Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A former congressman created personalized videos for paying customers through the Cameo platform. A late-night television host, using fictitious names, requested and purchased several of these videos. The host then broadcast some of the videos on his show as part of a recurring segment that mocked the congressman by highlighting his willingness to say unusual things for money. The congressman claimed that this use of his videos infringed his copyrights and also violated state law through breach of contract and fraudulent inducement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case and dismissed the complaint. The court found that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, reasoning that the television host’s use was transformative and did not harm the market for the original videos. The court also held that the state law claims were either preempted by the Copyright Act or failed to state a claim under applicable state law. Specifically, the court determined that the congressman was not a party to the relevant contract, failed to allege the essential terms of any implied contract, and did not plead any actual out-of-pocket loss for the fraudulent inducement claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were barred by the fair use doctrine, emphasizing the transformative nature of the use and the lack of market harm. The court also concluded that the state law claims failed to state a claim for relief, either because the congressman was not a party to the contract, did not allege an implied contract, or failed to allege actual damages. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed in full. View "Santos v. Kimmel" on Justia Law

Several individuals and a firearms instruction company challenged various aspects of New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA) and the way the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD) implements the law. The individual plaintiffs, all Suffolk County residents, objected to requirements for obtaining a handgun license, including a “good moral character” standard, an in-person interview, disclosure of household members and character references, a list of social media accounts, and completion of eighteen hours of firearms training. They also alleged that the SCPD’s process for scheduling interviews and issuing licenses could take years, far exceeding statutory timelines. Additionally, the plaintiffs, including firearms instructors, challenged an alleged SCPD policy of arresting unlicensed individuals participating in live-fire training, despite a state law exemption for such training.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the individual applicants lacked standing to challenge the CCIA’s requirements because they had not completed the application process, and that none of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the SCPD’s arrest policy due to a lack of credible threat of enforcement. The district court did not address the challenge to the SCPD’s processing delays.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the applicants did have standing to challenge the CCIA’s requirements and the SCPD’s processing delays, but affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their facial Second Amendment challenges, except for the social media disclosure requirement, which was already preliminarily enjoined in another case, rendering that issue moot. The court also found that at least one plaintiff had standing to challenge the SCPD’s arrest policy and vacated the district court’s ruling on that issue, remanding for further proceedings. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Giambalvo v. Suffolk Cnty." on Justia Law

A hotel in the Town of Newburgh, New York, agreed to provide long-term housing to asylum seekers as part of a program initiated by New York City. In response, the Town alleged that the hotel’s actions violated local zoning and occupancy ordinances, which limited hotel stays to transient guests for no more than 30 days. The Town inspected the hotel, found modifications suggesting long-term use, and filed suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Orange County, seeking to enjoin the hotel from housing asylum seekers for extended periods. The state court issued a temporary restraining order, but allowed the asylum seekers already present to remain pending further orders.The hotel removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the Town’s enforcement was racially motivated and violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus justifying removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). The district court found that removal was improper because the hotel had not sufficiently pleaded grounds for removal under § 1443(1), and remanded the case to state court.While the hotel’s appeal of the remand order was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the underlying state court action was discontinued with prejudice after the asylum seekers left and the City ended its program. The Second Circuit determined that, because the state court case was permanently terminated, there was no longer a live controversy regarding removal. The court held the appeal was moot and, following standard practice when mootness occurs through no fault of the appellant, vacated the district court’s remand order and dismissed the appeal. View "Town of Newburgh v. Newburgh EOM LLC" on Justia Law

Verizon Communications Inc. provided mobile voice and data services to customers and, until 2019, operated a program that sold access to customer device-location data through third-party aggregators. These aggregators resold the data to various entities for uses such as call routing and roadside assistance. Verizon relied on contractual arrangements and an external auditor to ensure that customer consent was obtained before disclosing location data. In 2018, a news report revealed that a third party, Securus Technologies, enabled law enforcement to access customer location data without proper consent, exposing flaws in Verizon’s safeguards. Verizon subsequently terminated access for Securus and related entities, but continued the program for other providers for several months.Following the news report, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an enforcement action, issuing a Notice of Apparent Liability and, after considering Verizon’s response, a forfeiture order. The FCC found that Verizon’s device-location data qualified as “customer proprietary network information” under § 222 of the Communications Act, and that Verizon failed to reasonably protect this information both before and after the Securus incident. The FCC imposed a $46.9 million penalty, calculated as 63 continuing violations—one for each third-party relationship that persisted after the breach was publicized—and included a 50% upward adjustment for egregious conduct. Verizon paid the penalty and petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that device-location data is protected under § 222, the FCC’s liability finding was not arbitrary or capricious, and the penalty did not exceed statutory limits. The court also found that Verizon’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not violated, as Verizon could have obtained a jury trial by declining to pay the penalty and contesting the forfeiture in federal district court. The petition for review was denied. View "Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York of transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography, all in violation of federal law. The defendant’s conduct involved the use of the Kik messaging application, which uses software to detect and report child sexual abuse material (CSAM) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Kik’s detection process relies on a database of known CSAM hash values provided by NCMEC. When Kik’s software identifies a match, a designated employee reviews the file and, if confirmed as CSAM, reports it to NCMEC, which then forwards the information to law enforcement. The defendant was linked to the offending accounts through IP address records and admitted during a post-arrest interview to using the relevant Kik accounts and sharing child pornography.After his arrest, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from Kik’s searches and his own statements to law enforcement, arguing that Kik acted as an agent of NCMEC, which he claimed was a governmental entity for Fourth Amendment purposes. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the motion, finding that while NCMEC might be a governmental entity, Kik was not acting as its agent. The court also found that the defendant had validly waived his Miranda rights and that his statements were not coerced. The jury acquitted the defendant on some counts but convicted him on others. The court sentenced him to 151 months in prison and 15 years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that NCMEC is a governmental entity for Fourth Amendment purposes, but the defendant failed to show that Kik acted as a governmental agent when it searched his accounts. The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions, and upheld the sentence as substantively reasonable. However, the court vacated and remanded in part, instructing the district court to amend the written judgment to conform with its oral pronouncement regarding certain conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Guard" on Justia Law

A law firm serving on the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee in multidistrict litigation related to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was found to have deliberately leaked a confidential deposition transcript to a reporter, violating two court-issued protective orders. The firm, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, had previously received a warning for a similar breach. After the leak, the firm conducted an internal investigation but failed to question the individual responsible. When the breach was investigated by the court, the firm initially denied responsibility and submitted deficient declarations before ultimately admitting the leak.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, after a two-day evidentiary hearing before a Magistrate Judge, found that the firm had willfully violated the protective orders and misled the court. The court imposed sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), including removal of the firm from the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, an order to pay attorney’s fees, and a bar on receiving certain funds. The District Judge affirmed these sanctions. The firm’s petition for a writ of mandamus to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was denied, after which the firm filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the sanctions order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a Rule 37(b) sanctions order against attorneys for discovery violations is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The court reasoned that such orders are effectively reviewable after final judgment and do not resolve important issues separate from the merits of the underlying litigation. Accordingly, the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "In re: Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001" on Justia Law

A private Christian school in Vermont forfeited a girls’ basketball playoff game because it objected, on religious grounds, to playing against a team with a transgender athlete. The school believes that requiring its female athletes to compete against biological males would violate its religious convictions about the immutability of sex. Following the forfeit, the Vermont Principals’ Association (VPA), which oversees extracurricular activities for Vermont schools, expelled the school from all state-sponsored extracurricular activities, including both athletic and non-athletic events.After the expulsion, the school and several students and parents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, seeking a preliminary injunction to reinstate the school’s VPA membership and alleging a violation of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the VPA’s policies regarding transgender athletes were neutral and generally applicable, and thus subject only to rational-basis review. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that the VPA’s expulsion was not neutral, as it was accompanied by official expressions of hostility toward the school’s religious beliefs. The court found that the plaintiffs also satisfied the requirements of irreparable harm and public interest. Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to grant a preliminary injunction reinstating the school’s VPA membership pending further proceedings. View "Mid Vermont Christian School v. Saunders" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes.The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

Two former employees of a fire alarm and sprinkler company provided fire alarm testing and inspection services on public works projects in New York. They alleged that their employer failed to pay them the prevailing wages required by New York Labor Law § 220, which mandates that workers on public works projects receive at least the prevailing rate of wages. The contracts between the employer and various public entities included clauses that either disclaimed the applicability of prevailing wage laws, were silent on the issue, or referenced prevailing wage rates. Many contracts also contained a provision shortening the statute of limitations for any action against the company to one year.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted partial summary judgment in favor of the employer on all prevailing wage-related claims. The court found that: (1) the contracts did not expressly promise to pay prevailing wages; (2) the one-year contractual limitations period barred the claims; and (3) fire alarm testing and inspection work was not covered by § 220’s prevailing wage requirement. The court also dismissed related quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims and later approved a class action settlement on other claims, with the prevailing wage claims reserved for appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, based on a 2009 New York State Department of Labor opinion letter and relevant precedent, fire alarm testing and inspection work is covered by § 220, entitling the plaintiffs to prevailing wages. However, the Second Circuit found New York law unsettled on whether a promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract (even if not expressly stated) and whether a contractual one-year limitations period is enforceable against workers’ third-party beneficiary claims. The court therefore certified these two questions to the New York Court of Appeals for resolution. View "Walton v. Comfort Systems" on Justia Law

In 2019, a well-known advice columnist publicly accused a sitting U.S. president of sexually assaulting her in a department store in 1996. The president, while in office, responded with public statements denying the allegations, asserting he did not know the accuser, and claiming she fabricated the story for personal and political gain. The accuser then filed a defamation lawsuit in New York state court, alleging that these statements were false and damaged her reputation. The case was removed to federal court after the Department of Justice certified that the president acted within the scope of his office, but the DOJ later withdrew this certification. During the litigation, the accuser also brought a separate lawsuit under a new state law allowing survivors of sexual assault to sue regardless of the statute of limitations, which resulted in a jury finding that the president had sexually abused and defamed her after leaving office.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial summary judgment for the accuser in the original defamation case, relying on issue preclusion from the verdict in the later case. The trial was limited to damages, and the jury awarded the accuser $83.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The president moved for a new trial or remittitur, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to presidential immunity, that the damages were excessive, and that the jury instructions were erroneous. The district court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the president had waived any claim to absolute presidential immunity by failing to timely assert it, and that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Trump v. United States did not alter this conclusion. The court also found no error in the district court’s application of issue preclusion, evidentiary rulings, or jury instructions, and concluded that the damages awarded were reasonable and not excessive. The judgment in favor of the accuser was affirmed in full. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law