Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her deceased husband, brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States alleging that a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs hospital negligently failed to diagnose her husband with lung cancer. Prior to trial, the government conceded that the hospital’s ten-month failure to diagnose her husband was a departure from the standard of care. Following a two-day bench trial, the district court entered judgment and awarded $975,233.75 in damages to Plaintiff, including $850,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 for loss of consortium.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued: (1) the district court erred in failing to adequately explain its factual findings and methodology for arriving at its awards as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); and (2) the district court’s awards for pain and suffering and loss of consortium were based on legal errors.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court first clarified that the appropriate standard of review for assessing a district court’s FTCA damages award governed by New York law is whether the award “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation,” as articulated under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 5501(c). The court nonetheless found Plaintiff’s challenges to the district court’s damages awards to be unpersuasive. The district court’s explanation for the awards in its factual findings and conclusions of law, as well as in its denial of the motion to amend or alter the judgment as to these awards, satisfied the requirements of Rule 52. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a series of claims in New York state court arising out of a syndicated loan transaction facilitated by Defendants, a group of financial institutions. Plaintiff’s appeal presents two issues. The first issue presented is whether the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 632. The second issue presented is whether the District Court erroneously dismissed Plaintiff’s state-law securities claims on the ground that he failed to plausibly suggest that notes issued as part of the syndicated loan transaction are securities under Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction under the Edge Act because Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. engaged in international or foreign banking as part of the transaction giving rise to this suit. The court also held that the district court did not erroneously dismiss Plaintiff’s state-law securities claims because Plaintiff failed to plausibly suggest that the notes are securities under Reves. View "Kirschner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Appellants, investors in the securities of AmTrust Financial Services, Inc., appealed from a district court judgment dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim under Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against AmTrust, various AmTrust corporate officers and board members, AmTrust’s outside auditor, and multiple underwriters of AmTrust’s sale of securities. The district court determined that certain public misstatements relating to AmTrust’s recognition of revenue generated by its extended warranty contracts and the expenses associated with its payment of discretionary employee bonuses were non-actionable statements of opinion.The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court vacated the dismissal of the Appellants’ Section 11 claims against the AmTrust Defendants and the Director Defendants, the Section 12(a)(2) claims against AmTrust, and the Section 15 claims against the Officer Defendants and Director Defendants relating to AmTrust’s accounting for certain warranty contracts and bonuses. The court vacated the dismissal of the Appellants’ claims under Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) against the Underwriter Defendants relating to AmTrust’s accounting for certain warranty contracts and bonuses. The court concluded that Appellants have adequately established standing under Section 12(a)(2) by alleging that they purchased securities pursuant to the “pertinent offering documents” or in the relevant offerings underwritten by the defendants. View "New England Carpenters Guaranteed Annuity and Pension Funds v. AmTrust" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of, among other things, kidnapping and kidnapping conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1201. Defendant argued on appeal that the victim’s detention was too brief to constitute kidnapping under section 1201 because Defendant lacked the intent required to violate section 1201 and because the district court violated his constitutional rights by preventing him from cross-examining the victim about any connections that the victim’s family may have had to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with Defendant that not all detentions satisfy section 1201(a)’s second element. However, the court explained that Defendant’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, Rodriguez does not compel the conclusion that the victim’s detention was not a kidnapping. The court concluded that Defendant’s conduct satisfied the federal kidnapping statute’s second element. While the victim’s 30-minute detention may be characterized as relatively brief, it was nonetheless “appreciable.” As noted, Defendant forced the victim into the vehicle under threat of violence, physically restrained the victim before walking him to a more secluded location, threatened the victim with a knife, beat the victim repeatedly, and included the victim’s family in their threats. The perilous nature of these conditions weighs heavily in favor of concluding that the victim’s detention was appreciable. View "United States v. Krivoi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant appealed from a district court order granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees on his claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erroneously held that he lacks RICO standing to sue for his lost earnings because those losses flowed from, or were derivative of, an antecedent personal injury.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that RICO’s civil-action provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c), authorizes a plaintiff to sue for injuries to “business or property.” While that language implies that a plaintiff cannot sue for personal injuries, that negative implication does not bar a plaintiff from suing for injuries to business or property simply because a personal injury was antecedent to those injuries. The court explained that it is simply wrong to suggest that the antecedent-personal-injury bar is necessary to ensure “genuine limitations” in Section 1964(c), or to give restrictive significance to Congress’s implicit intent to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase “business or property”’ when it enacted RICO. View "Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Douglas Horn appealed the district court’s order of the granting summary judgment to Defendants on his claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). On appeal, Appellant argues that the district court erroneously held that he lacks RICO 11 standing to sue for his lost earnings because those losses flowed from, or were derivative of, an antecedent personal injury.   The Second Circuit agreed and vacated the order granting summary judgment to Appellees on Appellant’s civil RICO claim and remanded to the district court. The court explained that RICO’s civil-action provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c), authorizes a plaintiff to sue for injuries to 14 “business or property.” While that language implies that a plaintiff cannot sue for personal injuries, that negative implication does not bar a plaintiff from suing for injuries to business or property simply because a personal injury was antecedent to those injuries. View "Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants County of Suffolk, Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office Division Chief Edward Heilig, and Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office Special Investigations Bureau Chief Joseph Carroll. Plaintiff was a Clerk Typist in the District Attorney’s Office from 2008 until her employment in the Special Investigations Bureau was terminated in 2015. She alleged that defendants discriminated against her based on her disability and retaliated against her for seeking an accommodation for that disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Section 296, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim and vacated the district court’s judgment with respect to the reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims. The court agreed with Plaintiff that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims. The court explained that construing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, a rational jury could find that archiving was not an essential function of Plaintiff’s position and that defendants failed to provide a reasonable workplace accommodation for her disability. The court similarly concluded that disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. View "Tafolla v. Heilig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff painted two large murals directly onto the walls inside a building on the campus of Defendant-Appellee Vermont Law School, Inc. The work stirred controversy, which eventually prompted the law school to erect a wall of acoustic panels around the murals to permanently conceal them from public view. Kerson brought suit against the law school, alleging that obscuring his work behind a permanent barrier violated his rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), which creates a cause of action for artists to prevent the modification and, in certain instances, destruction of works of visual art.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that merely ensconcing a work of art behind a barrier neither modifies nor destroys the work, as contemplated by VARA, and thus does not implicate VARA’s protections. The court explained that this case presents weighty concerns that pin an artist’s moral right to maintain the integrity of an artwork against a private entity’s control over the art in its possession. On the facts presented here, the court resolved this tension by hewing to the statutory text, which reflects Congress’s conscientious balancing of the competing interests at stake.  Because mere concealment of the Murals neither “modifies” nor “destroys” them, the Law School has not violated any of VARA’s prohibitions. As such, VARA does not entitle Plaintiff to an order directing the Law School to take the barrier down and continue to display the Murals. View "Kerson v. Vermont Law School, Inc." on Justia Law

Objector-Appellant appealed from a district court judgment approving a settlement award, attorneys’ fee award, and incentive award in a class action lawsuit. Plaintiff-Appellee, on behalf of similarly situated subscribers in California, sued Defendant-Appellee The New York Times (“NYT”), claiming that NYT automatically renewed NYT subscriptions without providing the disclosures and authorizations required by California’s Automatic Renewal Law (the “ARL”).  The parties negotiated a settlement agreement whereby class members dropped their claims in exchange for NYT’s reformation of its business practices and either Access Codes for one-month NYT subscriptions or pro rata cash payments. The settlement agreement also provided for the payment of substantial attorneys’ fees to class counsel and an incentive award to the class representative. Appellant objected to the proposed settlement, primarily arguing that the settlement is unfair, the attorneys’ fees calculation improperly exceeds limits set by the coupon settlement provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), and the incentive award is not authorized by law. The district court disagreed, certifying a class and approving the settlement, $1.25 million attorneys’ fees, and a $5,000 incentive award.   On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with Appellant that the district court exceeded its discretion when it approved the settlement based on the wrong legal standard in contravention of Rule 23(e). The court also agreed that the Access Codes are coupons,  which subject the attorneys’ fees calculation to CAFA’s coupon settlement requirements. Because the district court’s conclusions are intertwined, the court vacated the district court’s judgment in its entirety and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Maribel Moses v. The New York Times Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a former employee of International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) who signed a separation agreement requiring confidential arbitration of any claims arising from her termination. Petitioner arbitrated an age-discrimination claim against IBM and won. She then filed a petition in federal court under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to confirm the award, attaching it to the petition under seal but simultaneously moving to unseal it. Shortly after she filed the petition, IBM paid the award in full. The district court granted Petitioner’s petition to confirm the award and her motion to unseal. On appeal, IBM argued that (1) the petition to confirm became moot once IBM paid the award, and (2) the district court erred in unsealing the confidential award.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s confirmation of the award and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition as moot. The court reversed the district court’s grant of the motion to unseal. The court explained that Petitioner’s petition to confirm her purely monetary award became moot when IBM paid the award in full because there remained no “concrete” interest in enforcement of the award to maintain a case or controversy under Article III. Second, any presumption of public access to judicial documents is outweighed by the importance of confidentiality under the FAA and the impropriety of Petitioner’s effort to evade the confidentiality provision in her arbitration agreement. View "Stafford v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp." on Justia Law