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses on which the conviction was based are not “crimes of violence” in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction remains valid even after Davis and Taylor because one of the predicate offenses underlying the conviction – attempted murder in aid of racketeering – is a categorical crime of violence. The court explained that here, unlike Hobbs Act robbery, the crime of second-degree murder cannot be committed through the mere threat of force and must instead involve the actual use of force. Since attempted murder requires both an intent to use physical force and a substantial step towards the use of physical force, it satisfies the “attempted use . . . of physical force” element under section 924(c), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A), and thereby qualifies as a crime of violence. View "United States v. Pastore" on Justia Law