Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought a review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal, ordering her removed, and denying her application for cancellation of removal. The BIA ordered that she be removed under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Specifically, the BIA and Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that a conviction under Arkansas Code Annotated (“ACA”) Section 5-60-101 is categorically a CIMT.   The Second Circuit reversed. The court concluded that a conviction under ACA Section 5- 60-101 is not categorically a CIMT because the statute criminalizes conduct that is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” The court explained that the BIA did not conduct an elements-based categorical inquiry. Instead, it applied an inapposite “realistic probability” test. That test “operates as a backstop when a statute has indeterminate reach, and where minimum conduct analysis invites improbable hypotheticals.” It applies only when there is a match between the state statute and federal standard, but a petitioner posits imaginative scenarios in which the state statute would be violated in such a way that does not meet the requirements of a CIMT. View "Giron-Molina v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants are American victims and the relatives and estates of victims of terrorist attacks in Israel between 2001 and 2003. Plaintiffs alleged that Palestine Investment Bank ("PIB") facilitated the attacks, in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2213-39D. The district court dismissed the case on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over PIB.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) permits a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent allowed by the law of the state in which it sits. New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) authorizes personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant for causes of action that arise out of “transact[ing] any business within the state,” whether in person or through an agent. in this context, transacting business means “purposeful activity—some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State," invoking the benefits of the state's laws.Here, the PIB's actions indicated that it availed itself of the benefits of New York's financial system and that Plaintiff's claim arose from these activities. View "Spetner v. PIB" on Justia Law

Magellan, a manufacturer of electronic nicotine delivery systems (“ENDS”) products, sought authorization from the FDA to market ENDS under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “TCA”). The FDA denied Magellan's application related to the company's flavored ENDS products, finding insufficient evidence showing that marketing the pods would be appropriate for the protection of public health, a finding that requires denial of an application under the TCA. Magellan petitioned for review, arguing the FDA action was arbitrary and capricious. Magellan also argues that the FDA exceeded its statutory authority by requiring applicants to demonstrate that their flavored ENDS products are more effective than tobacco-flavored products at promoting cessation or switching from combustible cigarettes to ENDS products.The Second Circuit affirmed. The FDA did not impose a new evidentiary standard on Magellan; therefore, the FDA did not need to provide notice or consider its reliance interests. Thus, the court concluded that the FDA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. View "Magellan Technology, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a 32-year-old native and citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States in 2006 and overstayed his visitor visa. On December 20, 2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers arrested Petitioner pursuant to a warrant issued by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). In removal proceedings before the IJ, Petitioner argued that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings and the officers violated agency regulations and his fundamental rights during his arrest and interrogation.   The Second Circuit denied the petition. The court agreed that the agency had jurisdiction and that termination of the removal proceeding was not warranted. The court explained under Rajah termination may be warranted for pre-hearing regulatory violations in cases involving "prejudice that may have affected the outcome of the proceeding, conscience-shocking conduct, or a deprivation of fundamental rights." As Petitioner has failed to show that he satisfies any of the three requirements for termination, he is not entitled to termination of his removal proceedings, with or without prejudice to renewal. Accordingly, the court found that the immigration court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to terminate. View "Medley v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on multiple counts of substantive and conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery and of the brandishing of a firearm during two crimes of violence (i.e., the charged robberies). Defendant argued that the district court erred (1) in relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine to deny his motion to suppress evidence obtained through warrants supported by concededly defective affidavits and (2) in charging the jury that a gun constitutes a firearm and refusing to give his requested jury instruction.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s firearms convictions. The court agreed with Defendant that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply in the circumstances of this case, and because the conceded misstatements in the affidavits were material to the issuing magistrate judges’ probable cause determinations, remand is required for the district court to conduct a hearing to determine if the challenged evidence was admissible under the standard identified in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). As to the jury charge, the district court erred in instructing the jury that a gun is a firearm. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that this error was harmless as a matter of law. View "United States v. Lauria (Molina)" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances after a search warrant was executed against his residence. The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement seized from the search. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the district court’s decision. Defendant challenged the search warrant’s validity. He argued that the district court should have given him a Franks hearing because the warrant relies on knowingly false statements in the supporting affidavit.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not made a substantial preliminary showing that any of the three statements Defendant scrutinized were false material statements that the Officers knowingly or recklessly included in the search warrant affidavit. He succeeds only at identifying inconsistent statements—and discrete details within them—that is immaterial to a finding of probable cause. Further, Defendant impugns only the CI’s veracity, not the Officers’. Accordingly, the court held that he is not entitled to a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Domenico Sandalo" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed from a district court’s order reversing an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court confirming a Chapter 11 plan that included nonconsensual third-party releases of direct claims against non-debtors.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit nonconsensual third-party releases against non-debtors, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Plan, and remanded the case to the district court for such further proceedings as may be required. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of the Canadian Creditors’ cross-appeal. The court held that nonconsensual third-party releases of such direct claims are statutorily permitted under 11 U.S.C. 10 Sections 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court further concluded that the court’s case law also allows for nonconsensual third-party claim releases in specific circumstances, such as those presented in this appeal. View "In re: Purdue Pharma L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a final judgment entered in favor of Defendants The TriZetto Group, Inc. and Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation (collectively, “TriZetto”) after a jury trial in district court. Relevant here, the district court ordered and entered judgment that (1) Syntel misappropriated 104 of TriZetto’s trade secrets in violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) and New York law; and (2) TriZetto’s $284,855,192 compensatory damages award was proper under the DTSA. On appeal, Syntel challenges the district court’s judgment with respect to liability and damages.   The Second Circuit affirmed and vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded. The court held that the unambiguous terms of the Amended Master Services Agreement (MSA) are clear, and so is the extrinsic evidence: TriZetto did not authorize Syntel to use TriZetto’s trade secrets to compete with TriZetto. Thus, Syntel misappropriated TriZetto’s intellectual property in violation of the DTSA and New York law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Syntel’s Rule 50(b) motion on this issue. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, an unjust enrichment award of avoided costs was unavailable under the specific facts of this case. Syntel’s unjust gain was fully “addressed in computing damages for [TriZetto’s] actual loss,” and TriZetto suffered no compensable harm beyond that actual loss. Thus, the court remanded the case for the district court to address the propriety of the two jury awards based on TriZetto’s damages theory of awarding a reasonable royalty: (1) the $142,427,596 New York trade secret misappropriation award and (2) the $59,100,000 copyright infringement award. View "Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius, Ltd., et al. v. The TriZetto Grp.," on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a district court judgment imposing, among other things, special conditions of supervised release making Defendant’s internet and computer access contingent on his compliance with computer monitoring terms devised by the U.S. Probation Office. Defendant challenges both the court’s special conditions themselves and the computer monitoring terms they contemplate on procedural reasonableness, substantive reasonableness, and improper delegation grounds.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although Defendant’s appeal raises legitimate concerns, nearly all of those concerns can be resolved by construing his computer monitoring restrictions to avoid the troublesome implications that, in a few cases, an expansive reading might suggest. The court wrote that although “the defendant, the public, and appellate courts should not be required to engage in guesswork about the rationale for a particular sentence,” it requires no “guesswork” to understand why the district court imposed the conditions it imposed in this case. Given the nature both of Defendant’s underlying offense and of his repeated violations of supervised release, the longstanding general computer monitoring requirement that Defendant has never (including now) objected to, and the officer’s justification for the recommended updates, the district court’s rationale for imposing this sort of computer monitoring program was apparent on this record. Thus, the court discerned no procedural error in the sentence it imposed. View "United States of America v. Kunz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against several police officers and the City of New York, asserting various claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and New York state law based on his allegation that police officers falsely claimed that they observed him selling drugs. After his criminal trial, Plaintiff was acquitted of a drug sale charge and convicted of a drug possession charge. Plaintiff subsequently filed this civil action, and the district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims and remanded. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s dismissal of all of the federal claims except for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim based on the use of fabricated evidence regarding the drug sale charge of which he was acquitted. Specifically, the district court erred in concluding that because Plaintiff was arrested, detained, prosecuted, and convicted for drug possession simultaneous to the drug sale proceedings, this precludes, as a matter of law, his ability to plead a deprivation of liberty caused by the drug sale prosecution. Because the prosecution of an individual based on fabricated evidence may itself constitute a deprivation of liberty, even in the absence of custody or a conviction, Plaintiff was not required to show that his drug sale prosecution resulted in additional custody or a conviction in order to sufficiently allege a claim at the pleading stage. View "Barnes v. City of New York" on Justia Law