Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841 and 846 and concealment money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). During his plea colloquy, speaking through a Spanish-English interpreter, Defendant repeatedly failed to acknowledge that he had intended to conceal the proceeds of his drug trafficking, an element of concealment money laundering. On appeal, Defendant contends that his conviction for concealment money laundering should be reversed because an insufficient factual basis existed for his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) conviction and sentence and remanded. The court explained that the district court’s error is “plain.” In this case, Defendant did not admit to a concealment purpose—an offense element—and the other evidence did not establish that intent either. Thus, it is clear and obvious that Rule 11(b)(3) was not satisfied. Second, the district court’s error prejudicially affected Defendant’s substantial rights. The court reasoned that it appears likely that Defendant would not have pled guilty to violating Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) had he understood its mens rea requirement and been told that he needed to state a concealment purpose. Defendant was consistent and persistent in maintaining that his purpose was otherwise. Last, the plain and prejudicial error seriously harmed the legitimacy of the judicial proceeding. The district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea without Defendant’s acknowledgment that he intended to conceal the source of his funds casts serious doubt upon the “fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” View "U.S. v. Aybar-Peguero" on Justia Law

On April 10, 2008, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree by a New York state-court jury. The court sentenced him to concurrent indeterminate prison terms of twenty years to life for the murder count and five to fifteen years for the weapon possession count. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent, the Warden of the facility in which Petitioner is imprisoned, moved to dismiss a subset of the claims in the petition on the ground that they were time-barred under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1). The district court agreed and entered an order supported by a memorandum decision granting the motion. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and sought a certificate of appealability. The Second Circuit granted a certificate of appealability. Petitioner contends that under Section 2244(d)(1), all the claims raised in his petition were timely because at least one claim asserted therein was timely filed within the applicable one-year limitations period.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that Section 2244(d)(1)’s statute of limitations requires a claim-by-claim approach. The court explained that Petitioner’s sole argument in support of his entitlement to equitable tolling is that his lawyer told him the wrong deadline for filing a habeas petition that included the arguments that he advanced in his direct appeal. But this argument has been squarely foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling and properly dismissed his claims as time-barred. View "Clemente v. Lee" on Justia Law

Deltech Corp. (“Deltech”), a chemical manufacturer, joins here with Stolt-Nielsen USA, Inc., and Stolt Tank Containers B.V. (together, “Stolt”), a shipping concern, to challenge the district court’s determination that they alone bear liability for damages caused by an explosion and fire that took place in June 2012 aboard the ocean-going vessel M/V MSC Flaminia. In the first phase of a three-part proceeding, the district court addressed the causes of the explosion. It determined that the decision to ship DVB-80 from New Orleans Terminal rather than a northeastern port, the early filling of the DVB-80 containers and their early transport to New Orleans Terminal, the conditions in which the tanks of DVB-80 were kept at New Orleans Terminal, and their placement and stowage onboard the Flaminia were the primary causes of the explosion. It exculpated other parties to the shipping transaction from legal liability. It is this decision that Deltech and Stolt challenge now in an interlocutory appeal.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court reversed the district court’s determination that Deltech and Stolt are strictly liable under Section 4(6) of the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act (“COGSA”), but the court affirmed its ruling that Deltech and Stolt are liable under a failure-to-warn theory pursuant to Section 4(3).  As to the other defendants, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the carrier and related shipowner interests were not negligent in their treatment of the shipment and that New Orleans Terminal too, was not negligent. The court also affirmed the district court’s determination that Stolt has not stated a claim against its subcontractor. View "In re: M/V MSC Flaminia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, pro se and incarcerated, appealed from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. The district court dismissed his complaint, concluding that Plaintiff was barred from proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) because he had accumulated three “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). At issue on appeal is whether (1) a res judicata dismissal and (2) a dismissal of an entire complaint on several alternative grounds—one of which qualifies as a strike under existing precedent—can constitute strikes under Section 1915(g).   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Section 1915(g) bars a prisoner from proceeding IFP, absent a showing of imminent danger, if on three or more occasions while incarcerated, he has brought an action or an appeal that was “dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The court reasoned that Section 1915(g) does not provide Plaintiff an opportunity to relitigate his prior cases. The court considered Plaintiff’s remaining arguments and concluded they are meritless. The district court correctly concluded that Griffin was barred by the PLRA’s three strikes provision from proceeding IFP, and, therefore, properly dismissed his complaint. View "Griffin v. Carnes" on Justia Law

Pakistani nationals and brothers petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision upholding orders denying them adjustment of status and directing their removal from the United States. Petitioners argued that the agency erred in finding them ineligible for adjustment of status based on their earlier filing of frivolous, i.e., deliberately and materially false, asylum applications because those applications were untimely and, thus, their concededly false statements could not have been material to a matter properly before the agency for decision. Petitioners further faulted the agency for alternatively denying them adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.   The Second Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for their review. However, the court explained that a question arises as to how Petitioners removal will affect their future ability to apply for reentry to the United States. A permanent and unwaivable bar on reentry applies to any alien who filed a frivolous claim for asylum after receiving notice of that consequence. Otherwise, the alien may be subject to lesser, waivable bars on reentry. Because this court cannot determine on the present record whether Petitioners received the notice required to trigger a permanent, unwaivable bar. The court granted review as to that single question and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the agency to make an express finding as to notice and, based on that finding, to specify the scope of the reentry bar that will attend Petitioners’ removal. View "Ud Din v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant defrauded his former employer and its investors of some $65 million. He was indicted on unrelated insider trading charges, and a subsequent internal investigation revealed the full breadth of his wrongdoing. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought a civil enforcement action against Defendant. To secure a potential disgorgement judgment, the SEC joined Defendant’s family and related entities as Relief Defendants, and the district court froze Defendant’s and the Relief Defendants’ assets. Defendant is currently a fugitive from justice, so the district court excluded him from discovery of the SEC’s investigative file. The district court granted the SEC’s motion for summary judgment and awarded disgorgement, supplemental enrichment, and civil penalties against Defendant. The district court also adopted the SEC’s theory that Defendant is the equitable owner of assets held in the name of the Relief Defendants as “nominees.” On appeal, Defendant and the Relief Defendants challenged the district court’s judgment and calculation of disgorgement.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The court affirmed the district court’s (1) exclusion of Defendant from discovery and denial of his access to frozen funds to hire counsel; (2) calculation of Defendant’s disgorgement obligation; and (3) retroactive application of the 2021 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Defendant’s disgorgement obligation. However, the court held that the district court (4) failed to assess whether actual gains on the frozen assets were unduly remote from Defendant’s fraud and (5) should have applied an asset-by-asset approach to determine whether the Relief Defendants are, in fact, only nominal owners of their frozen assets. View "SEC v. Ahmed" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hughes Communications India Private Limited (“Hughes India”) appealed from a district court judgment dismissing its indemnification claims against The DirecTV Group, Inc. (“DirecTV”). The case arises out of an asset purchase agreement in which DirecTV spun off fourteen subsidiaries, including Hughes India (the “Agreement”). The Agreement requires DirecTV to indemnify Hughes India for certain contractually defined “Taxes” that accrued before the closing of the spin-off transaction and “Proceedings” that were initiated prior to the closing date. Hughes India sought a declaration that DirecTV must indemnify it for unpaid license fees, interest, and penalties imposed by India’s Department of Telecommunications (the “DOT”). The district court granted summary judgment for DirecTV, concluding that the license fees were not subject to indemnification because they were neither Taxes nor the result of Proceedings against Hughes India as defined by the Agreement. Hughes India appealed.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court agreed with Hughes India that under the plain terms of the Agreement, the license fees are Taxes, and the Provisional License Fee Assessment (the “Provisional Assessment”) issued by the DOT initiated a Proceeding against Hughes India. The court concluded that DirecTV is obligated to indemnify Hughes India for license fees, interest, and penalties accrued for tax periods ending on or before closing and for those amounts related to the Provisional Assessment issued for fiscal years 2001 to 2003, which was the only Proceeding initiated before closing. View "Hughes Communications India Private Limited v. The DirecTV Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an aspiring sidewalk counselor, brought a First Amendment challenge to Westchester County’s recently enacted “bubble zone” law, which makes it illegal to approach within eight feet of another person for the purpose of engaging in “oral protest, education, or counseling” when inside a one-hundred-foot radius of a reproductive health care facility. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff lacks standing to mount a pre-enforcement challenge to the bubble zone law and that, in any event, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) forecloses her First Amendment claim.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for lack of standing. The court nevertheless affirmed the judgment on the merits because the district court correctly concluded that Hill is dispositive of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. The court concluded that Plaintiff has standing to seek pre-enforcement relief because she has pleaded sufficient facts to support a credible threat that Westchester County will enforce the bubble zone law if she pursues her stated intention to engage in sidewalk counseling. View "Vitagliano v. County of Westchester" on Justia Law

Appellants in these tandem appeals are each a parent of a disabled child. Arguing that his or her child was entitled to benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i), each parent brought an administrative action against his or her local education agency and prevailed. Subsequently, each parent brought a federal action for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). In each case, the district court awarded less attorneys’ fees than the parent requested, and the parents appealed.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961 and remanded for further proceedings. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments of the district courts. The court found that it was persuaded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees in each case. Further, the court wrote that the district courts that declined to award prejudgment interest did not abuse their discretion because “delays in payment” may be remedied by “application of current rather than historic hourly rates.” However, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied any travel-related fees to M.D.’s counsel. A district court may permissibly adjust excessive travel costs. But the district court could not “eliminate all of the hours submitted by [CLF] as travel time” by denying travel-related fees altogether. View "H.C. v. NYC DOE, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed successive habeas corpus petitions challenging their convictions and mandatory sentences imposed by the district court. The district court held that their substantive RICO convictions, on which their Section 924(c) convictions were based, were valid “crimes of violence.”This appeal focuses on their convictions under Count Thirteen of the indictment, which charged them with using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), based on an offense charged in Count One, racketeering activity in violation of RICO.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the jury was instructed that it could base Petitioners’ Section 924(c) convictions upon a predicate offense, which, according to the Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretations of the term, was not a “crime of violence.” The jury’s findings rendered under those (later determined to be erroneous) instructions do not specify whether it found that the defendants committed a variation of New York larceny by extortion that necessarily requires the actual or threatened use of force. Nor did the written jury findings specify whether the predicate offense related to second-degree grand larceny by extortion was the substantive offense or conspiracy or attempt to commit the offense. Nonetheless, reviewing the jury’s verdict in relation to the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded with a high degree of confidence that, if properly instructed, the jury would have predicated Petitioners’ Section 924(c) convictions on a valid crime of violence. View "U.S. v. Colotti" on Justia Law