Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following the 2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, Connecticut enacted legislation restricting the acquisition and possession of certain “assault weapons” and “large capacity magazines.” The laws were later expanded to include additional firearms. Individuals and organizations who wished to acquire and possess weapons restricted by these statutes, including AR-platform rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds, challenged the laws. They argued that the restrictions violated their rights under the Second Amendment.In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the plaintiffs in both cases sought preliminary injunctions to prevent enforcement of the statutes. The district court denied the motions, finding that the plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their Second Amendment claims. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the regulated weapons and magazines were commonly used for self-defense, and, alternatively, that the state’s restrictions were consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons. The plaintiffs appealed these rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunctions. Applying the framework established by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Second Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs’ proposed conduct was presumptively protected by the Second Amendment. The court concluded, however, that Connecticut’s laws are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons, as they impose targeted restrictions while preserving numerous alternatives for lawful self-defense. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief in both cases. View "Nat'l Ass'n for Gun Rights v. Lamont" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including an individual, a retirement fund, and several investment funds, traded derivatives based on the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor). They alleged that a group of banks and brokers conspired to manipulate Euribor, which affected the pricing of various over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, such as FX forwards, interest-rate swaps, and forward rate agreements. The alleged conduct included coordinated false submissions to set Euribor at artificial levels, collusion among banks and brokers, and structural changes within banks to facilitate manipulation. Plaintiffs claimed this manipulation harmed them by distorting the prices of their Euribor-based derivative transactions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Sherman Act, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and state common law, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court also found that the RICO claims were based on extraterritorial conduct and did not meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). It declined to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed that conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction was not established but held that two plaintiffs—Frontpoint Australian Opportunities Trust and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System—had established specific personal jurisdiction over UBS AG and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC for Sherman Act and RICO claims related to OTC Euribor derivative transactions in the United States. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claims for lack of particularity, but held that the Sherman Act claims were sufficiently pleaded. It vacated the district court’s refusal to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. View "Sullivan v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of possessing child pornography, following an investigation that began when coworkers reported him for viewing such material at work. A forensic analysis confirmed the allegations, and further investigation revealed that he possessed between 10 and 150 images of child pornography, as well as other images indicating a sexual interest in children. During the investigation, authorities also learned that in 2014, the defendant, then a church treasurer and deacon, had sexually abused two young boys at his church on the same day, in separate rooms and separated by non-criminal conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York accepted the defendant’s guilty plea and, at sentencing, applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s abuse of the two boys constituted two separate instances of sexual abuse. The court sentenced the defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment and imposed a 20-year term of supervised release, including special conditions restricting contact with minors, limiting him to one internet-capable device, and prohibiting possession of sexually explicit material.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the application of the pattern enhancement, the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, and the procedural reasonableness of the special conditions of supervised release. The court held that the district court correctly applied the pattern enhancement, finding that the two acts of abuse were separate instances under the relevant guideline, drawing on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wooden v. United States. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable and upheld the special conditions of supervised release. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Wildlife Preserves, Inc., a non-profit conservation organization, conveyed land comprising most of the Sunken Forest Preserve—a rare maritime holly forest on Fire Island, New York—to the United States government in the 1950s and 1960s. The deeds included restrictions requiring the land to be maintained in its natural state and operated as a preserve for wildlife, prohibiting activities such as hunting, trapping, and any actions that might adversely affect the environment or animal population. Over time, the National Park Service managed the property as part of the Fire Island National Seashore. In response to a significant increase in white-tailed deer, which threatened local flora and fauna, the government adopted a 2016 management plan involving exclusion fencing and deer population reduction within the Sunken Forest.Wildlife Preserves filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, arguing that the 2016 plan violated the deed restrictions and triggered a reversionary interest in the property under New York law. The district court denied Wildlife Preserves’ motion for summary judgment and granted the government’s cross-motion, holding that the suit was time-barred under the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations due to a prior fence constructed in 1967.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but on alternative grounds. The court held that, under New York law, the 2016 management plan did not violate the deed restrictions. The court reasoned that the plan’s fencing and deer reduction measures were consistent with the requirement to maintain the land in its natural state and operate it as a wildlife preserve, and that the restrictions must be strictly construed against the grantor. Thus, summary judgment for the government was affirmed. View "Wildlife Preserves v. Romero" on Justia Law

A prospective candidate for the 2025 New York City mayoral election, who had not been affiliated with any political party since 2006, sought to run as the nominee of an independent body named the “Independence Party.” New York election law prohibits both political parties and independent bodies from using certain words, including “Independence” and “Independent,” in their names. The candidate argued that these naming restrictions, as applied to him, violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and association.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reviewed the candidate’s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the naming restrictions. The district court found that the candidate had standing to sue but denied the injunction. The court concluded that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights, as they did not prevent him from communicating his political message or engaging in petitioning activity. Applying the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, the court determined that the restrictions were reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and justified by the state’s interest in preventing voter confusion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit held that the naming restrictions apply to independent bodies, that the candidate had standing, and that the state officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court further held that the naming provisions did not impose a severe burden on the candidate’s First Amendment rights and were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulations justified by the state’s interest in avoiding voter confusion. The denial of the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Walden v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

The United States government brought suit against several defendants, including EZ Lynk, SEZC, Thomas Wood, and Bradley Gintz, alleging that their product, the EZ Lynk System, violated the Clean Air Act by enabling vehicle owners to bypass or disable emissions controls. The EZ Lynk System consists of a physical device that connects to a vehicle’s diagnostics port, a smartphone app, and a cloud-based service. Through this system, users can download and install “tunes” created by third-party technicians, including “delete tunes” that defeat emissions controls. The complaint detailed how EZ Lynk collaborated with tune creators, provided technical support, and maintained an online forum where users discussed using the system to delete emissions controls.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the government’s complaint sufficiently alleged that the EZ Lynk System was a “defeat device” under the Clean Air Act. However, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that EZ Lynk and its principals were immune from liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The court reasoned that EZ Lynk merely published third-party information (the delete tunes) and did not create them, thus qualifying for Section 230 immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Second Circuit agreed that the complaint adequately alleged the EZ Lynk System was a defeat device. However, it held that the complaint also sufficiently alleged that EZ Lynk, Wood, and Gintz directly and materially contributed to the creation of the unlawful delete tunes, making them ineligible for Section 230 immunity. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that Section 230 immunity does not apply where a defendant directly and materially contributes to the creation of unlawful content. View "United States v. EZ Lynk" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was stopped by New York State Troopers in Oneida County, New York, on September 4, 2017, after a report of erratic driving. During the stop, Trooper Colton claimed the plaintiff failed field sobriety tests and later registered a high blood alcohol content on a breathalyzer. The plaintiff disputed these findings, alleging the tests were improperly administered and that he passed them. He was arrested and charged with a felony for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, multiple DWI-related misdemeanors, and a traffic infraction. The felony charge was later amended to a misdemeanor before a suppression hearing, after which the city court suppressed evidence due to concerns about Trooper Colton’s credibility. The plaintiff ultimately pled guilty to the traffic infraction, and the remaining DWI-related charges were dismissed.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the plaintiff’s federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleged false arrest, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence. The district court found that the guilty plea to the traffic infraction established probable cause for the arrest, defeating the false arrest claim. It also held that the plaintiff could not show favorable termination for the malicious prosecution claim because the DWI-related charges were dismissed as part of a plea agreement. The fabrication of evidence claim was dismissed as conclusory and contradicted by Trooper Colton’s testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the false arrest claim and the malicious prosecution claim as to the DWI-related charges dismissed in the plea agreement, holding that a guilty plea to one charge bars a malicious prosecution claim for other charges dismissed as part of the same plea. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim as to the terminated felony charge, finding it plausibly terminated favorably because its dismissal was not clearly part of the plea. The court also reinstated the fabrication of evidence claim, concluding the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged intentional fabrication. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Carruthers v. Colton" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont brought a lawsuit in state court against 3M Company, alleging that 3M’s production of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), known as “forever chemicals,” had contaminated Vermont’s natural resources, including water, wildlife, soil, and sediment. The case focused on contamination at the Rutland City landfill and a former 3M manufacturing facility in Rutland, Vermont. In 2023, Vermont’s Department of Environmental Conservation sent 3M a letter identifying it as a potentially responsible party for PFAS contamination, and Vermont’s counsel later forwarded this letter to 3M’s counsel in the context of the ongoing litigation.After receiving the letter, 3M conducted an internal investigation and determined that, during its ownership of the Rutland facility, it had manufactured copper-clad laminates in accordance with military specifications that required the use of PFAS. On January 3, 2024, 3M removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), asserting a federal defense based on its compliance with military requirements. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont found that 3M’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), reasoning that the thirty-day removal period began when 3M received Vermont’s email with the DEC letter, and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s remand order de novo. The Second Circuit held that Vermont’s correspondence did not provide sufficient information for 3M to ascertain that the case was removable under the federal officer removal statute, and thus the thirty-day removal period had not begun when 3M received the email. The court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

A New York resident, known as Lucha El, was twice arrested for unlawful possession of firearms. In both instances, the firearms had been purchased in South Carolina by another individual, Keith Vereen, who acted as a straw purchaser. Lucha El paid Vereen, who then transported the firearms to New York, where Lucha El received them. Lucha El did not have the necessary permits to purchase firearms in New York and did not attempt to obtain a federal license to transport firearms across state lines.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charged Lucha El with interstate transport of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and conspiracy to transport or receive firearms from outside his state of residency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Lucha El moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that § 922(a)(3) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. After a trial, a jury found him guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and forfeiture of the firearms. Lucha El appealed, raising only the Second Amendment challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that § 922(a)(3) is a lawful regulation on the commercial sale of firearms that does not meaningfully constrain the right to keep and bear arms. The court further found that, even if the statute did impose a meaningful constraint, it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Lucha El’s convictions under § 922(a)(3) did not violate the Second Amendment. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, deposited approximately $2 million in a New York Merrill Lynch account in 1972, which grew to over $40 million. These funds, known as the Arelma Assets, were proceeds of Marcos’s criminal activities. After Marcos’s ouster, multiple parties—including the Republic of the Philippines, a class of nearly 10,000 human rights victims, and the estate of Roger Roxas (from whom Marcos had stolen treasure)—asserted competing claims to these assets. The Republic obtained a forfeiture judgment from a Philippine court and requested the U.S. Attorney General to enforce it under 28 U.S.C. § 2467.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the enforcement application. The court rejected the class’s affirmative defenses, which included arguments based on statute of limitations, subject matter jurisdiction, lack of notice, and fraud. The court also found that Roxas lacked Article III standing because she failed to show a sufficient interest in the Arelma Assets, and denied her leave to amend her answer. The court entered judgment for the Government, allowing the assets to be returned to the Republic of the Philippines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the class failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to any of its affirmative defenses and that Roxas lacked standing to participate as a respondent. The court also upheld the denial of intervention by Golden Budha Corporation, finding its interests adequately represented and lacking standing. The main holding is that the Government’s application to enforce the Philippine forfeiture judgment was timely and proper, and that neither the class nor Roxas could block enforcement or claim the assets. View "In re: Enforcement of Philippine Forfeiture Judgment" on Justia Law