Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs (Rockland County Probation Department employees and their union) brought a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants (the County of Rockland and its Director of Probation). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants retaliated against them for writing a letter to the Rockland County Legislature by holding department-wide emergency meetings and issuing a “Memorandum of Warning.” The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the Plaintiffs on two liability issues: (1) whether the Plaintiffs’ letter had spoken on a matter of public concern and (2) whether the Plaintiffs had spoken as private citizens. A jury trial was held on liability issue (3): whether the Defendants had engaged in an adverse employment action. After the jury entered a verdict for the Defendants, the district court granted the Plaintiffs’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. It later granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction prohibiting the Defendants from retaining the Memorandum of Warning or using it against any Plaintiff. Defendants appealed the district court’s decision to grant judgment as a matter of law on Issues (2) and (3). They also challenged the permanent injunction.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remand the case with directions to enter judgment for the Defendants. The court explained that the trial record contains evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the test for adverse action was not met. Indeed, the evidence below could support a conclusion that the Memorandum and the meetings were no more than a “‘petty slight,’ ‘minor annoyance,’ or ‘trivial’ punishment.” View "Bennett v. County of Rockland" on Justia Law

Defendant s pled guilty to (1) using, carrying, and possessing a firearm during an attempted armed robbery of suspected marijuana dealers (“Count One”); and (2) using, carrying, possessing, and discharging a firearm during an assault in aid of racketeering of an individual whom Defendant shot and killed (“Count Two”). Both Counts were violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A), which requires that a defendant use, carry, or possess a firearm “during and in relation to” or “in furtherance of,” as relevant here, a “crime of violence.” To sustain Defendant’s Section 924(c) convictions, each Count must contain a predicate “crime of violence.” Defendant appealed from the judgment sentencing him principally to 360-months’ imprisonment. He argued that neither count contains a predicate “crime of violence” necessary to sustain his Section 924(c) convictions.   The Second Circuit held Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction on Count One is vacated because attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a valid predicate crime of violence that would support a conviction under Section 924(c). Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction on Count Two is sustained because, after applying the modified categorical approach prescribed by the Supreme Court, the court concluded that the predicate crime of violence—VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon premised on a violation of N.Y. Penal Law Section 120.05(2) and perhaps also N.Y. Penal Law Section 120.10(1)—qualifies as a crime of violence that supports a conviction under Section 924(c). View "United States v. Darren Morris" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction after a guilty plea in district court. Among other things, The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sections 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii), and 2 for using, brandishing, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to an attempted Hobbs Act robbery, as well as his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sections 924(j)(1) and 2 for murdering a person with a firearm during and in relation to an attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded it to the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022).   The Second Circuit vacated the section 924(c) conviction and the section 924(j) conviction. The court explained that after Taylor, attempted Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) and, therefore, cannot serve as a predicate for Defendant’s conviction under section 924(c)(1)(A). Furthermore, because an element of an offense under section 924(j)(1) is that the defendant was “in the course of a violation of [section 924(c)],” attempted Hobbs Act robbery also cannot serve as a predicate for Defendant’s conviction under section 924(j)(1). Moreover, the court wrote it cannot conclude that the purported Rule 11 error made any difference in Defendant’s guilty-plea calculation. View "United States v. Collymore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants St. Joseph Hospital and Catholic Health System of Long Island, Inc. for injuries he sustained at St. Joseph Hospital, where he was admitted in March 2020 with COVID-19. Plaintiff brought claims for malpractice, negligence, and gross negligence in New York state court. Defendants removed the case to the New York district court and moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants asserted state and federal immunities under the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (“EDTPA”) and the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”). The district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with directions to remand the case to state court. The court concluded that removal to federal court was improper because the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. First, Plaintiff’s state-law claims are not completely preempted by the PREP Act. Second, there is no jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute because Defendants did not “act under” a federal officer. Finally, Plaintiff’s claims do not “arise under” federal law. View "Solomon v. St. Joseph Hosp." on Justia Law

The Evergreen Association brought an action against New York officials, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of New York Labor Law Sec. 203-e, which prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees for their reproductive health decisions. Evergreen claimed that Sec. 203-e unconstitutionally burdens its right to freedom of expressive association, preventing it from employees who seek abortions. The district court granted the New York defendants' motion to dismiss, and Evergreen appealed.On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evergreen's claims that Sec. 203-e violates its right to freedom of speech, violates its right to the free exercise of religion, and is impermissibly vague. However, the court reversed Evergreen's claim that the statute violates its freedom of expressive association. More specifically, the panel held that the district court should have applied strict scrutiny. Because the state did not show that Sec. 203-e is the least restrictive means to achieve its governmental interest, the panel reversed on this issue alone. View "Slattery v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Plaintiff responded to a distracted-driving enforcement campaign conducted by Defendants (the City of Stamford and its Sergeant) by standing down the street from where police sat holding a sign stating "Cops Ahead." Plaintiff's sign was confiscated twice before he was arrested for interfering with an officer. Charges were filed, Plaintiff spent a night in jail, and shortly thereafter, the prosecution dropped the charges against Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed suit under Sec. 1983, claiming Defendants infringed on his freedom of speech, engaged in malicious prosecution, and deprived him of equal protection and due process, violating the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part Plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim. Specifically, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on the First and Fourth Amendment claims but did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court held that no Connecticut law proscribed Plaintiff's conduct, and thus, officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. Thus, the district court erred in finding that the existence of probable cause served as a complete defense to Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. The court also held that Plaintiff's speech was protected but rejected his equal protection and due process claims based on the City's bail-setting policies. View "Friend v. Gasparino" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are participants in the physical and derivatives markets for platinum and palladium and seek monetary and injunctive relief for violations of the antitrust laws and the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”). According to Plaintiffs, Defendants—mostly foreign companies engaged in trading these metals—manipulated the benchmark prices for platinum and palladium by collusively trading on the futures market to depress the price of these metals and by abusing the process for setting the benchmark prices. Defendants allegedly benefited from this conduct via trading in the physical markets and holding short positions in the futures market. The district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over two of the foreign Defendants, but it dismissed Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims for lack of antitrust standing and the Plaintiffs’ CEA claims for being impermissibly extraterritorial. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of these claims.   The Second Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part. The court reversed the district court’s holding that the “Exchange Plaintiffs” lacked antitrust standing to sue for the manipulation of the New York Mercantile Exchange futures market in platinum and palladium. The court explained that as traders in that market, the Exchange Plaintiffs are the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws for that injury. But the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that KPFF Investment, Inc. did not have antitrust standing. Additionally, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ CEA claims. View "In re Platinum and Palladium Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

Alleging the creation of a hostile work environment in violation of federal, state, and city law, Plaintiff sued the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) and two NYCHA senior officials (collectively, the “NYCHA Defendants”) and the former Speaker of the New York City Council (collectively, “Defendants”). The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and, in doing so, misapplied the totality of the circumstances standard established in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).   The Second Circuit agreed and vacated the district court’s judgment. The court concluded that the district court failed to draw “all reasonable inferences” in Plaintiff’s favor when it considered the five incidents underlying her claims, both when viewing the incidents individually and in their totality. The court explained that the district court held that Plaintiff did not demonstrate the effort to replace her tangibly impacted her work environment, bearing in mind that all a plaintiff must show is that the harassment “altered working conditions as to  make it more difficult to do the job.” But a jury could find that the delay in filling the HA vacancies and the transfer of the superintendent, along with the behind-the-scenes effort to transfer Plaintiff, made it more challenging for Plaintiff to carry out her job. Regardless, these are determinations for the jury, not the judge, to make. View "Allison Williams v. New York City Housing Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. Section 552, seeking documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) related to himself, speculating that they might include exculpatory information that the government had not disclosed in his recent criminal trial. The government produced sets of responsive documents and an index detailing FOIA exemptions under which it withheld other responsive documents, and the district court granted summary judgment for the government. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the United States Department of Justice.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued (1) that summary judgment was improperly granted because his FOIA action is an effort to vindicate his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and (2) that, in the alternative, the district court erred in not conducting an in-camera inspection of withheld documents. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in Brown v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 658 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1981), FOIA and the criminal discovery process provide distinct tracks for seeking disclosure from the government. That a FOIA action might lead to the discovery of documents useful to a particular criminal defendant changes neither the government’s statutorily defined obligations under FOIA nor the government’s burden at summary judgment. View "Jabar v. U.S. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The government petitions for a panel rehearing of so much of the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Gibson, 55 F.4th 153 (2d Cir. 2022), as ruled that the 2015 removal of naloxegol from the federal controlled substances schedules promulgated under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), 21 U.S.C. Sections 801-971, rendered those schedules categorically narrower than the New York drug schedules applicable to Defendant’s 2002 state-law conviction. The government's petition suggests that that ruling in the court’s opinion ("Opinion") was dictum rather than a holding and asks that the court issue an amended opinion so stating.   The Second Circuit granted rehearing in order to note the government's various positions on the comparability of the state and federal drug schedules and to flag some defects in the petition's characterizations of the record. However, the court denied the request for an amended opinion. The court explained that the comparability of the New York's 2002 drug schedules and the current federal drug schedules was an issue that the district court was required to, and did, decide in order to make a determination as to what Defendant’s Guidelines sentence would be. This Court was required to and did, determine whether the district court's decision was correct. View "USA v. Gibson" on Justia Law