Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her brother, the executor of their father's estate, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court held that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“RICO Amendment”), which provides that “no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of [RICO].” 18 U.S.C.1964(c).The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claims were not barred by the RICO Amendment because the fraud she alleged was not related to the “purchase or sale of securities.” The alleged frauds committed by her brother "only incidentally involved securities, unlike a securities broker who sells client securities in breach of his duty to execute securities transactions in the best interests of the client." View "D'Addario v. D'Addario" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from a district court judgment dismissing his to confirm an arbitral award. The court held that a forum selection 2 clause in the parties’ arbitration agreement required that any confirmation action be brought in the state courts of New Jersey or New York, and that this deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.   The Second Circuit vacated. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s petition. First, the court held that the petition adequately pleaded subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. Because parties cannot contractually strip a district court of its subject matter jurisdiction, it was error to conclude that the forum selection clause did so. Second, the court interpreted the relevant forum selection clauses as permissive arrangements that merely allow litigation in certain fora, rather than mandatory provisions that require litigation to occur only there. Accordingly, applying the modified forum non conveniens framework, the court held that the forum selection clauses did not bar proceedings from going forward in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. View "Rabinowitz v. Kelman" on Justia Law

Niagara County’s Child Protective Services successfully petitioned in Niagara County Family Court to strip Plaintiff of her parental rights over her minor son. Plaintiff appealed the Family Court’s decision. While that appeal was pending, she brought suit in federal court against officials and entities involved in terminating her parental rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment insofar as the district court denied Plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend and for additional time to serve defendants. The court held that the RookerFeldman doctrine does not apply when an appeal remains pending in state court. Rooker-Feldman applies only after the state proceedings have ended. View "Hunter v. McMahon" on Justia Law

Appellant motioned the Second Circuit to consider his pro se filing in addition to his counseled brief and to supplement the record. Appellant’s underlying appeal arises from the government’s dismissal, on May 8, 2019, of several indictments against him. Those indictments had been pending since 1999 when Appellant was charged for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.   The Second Circuit denied Appellant’s motion for the court to consider his supplemental pro se brief and his motion to supplement the record. Further, the court granted the government’s motion or an extension of time to file its brief to a date three weeks after the date of resolution of Appellant’s motion. The court explained that Appellant’s motion to supplement the record does not explain why he did not submit them to the district court. Appellant asked the Court to draw factual inferences from the letter and the declaration—inferences the government contests—but a motion to supplement the record “is not a device for presenting evidence to this Court that was not before the trial judge.” View "United States v. Hage (Mamdouh Mahmud Salim)" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who operate small venue theaters in New York City, brought claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and nominal damages, alleging that the City’s Key to NYC program—which required certain indoor venues to check the COVID-19 vaccination status of patrons and staff before permitting entry—violated their rights to free speech and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the expiration of the Key to NYC program, the district court dismissed as moot Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for nominal damages for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an injury in fact. Plaintiffs now appeal that order.   The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged Article III standing. However, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal on the alternative ground of failure to state a claim. The court explained that Key to NYC does not impair a fundamental right because it does not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Nor does it target a suspect class. These are locations where large numbers of unassociated individuals are likely to gather and spend significant amounts of time exposed to one another, thereby posing a relatively high risk of spreading COVID-19. Requiring individuals in those settings to be vaccinated mitigated that risk and incentivized vaccination among the people most likely to be in a position to spread the virus. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged an equal protection violation. View "Clementine Co. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment in his Section 1983 suit arising from those portions of Plaintiff’s imprisonment that occurred as a result of an improper imposition of administrative post-release supervision (“PRS”) by New York State agencies, and subsequent improper imposition of PRS by a New York state court. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in limiting relief to $1 in nominal damages, denying him punitive damages as a matter of law, and granting summary judgment for Appellees on his false imprisonment claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court instructed the district court to consider further whether, under Vincent, compensatory damages may still be available to Plaintiff. Further, the court agreed with Plaintiff that material issues of disputed fact preclude summary judgment. Appellees’ Rule 56.1 statement stated that as of May 30, 2000, the maximum expiration date of Plaintiff’s sentence was February 13, 2008, and as of July 30, 2007, it was June 6, 2008. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s failure in the district court to object to Appellees’ statement of material facts does not preclude him from relying on inconsistencies in Appellees’ own evidence to identify a disputed issue of material fact that made it erroneous to enter summary judgment. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees on the false imprisonment claim. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s challenge to his post-resentencing confinement is precluded by Appellees’ qualified immunity defense. View "Aponte v. Perez" on Justia Law

Appellant UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. was sued in the Southern District of New York and filed a third-party complaint against Appellee EVA Airways Corporation, seeking indemnification and contribution. The district court granted EVA’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. UPS appealed, arguing that EVA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction based on both New York’s long-arm statute and the Montreal Convention.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Appellant UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. was sued in the Southern District of New York and filed a third-party complaint against Appellee EVA Airways Corporation, seeking indemnification and contribution. The district court granted EVA’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. UPS now appeals, arguing that EVA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction based on both New York’s long-arm statute and the Montreal Convention. View "UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. v. EVA Airways Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of racketeering conspiracy (Count One); murder in aid of racketeering (Count Two); and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count Three). Defendant argued that his Count Three conviction must be vacated because his predicate offense of murder in aid of racketeering was not a crime of violence.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Defendant’s contention that the VICAR murder statute is indivisible and held that the modified categorical approach applies to the court’s consideration of whether his conviction for murder in aid of racketeering, a substantive VICAR offense, constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of Section 924(c). The court explained that first-degree manslaughter, regardless of whether it may be completed by commission or omission, “can only be committed by a defendant who causes death—the ultimate bodily injury—while intending to cause at least serious physical injury,” necessarily requiring the use of physical force. The court wrote that to hold otherwise would preclude courts from recognizing even intentional murder as a categorically violent crime, an untenable consequence. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a First Amendment challenge to the City of Kingston’s prohibition against bringing signs and posters into public meetings of the Common Council held at Kingston City Hall. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Common Council meetings are limited public fora in which the City is permitted to reasonably restrict speech that undermines the purpose for which the forum had been opened. The district court granted the City’s motion, noting that government entities are permitted to regulate the manner in which the public participates in limited public fora. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that the City’s sign prohibition was unreasonable in light of the potential disruption or distraction that signs at Common Council meetings might pose.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Complaint itself and common sense offer a satisfactory rationale for the City’s sign prohibition, which undermines Plaintiffs’ assertions of unreasonableness. To be sure, there may be cases where restrictions on the form or manner of speech—including the use of signs—in a limited public forum would be unreasonable, but Plaintiffs have not pled such facts here. View "Tyler v. Kingston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim against prison officials for their conduct during an electrical fire at Sing Sing Correctional Facility. Meanwhile, the prison officials claim that Plaintiff received a denial but failed to appeal. The district court determined that Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the officials. Plaintiff claimed that he received a denial and then appealed through the second and third stages of review.The Second Circuit vacated. The court explained that drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. The prison officials may have mistakenly failed to consolidate Plaintiff’s grievance with those of the other inmates who were affected by the electrical fire—in a possible violation of state regulations requiring full consolidation. Plaintiff’s declaration is consistent with a belief that his grievance was denied as part of the consolidated group of grievants. He may have appealed that denial, but the prison system might not have a record of his appeal because it failed to record the denial of his initial grievance in the first place. Plaintiff’s declaration—combined with (1) the undisputed evidence that he filed an initial grievance, (2) the absence of documentary evidence that his complaint was ever denied, and (3) the apparent failure of the prison officials to consolidate his complaint with those of the other inmates—creates a dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff actually did pursue all administrative remedies that were “available” to him. 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(a). View "Garcia v. Heath" on Justia Law