Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are 21 U.S. citizens who were harmed, and the estate and family members of a U.S. citizen who was killed in rocket attacks carried out in Israel in 2006 by the terrorist organization Hizbollah. Plaintiffs alleged that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (“LCB”) provided extensive financial assistance to Hizbollah in the years leading up to the attacks. In 2011, Defendant Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (“SGBL”) acquired all of LCB’s assets and liabilities in a transaction conducted under the laws of Lebanon. Plaintiffs sued for damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 and sought to hold SGBL liable as LCB’s successor. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that SGBL did not inherit LCB’s status for purposes of personal jurisdiction when it acquired LCB’s assets and liabilities.   The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs’ successor-jurisdiction theory raises an important and unresolved issue under New York law. Accordingly, the court certified the following two questions to the New York Court of Appeals:1. Under New York law, does an entity that acquires all of another entity’s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherit the acquired entity’s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction? 2. In what circumstances will the acquiring entity be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York? View "Lelchook v. Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs – issuers of collateralized debt obligations secured by certificates in residential-mortgage-backed securities trusts – appealed from three separate judgments dismissing actions brought against The Bank of New York Mellon, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas. In each case, the district courts assumed that Plaintiffs had Article III standing but found that Plaintiffs were precluded from relitigating the issue of prudential standing due to a prior case Plaintiffs had brought against U.S. Bank National Association.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The court explained that it joined the Ninth Circuit in concluding that the district courts permissibly bypassed the question of Article III standing to address issue preclusion, which offered a threshold, non-merits basis for dismissal. The court also concluded that the district courts’ application of issue preclusion was correct. The court wrote that it fully agreed with the district courts that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a second bite at the prudential-standing apple after the U.S. Bank Action. The district courts, therefore, did not err in taking this straightforward, if not “textbook,” path to dismissal. View "Phx. Light SF Ltd. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon; Phx. Light SF DAC v. Bank of N." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his application for cancellation of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). After an immigration judge (“IJ”) initially granted cancellation, the BIA reversed, determining that Petitioner was statutorily eligible for cancellation but did not merit a favorable exercise of the agency’s discretion in light of his criminal history— namely, his two convictions for domestic violence. Petitioner objected to the BIA’s characterization of his criminal history, arguing that it impermissibly engaged in factfinding and reevaluated the IJ’s factual findings.   The Second Circuit dismissed the petition, holding that it lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary decision. The court explained that the BIA did not second-guess the IJ’s factual findings or find facts of its own—it conducted a de novo reweighing of the equities based on the facts found by the IJ. The BIA thus properly exercised its discretion to deny cancellation of removal. View "Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald J. Trump and Appellant the United States of America appealed from a district court judgment denying their motion to substitute the United States in this action pursuant to the Westfall Act of 1988. In the Second Circuit’s prior opinion, the court vacated the district court’s judgment that Trump did not act within the scope of his employment, and the court certified to the D.C. Court of Appeals the following question: Under the laws of the District, were the allegedly libelous public statements made, during his term in office, by the President of the United States, denying allegations of misconduct, with regards to events prior to that term of office, within the scope of his employment as President of the United States?   The D.C. Court of Appeals reformulated our certified question in two parts, asking (1) whether the D.C. Court of Appeals should opine on the scope of the President of the United States’ employment and (2) how the court might clarify or modify the District of Columbia’s law of respondeat superior to resolve the issue in this appeal. The D.C. Court of Appeals answered the former part in the negative and provided additional guidance in response to the latter. Having vacated the district court’s judgment in the court’s prior opinion, the court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the guidance provided in the D.C. Court of Appeals’ opinion. View "E. Jean Carroll v. Donald J. Trump" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC (“MSP”) appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of standing its putative class action against Defendant Hereford Insurance Company (“Hereford”) and denying leave to amend. MSP has brought several lawsuits around the country seeking to recover from insurance companies that allegedly owe payments to Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs”) under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (the “MSP Act”). In the putative class action brought here, MSP charges Hereford with “deliberate and systematic avoidance” of Hereford’s reimbursement obligations under the MSP Act.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that MSP lacked standing because its allegations do not support an inference that it has suffered a cognizable injury or that the injury it claims is traceable to Hereford. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied MSP leave to amend based on MSP’s repeated failures to cure. The court explained that the plain language of Section 111 provides that when a no-fault insurance provider such as Hereford reports a claim pursuant to Section 111, it does not thereby admit that it is liable for the claim. The statutory context of the section’s reporting obligation and the purpose of the reporting obligation confirms the correctness of this interpretation. Because MSP’s argument that the payments made by EmblemHealth are reimbursable by Hereford rests entirely on its proposed interpretation of Section 111, MSP has not adequately alleged a “concrete” or “actual” injury or that the injury it alleges is fairly traceable to Hereford. View "MSP v. Hereford" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment sentencing him to 57 months imprisonment following his plea of guilty to one count of wire fraud. Defendant argued that the district court incorrectly applied a two-level obstruction enhancement and improperly denied him a three-level sentence reduction.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1’s obstruction enhancement to Defendant’s sentence and did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1’s acceptance of responsibility reduction. The court explained that at least two of the forged letters satisfy Section 3C1.1’s materiality requirement, which makes the application of the obstruction enhancement proper. In deciding whether to apply the sentence reduction, a district court considers factors such as the defendant’s “voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations.” U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1 application note 1(b). Here, the district court observed that Defendant’s forgery of the sentencing letters resembled the forgeries he submitted as part of the donation scheme, indicating that Defendant had not abandoned his criminal conduct. These were appropriate considerations. View "U.S. v. Strange" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused and exploited from approximately 1978 to 1984, when he was between 12 and 17 years old, by Father P.M., a now-deceased Rhode Island priest. Plaintiff sued the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence (“RCB”), St. Anthony’s Church Corporation North Providence (“St. Anthony’s”), and a retired Bishop (together, “Defendants”) for various torts based on Defendants’ alleged role in enabling the abuse. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that New York’s long-arm statute did not permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. First, P.M. did not commit the alleged sexual abuse in New York as an agent of Defendants. Second, the alleged conduct is unrelated to Defendants’ business activities in New York. The court explained that Plaintiff argued that the nexus requirement is satisfied because Defendants’ alleged business activity, conducted through P.M., was the “factual cause” of P.M.’s sexual assault of “Plaintiff in New York.” But a chain of causation involving physical presence in New York does not, by itself, create a nexus between an otherwise unrelated tort claim and a business transaction. View "Philip Edwardo v. The Roman Catholic Bishop, et al" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a), which prohibits using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct. The jury also convicted Defendant of possessing and distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A, based on different images found on his phone. The district court sentenced Defendant to 70 years in prison. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the production charge, that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement based on a finding that he was a repeat and dangerous offender and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that because Defendant took actions designed to depict the minor as the passive recipient of his sexual actions, the court concluded, on the particular facts of this case, that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant used the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct. The court further concluded that the evidence supported the enhancement and that the sentence was not shockingly high in light of Defendant’s conduct. View "United States v. Osuba" on Justia Law

AMA Capital, LLC (“AMA”) is a claimant in an antitrust class-action settlement. The settlement agreement at issue required that each claimant substantiate its claims with such documents as class counsel and the claims administrator, in their discretion, deemed acceptable. The settlement agreement also provided each claimant with the opportunity to (1) remedy deficiencies in its claims before the claims administrator issued its decision and (2) if the claims administrator rejected its claims in whole or in part, contest the claims administrator’s decision within twenty days of the mailing of the rejection notice. In this case, the claims administrator rejected most of AMA’s claims because, among other things, AMA repeatedly failed to provide the requisite transactional records to support its claims. The district court agreed and also denied AMA’s motion for reconsideration based on documents it submitted subsequent to the claims administrator’s rejection.   On appeal, AMA argues primarily that the district court erred by failing to consider documents it submitted during the post-rejection contest process and by denying its claims on the basis of improper evidentiary requirements. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order holding that the claims administrator was not required to accept records during the contest process that were previously available to AMA, which is akin to a motion for reconsideration, and that the district court did not err by denying AMA’s claims. Moreover, because AMA has standing as a class member to appeal any denial of its claims, the court dismissed as moot the appeal in No. 22-19, which challenges the district court’s denial of AMA’s motion to intervene. View "Contant v. AMA Cap., LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ukraine, sought review of a December 12, 2019 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Based on ostensible inconsistencies in  Petitioner’s testimony and a purported failure to submit corroborating evidence, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) entered an adverse credibility finding.   The Second Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded the case. The court explained that based on ostensible inconsistencies in Petitioner’s testimony and a purported failure to submit corroborating evidence, the IJ entered an adverse credibility finding. However, the court d that the adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial evidence and that the IJ unjustifiably refused to allow Petitioner to present readily available witness testimony, thereby depriving him of a full and fair hearing.   The court reasoned that the IJ identified discrepancies between Petitioner’s testimony as to whether his prior employment included driving responsibilities and whether his most recent period of employment began in October 2013 or March 2014. These findings were not adopted by the BIA. Though labeled a “material inconsistency” by the IJ, nowhere in his decision did he explain how these issues relate to Petitioner’s asylum claim, nor is the connection self-evident. The court explained that it has doubts whether, absent the errors identified above, the IJ would have reached the same conclusion based on these remaining issues. View "Malets v. Garland" on Justia Law