Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff leased a Subaru Forester in November 2018. Defendant Trans Union, LLC received certain information about the lease and reported that information on Sessa’s credit report. In particular, Trans Union reported that Plaintiff owed a “balloon payment” at the end of the lease term -- a payment that the terms of the lease did not, in fact, require. Plaintiff sued Trans Union under section 1681e(b) of the FCRA, which requires credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”), like Trans Union, to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” in a consumer’s credit report. 15 U.S.C. Section 681e(b). The district court granted Trans Union summary judgment, reasoning that Plaintiff's credit report could not be considered “inaccurate” under section 1681e(b) because the question of whether Plaintiff owed a balloon payment amounted to a legal, rather than factual, dispute.The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court concluded that section 1681e(b) does not incorporate a threshold inquiry as to whether an alleged inaccuracy is “legal” or “factual” in nature. The court, therefore, determined that the district court erred by ending its analysis after it found that the accuracy of the reported balloon payment amounted to a legal dispute and was, therefore, not actionable under section 1681e(b). View "Sessa v. Trans Union, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants are the City of Niagara Falls ("Niagara Falls"), its water board, and various companies (collectively, "Defendants") tasked with remediation of hazardous waste disposal sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("Superfund"). Plaintiffs -- members of three families residing in Niagara Falls -- brought this action in the State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara, in 2012, seeking damages arising from purported deficiencies in Defendants' remediation of one Superfund site, the Love Canal. Between 2013 and 2017, 18 identical complaints were filed by other plaintiffs. In 2013, Defendants removed two of the 19 cases -- including this one -- to the court below on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, but the district court remanded the cases to state court. The cases remained in state court until 2020 when Plaintiffs in all 19 cases filed identical amended complaints. The amended complaints alleged additional sources of injury. Defendants again removed the 19 cases, this time on the basis of both federal officer and federal question jurisdiction. The district court held that the removal was untimely and again remanded the cases to state court. Defendants appealed.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs continue to allege the same injuries against the same Defendants, caused by the same toxins, and resulting in the same damages. The amended complaint highlighted only additional sources of already-alleged injury. The changes in Plaintiffs' pleadings 20 are not substantial, and the amendments did not result in essentially new lawsuits. View "Abbo-Bradley, et al. v. City of Niagara Falls, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on two counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 18 U.S.C. On appeal, she argued that the government failed to prove that venue was proper in the Southern District of New York.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the government adduced evidence sufficient to prove that Defendant damaged a protected computer within that District and that venue was, therefore, proper. The court explained that the jury was entitled to conclude that Defendant’s actions impaired the availability of data on the JazzHR system on her supervisor’s computer. The fact that the deletion might also have damaged the Amazon servers located in Virginia and California makes no difference. Thus, the fact that the email addresses of some New Jersey residents were obtained from AT&T’s servers was merely a “circumstance element” that could not support the venue in New Jersey where the “essential conduct elements” of the crime all occurred in other states. View "United States v. Calonge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution, sued pro se under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the defendants failed for years to provide him with adequate medical care for painful infections and lesions on his scalp, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. His initial complaint (“Initial Complaint”) named five administrators (collectively, the “Administrator Defendants”) and three John Doe medical professionals. That complaint was dismissed sua sponte prior to service on the defendants and without leave to amend as to the administrators. An Amended Complaint omitted the administrators (no leave to amend having been given as to them) and named in addition three nurse defendants.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court concluded that the appeal from the judgment brings up for review the dismissal of both complaints, that the Initial Complaint should not have been dismissed against the Administrator Defendants on the ground of frivolousness prior to service and without leave to amend, and that the Amended Complaint should not have been dismissed on the qualified immunity ground adduced by the district court. The court explained that it was error to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to satisfy the objective component of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard. While it may be that Defendants did not act with “deliberate indifference” or that some or all of the conduct can be classified as malpractice at worst, the district court did not pass on those issues, and the court wrote that it will not consider them now. View "Collymore v. Commissioner of D.O.C." on Justia Law

Twenty-eight individuals and businesses commenced this citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), which creates a private right of action against any entity that has “contributed . . . to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” Plaintiffs complained of elevated levels of radiation detected on their land and seek to hold responsible three entities that operated nearby chemical plants during the twentieth century. The district court dismissed their complaints, holding, among other things, that the radioactive materials found on the plaintiffs’ properties fall outside the scope of RCRA because they were recycled industrial byproducts rather than discarded waste. Defendants raised a host of additional arguments in support of dismissal.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that as to Defendants Union Carbide Corporation and Occidental Chemical Corporation, the complaint plausibly alleged the elements of a citizen suit under RCRA, or the Plaintiffs have identified extrinsic evidence that may render amendment fruitful. However, as against defendant Bayer CropScience Inc., there are no particularized allegations from which liability can reasonably be inferred. The court reasoned that there is one probative allegation implicating Bayer: Stauffer’s Lewiston plant was located within 2,000 feet of the Robert Street properties and within a mile of four of the Plaintiffs’ other properties. But proximity alone is insufficient to make Bayer’s contribution plausible. View "Talarico Bros. Bldg. Corp., et al. v. Union Carbide Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision (1) affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. The BIA rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, declined to remand for consideration of additional hardship relating to his cancellation application, and declined to remand to await adjudication of his U visa application. Petitioner argued that the BIA (1) applied an incorrect standard when reviewing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (2) overlooked and mischaracterized his new hardship evidence, and (3) failed to follow precedent when denying his request for remand.   The Second Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that it does not matter whether Petitioner initially requested a continuance from the IJ or whether his motion to remand was filed while proceedings before the IJ were ongoing. Petitioner only became aware of prior counsel’s alleged misconduct the premise for his U visa application—after the IJ had issued its decision and Petitioner sought advice from other counsel. Thereafter, he appears to have diligently pursued his U visa application and presented proof of his submitted U visa application to the BIA while his appeal was still pending. The BIA has advanced no reason why Sanchez Sosa should not apply under these circumstances. Therefore, the court concluded that the BIA should have applied the Sanchez Sosa factors in considering Petitioner’s motion to remand as it pertains to his U visa or explained its reasoning for not doing so. View "Paucar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Respondent the State of Libya (“Libya”) appealed from a district court judgment granting Petitioner Olin Holdings Limited’s (“Olin”) petition to confirm an arbitration award issued under a bilateral investment treaty between Libya and the Republic of Cyprus and denying Libya’s cross-motion to dismiss the petition on forum non-conveniens grounds. On appeal, Libya’s primary argument is that the district court erred by declining to independently review the arbitrability of Olin’s claims before confirming the final award.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Libya was not entitled to de novo review of the arbitral tribunal’s decisions because it “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators in the first instance. The court further concluded that the district court properly confirmed the final award and rejected Libya’s cross-motion to dismiss the petition. The court explained that regarding the public and private interest factors, the district court held that Libya fell well short of satisfying its heavy burden because it “failed to identify even one” factor that weighed in favor of dismissal. On appeal, Libya makes “no persuasive argument identifying an error in the factual or legal components of the district court’s discretionary decision.” View "Olin Holdings Ltd. v. State of Libya" on Justia Law

Respondent is a former employee who won a judgment in Argentina's National Court of Labor Appeals against Citibank, N.A. Petitioner, the Argentinian branch of Citibank, N.A., filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association and brought the proceedings below. The district court compelled arbitration, preliminarily enjoined the employee from enforcing the Argentinian judgment against Petitioner, and held Respondent in contempt of court. It also denied his motion to dismiss.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition. Therefore, the district court was without authority to issue its orders in this case. The court reversed the district court's orders -- including its order to compel arbitration, the preliminary injunction it entered against Respondent, its order finding Respondent in contempt, and its order requiring Respondent to pay the Branch's attorneys' fees and costs. The court concluded that because the Branch has not shown it enjoys independent legal existence and Citibank has not sought to substitute itself or join this action as the real party in interest, there has been no party adverse to Respondent. Without adverse parties, there can be no subject matter jurisdiction under Article III. View "The branch of Citibank, N.A., established in the Republic of Argentina v." on Justia Law

Defendants were prosecuted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) for conspiring to traffic drugs on the high seas using a stateless vessel. Before ultimately pleading guilty to the offense, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss their indictments on the ground that conspirators operating from a foreign country who were never physically on the high seas and who had no ties to the United States could not constitutionally be subject to prosecution under the MDLEA.The district court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss. On appeal, Defendants argued that their prosecution under the MDLEA violated due process because their conduct lacked a nexus with the United States and that, by applying the MDLEA to their conduct, Congress exceeded its Article I powers.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. View "United States v. Antonius" on Justia Law

Third-Party Plaintiff Dynasty Healthcare, LLC, a medical billing firm, claimed that a Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”) negligently processed and misclassified the enrollment and payment application of one of Dynasty’s clients, a medical services supplier, and that. As a result, the client was underpaid for providing Medicare services. When the client sued Dynasty for the error, Dynasty sued the MAC, blaming it for the error. The district court dismissed Dynasty’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Dynasty failed to pursue administrative channels through the United  States Department of Health and Human Services before seeking judicial review. At issue on appeal is whether Dynasty’s claims “arise under” the Medicare Act, such that the administrative channeling requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. 14 Section 405(h) applies; and second, if so, whether the district court nonetheless had jurisdiction based on a narrow exception to the  Medicare Act’s jurisdiction stripping provision recognized in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the claims arise under the Medicare Act and that the Illinois Council exception does not apply to these claims. The court explained that Dynasty is not entitled to the exception because Retina’s financial interests in the claims alleged in this case were aligned with Dynasty’s interests at all relevant times, and Retina had both the incentive and the ability to seek administrative review. That Retina pursued a different course is irrelevant to the court's analysis under Illinois Council’s “objective inquiry.” View "Dynasty Healthcare, LLC v. Nat'l Gov't Services, Inc." on Justia Law