Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Union Mutual”) appealed from a district court judgment. On March 4, 2017, a fire started at Liberty Avenue in Queens, New York, spreading to and damaging four neighboring buildings insured by Union Mutual. After an investigation, the fire marshals concluded, but could not determine with certainty, that the fire originated in the extension cords used by Ace Caribbean Market. Union Mutual paid proceeds to the damaged neighboring buildings and subrogated into their owners’ tort claims. Union Mutual then sued Ace Caribbean Market and others (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that their negligent use of the extension cords caused the fire. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. At issue on appeal is whether evidence that a fire may have originated in the extension cords is sufficient to show that (a) the owners and proprietors were negligent in their use of the extension cords and (b) if they were negligent, that negligence was the cause of the fire.   The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that such evidence is not sufficient. The court held that, at most, Union Mutual produced weak circumstantial evidence that something wrong with the extension cords caused the fire. But, even assuming a reasonable jury could so conclude, Union Mutual showed no evidence of negligence whatsoever on Defendants’ part, and evidence of causation by itself is not evidence of negligence. The court concluded that there may have been negligence and that negligence may have been the cause of the fire. But no inference that it was Defendants’ negligence is permissible on the facts. View "Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Caribbean Mkt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former New York State prisoner, sued defendants-appellants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for purportedly violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when they denied his judicially ordered enrollment in New York's Shock Incarceration Program, thereby potentially extending his period of confinement. The district court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated clearly established law.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, reversed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Eighth Amendment claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails at the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis: it was not clearly established at the time of Defendants' conduct that denying a prisoner the opportunity to obtain early release from his sentence of confinement by denying judicially ordered entry into the Shock program would violate the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that given the liberty interest at stake and the clarity of the statutory law, Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants' actions were egregious, shocking to the conscience, and unreasonable. View "Michael Matzell v. Anthony J. Annucci et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his request for administrative closure of his removal proceedings. The agency relied on the Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), a then-controlling decision of the Attorney General that prohibited administrative closure. The Attorney General subsequently overruled that decision and revised the agency’s position.   The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. First, the court held that an agency does not abuse its discretion by relying on an interpretation of its regulations that are controlling at the time of its decision—even if the agency subsequently revises that interpretation—as long as it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the regulations. Second, the court concluded that the regulations, in this case, are at least ambiguous with respect to the availability of administrative closure and that Matter of Castro-Tum expressed a reasonable interpretation of the regulations that is entitled to deference. Third, the court agreed with the BIA that the Matter of Castro-Tum did not authorize administrative closure in this case. View "Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

On June 22, 2021, the Second Circuit issued an opinion affirming the convictions and sentences of Defendants T.E. and K.A. after a jury trial. Among other things, the court upheld T.E.’s conviction on Count Seven for possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court vacated the court’s decision with respect to T.E. and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).   The Second Circuit concluded that having given due consideration to Taylor, it vacated T.E.’s conviction on Count Seven and remanded for resentencing on all of T.E.’s remaining counts of conviction. The court held that kidnapping in the second degree under New York Penal Law Section 135.20 is not categorically a crime of violence pursuant to Section 924(c)(3)(A). The court left intact all other aspects of its original opinion, including the court’s affirmance of T.E.’s other convictions. View "United States v. Eldridge" on Justia Law

Argonaut Insurance Company (“Argonaut”) appealed from an order of the district court remanding this breach-of-bond action, brought by LeChase Construction Services, LLC (“LeChase”), to New York state court after Argonaut removed it on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The district court purported to issue its remand order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(e), which authorizes remand if, after removal, a plaintiff joins defendants whose inclusion would destroy diversity jurisdiction. The district court expressly acknowledged that section 1447(e) is facially inapplicable here, as LeChase was not seeking to join a non-diverse defendant or otherwise contesting the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the district court reasoned that, since remand would facilitate this case’s consolidation with two related actions then pending in New York state court, thus conserving judicial resources and avoiding the risk of inconsistent outcomes, it was appropriate under the “rubric” of section 1447(e). At issue was: (1) whether the Second Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s remand order notwithstanding Section 1447(d; and (2) if the court does, whether the district court issued such order in excess of its statutory authority under section 1447(e).   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court concluded, as a matter of first impression, that “[section] 1447(d) permits appellate review of a district-court remand order that dresses in [section 1447(e)’s] jurisdictional clothing a patently non-jurisdictional ground,” such as the prudential considerations invoked by the district court here. The court concluded – for essentially the reasons acknowledged by the district court itself – that its remand order here was unauthorized under section 1447(e). View "LeChase Constr. Servs. LLC v. Argonaut Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant the Law Offices of Crystal Moroney (“Moroney”) is a law firm that principally provides legal advice and services to clients seeking to collect debt. As the agency charged with regulating this industry, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) served on Moroney a civil investigative demand (“CID”) for documents, which it subsequently petitioned to enforce in the district court. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), holding that the provision that protected the Director of the CFPB from removal other than for cause was an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s removal power. The CFPB filed a notice to ratify the CID and the enforcement action against Moroney. The district court granted the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID. On appeal, Moroney argues that the CID cannot be enforced.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the CID was not void ab initio because the CFPB Director was validly appointed, that the CFPB’s funding structure is not constitutionally infirm under either the Appropriations Clause or the nondelegation doctrine and that the CID served on Moroney is not an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena. The court explained that under the nondelegation doctrine’s lenient standard, Congress has plainly provided an intelligible principle to guide the CFPB in setting and spending its budget. Therefore, the court concluded that the CFPB’s funding structure is proper under the nondelegation doctrine. View "CFPB v. Law Offs. of Crystal Moroney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision dismissing her claims against New York University (NYU) and declining to allow her to amend her complaint to add another plaintiff. Plaintiff s a parent of an adult student who attended New York University (NYU) (Defendant-Appellee) during the Spring 2020 semester—a semester during which NYU suspended its in-person operations and transitioned to remote instruction. Alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims, Plaintiff brought a putative class action suit against NYU to partially recover the tuition and fees she paid for her daughter’s Spring 2020 semester. The district court granted NYU’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff lacked standing and denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add a current NYU student as an additional plaintiff because it concluded that amendment would be futile.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims because she has not alleged an injury-in-fact to herself, rather than to her daughter. The court held that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a claim for conversion. The court wrote that for these reasons, the district court properly dismissed her claims. However, the court concluded that amending the complaint to add a current student as plaintiff would not be futile. The student plaintiff plausibly alleged claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and received that would survive a motion to dismiss. View "Christina Rynasko v. New York University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, seeking compensatory damages for the 686 days that he was unlawfully incarcerated after the Second Circuit clearly established in Earley v. Murray that only a court could lawfully impose post-release supervision (PRS). Plaintiff served this time for violating the terms of his PRS that the New York Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)—not his sentencing judge—had imposed. He sued various New York state officials, including Defendant, then-Deputy Commissioner and legal counsel for DOCS, for the unlawful deprivation of his liberty under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s award of compensatory damages to Plaintiff and revives his claim of qualified immunity, which was previously unsuccessful.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s decision. The court explained that it previously held in Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2013) that the unconstitutionality of administratively imposed terms of PRS was clearly established by Earley I. And the court later held in Betances v. Fischer, 837 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2016) that because Defendant failed to make objectively reasonable efforts to comply with federal law that was clearly established by Earley I, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant offers no compelling argument for the court to reconsider these prior holdings. The court thus concluded that the district court did not err in applying the court’s prior precedents to deny him qualified immunity. View "Vincent v. Annucci" on Justia Law

Insureds – who operate an annual motorcycle rally in Pattersonville, New York (the “Harley Rendezvous”) – appealed from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Covington Specialty Insurance Company (“Covington”) in this insurance-coverage dispute. Specifically, the parties disagree as to Covington’s duties, under a general commercial liability policy issued to the Insureds (the “Policy”), to defend and indemnify the Insureds against personal-injury claims asserted in a separate, state-court action by two motorcycle riders who were struck by another attendee’s automobile at the Harley Rendezvous. The district court found that a provision of the Policy (the “Absolute Auto Exclusion”) unambiguously excluded liability coverage for automobile accidents, regardless of whether the Insureds themselves owned or operated the vehicle at issue. On appeal, the Insureds argued that the district court was bound by – and erroneously failed to follow – a case in which a New York intermediate appellate court found ambiguity in a similarly worded exclusion provision in a different insurance policy.   The Second Circuit affirmed and found that Grande Stone Quarry is inapposite here and that countless other decisions by New York courts support the district court’s reading of the Absolute Auto Exclusion. The court explained the district court’s “task” here was simply “to determine how the New York Court of Appeals would decide” the issue. Here, the record reflects that the district court carried out that task soundly and carefully. The court concluded that under New York law, the Absolute Auto Exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage of the Insureds’ defense and indemnity in the Underlying Action. View "Covington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Indian Lookout Country Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of gun possession in furtherance of drug trafficking and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing that evidence regarding a firearm and marijuana should have been suppressed because the warrant pursuant to which the search of his second-floor apartment in a triplex was conducted did not authorize a search of the shared back porch where this evidence was found. He also challenged the sufficiency of the government’s evidence of his possession in furtherance of drug trafficking and the application of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as to the suppression issue, although the court rejects any categorical rule that the Fourth Amendment always allows warrantless searches of all shared areas in multi-unit buildings, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion because he failed to carry his burden to show that his Fourth Amendment rights extended to the shared back porch of the triplex where he lived. Because the court also concluded the evidence was sufficient to convict him of possession of a firearm in furtherance of marijuana trafficking, and the application of the obstruction enhancement was appropriate, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law