Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty on counts related to a drug distribution conspiracy, the discharge of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant committed these crimes while on supervised release following prior convictions. On appeal, Defendant asserted primarily that two alleged district court errors require vacatur of his conviction. First, relying on Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 2 U.S. 545 (1977), Defendant contended that the government violated his Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting testimony from his former cellmate concerning what Defendant told the cellmate about Defendant planned defense. Second, Defendant submitted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer supervising Defendant during his period of supervised release coordinated a search of his residence and rental car. Accordingly, Defendant argued that the district court erred by admitting his former cellmate’s testimony and evidence seized during the search of his residence and rental car.   The Second Circuit affirmed hold that on plain error review of the Sixth Amendment claim, the court identified no error, never mind plain error. Nothing in the record suggests that the government learned privileged information or intentionally invaded Defendant’s relationship with his attorney. On de novo review of the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The officer monitoring Defendant had reasonable suspicion to search his residence and rental car based on credible reports that Defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm and was engaged in drug trafficking. View "United States v. Chandler" on Justia Law

On appeal to the Second Circuit from remand from the United States Supreme Court, the court vacated Defendants’ convictions conversion of government property, wire fraud, and securities fraud; and convicting certain Defendants on various counts of conspiring to engage in conduct violating one or more of the above sections, all originating from misappropriation of confidential information from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS").   On remand: (A) Defendants contend that their argument that the CMS information at issue does not constitute "property" or a "thing of value" within the meaning of the above statutes is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly; (B) the government, concurring in that contention, confesses error as to the substantive counts and as to a count charging only conspiracy to violate Sections 1343 and 1348 (Count Two); and it agrees that either Defendants' convictions on those counts should be reversed, or the cases should be remanded to the district court so that the government can dismiss those counts pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a); and (C) the government seeks affirmance on the remaining conspiracy counts (Counts One and Seventeen).   The Second Circuit explained that given the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly and the prosecutorial discretion to which the Executive Branch of the government is entitled, the court granted the government's request to remand the cases to the district court for dismissal of the substantive counts and Count Two. View "USA v. Blaszczak" on Justia Law

Yale New Haven Hospital (“YNHH”) receives federal funds under the Medicare Act. As part of the statutory formula for determining appropriate funding, the Medicare Act directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) to “estimate” the “amount of uncompensated care” that each hospital will provide to indigent patients in a given federal fiscal year (“FFY”). Here, YNHH contended that the Secretary failed to conduct adequate notice-and-comment rulemaking before choosing to use only YNHH’s historical data – and not that of a hospital that had recently merged into YNHH – to estimate YNHH’s amount of uncompensated care for FFY 2014. The Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C Section 1395ww(r)(3), which prohibits “judicial review” of “[a]ny estimate of the Secretary.” The district court denied the Secretary’s motion, reasoning that section 1395ww(r)(3) applies only to substantive challenges to estimates, but not to procedural challenges like YNHH’s. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of YNHH.   The Secretary appealed, disputing (1) the district court’s ruling that it had jurisdiction to consider YNHH’s procedural challenge, and alternatively (2) the district court’s merits ruling that the Secretary’s estimate was procedurally unlawful.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the Secretary’s motion to dismiss YNHH’s procedural challenge for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; vacated, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for YNHH on its procedural challenge; REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the remainder of YNHH’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and dismissed YNHH’s cross-appeal disputing the district court’s chosen remedy. View "Yale New Haven Hosp. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Defendants, Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (the "CIAC") and its member high schools (together, "Defendants"), have followed the "Transgender Participation" Policy (the "Policy"), which permits high school students to compete on gender specific athletic teams consistent with their gender identity if that is different from "the gender listed on their official birth certificates."   Plaintiffs are four cisgender female students who allege that the policy disproportionally disadvantages cisgender girls as compared to boys. Plaintiffs allege that the Policy violates Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq. ("Title IX"), because the participation of transgender females in girls' high school athletic events results in "students who are born female" having materially fewer opportunities for victory, public recognition, athletic scholarships, and future employment "than students who are born male."   The district court dismissed the claims on grounds that (1) Plaintiffs' request to enjoin future enforcement of the Policy was moot; (2) Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claim for an injunction to change the record books; and (3) Plaintiffs' claims for monetary damages were barred under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.   The Second Circuit affirmed writing that it was unpersuaded, with respect to the claim for an injunction to alter the records, that Plaintiffs have established the injury in fact and redressability requirements for standing; both fail for reasons of speculation. And because the court concluded that the CIAC and its member schools did not have adequate notice that the Policy violates Title IX Plaintiffs' claims for damages must be dismissed. View "Selina Soule et al. v. Connecticut Association of Schools et al." on Justia Law

The TLA Claimholders, who assert unsecured claims against Tam Linhas Aéreas S.A. (“TLA”), an affiliate of LATAM Airlines Group S.A. (“LATAM”), a large South American airline holding company, appealed from an order of the district court, affirming a June 18, 2022 order of the United States Bankruptcy Court confirming LATAM’s reorganization plan. The plan of reorganization provides that the Appellants’ claims will be paid in full, except for any post-petition interest. The Bankruptcy Court determined that such treatment rendered the claims unimpaired under Section 1124(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, because Section 502(b)(2) of the Code provides that “unmatured interest” may be excluded from a claim. It also determined that the affiliate, TLA, was insolvent, so that the solvent-debtor exception—an equitable doctrine permitting the payment of post-petition interest by a solvent debtor in limited circumstances—did not apply. On appeal, the TLA Claimholders contend that, unless they receive post-petition interest, their claims are “impaired” under Section 8 1124(1). They also argue that TLA is solvent and that its solvency makes the solvent debtor exception applicable. They further contended that the Bankruptcy Court’s test for assessing solvency was legally flawed.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that 1) a claim is not impaired under 11 U.S.C. Section 1124(1) when it is altered by operation of the Bankruptcy Code, and (2) the Bankruptcy Court did not err in its assessment of TLA’s solvency. The district court did not abuse that discretion in determining that the Debtors’ analyses and the corrected Waterfall Analysis were more probative on the question of TLA’s solvency than the Discounted Cash Flow Analysis. View "In re LATAM Airlines Group S.A." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with five counts of an eight-count indictment in connection with the murders of two victims. Counts Four, Five, and Six charged Defendantwith conspiring to commit, and committing, murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1958. Counts Seven and Eight charged Defendant with use of a firearm to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j). Defendant was convicted on all five counts and received a sentence of five concurrent life terms, one for each count. In response to intervening Supreme Court precedent, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 asserting that his two Section 924(j) convictions on Counts Seven and Eight should be vacated. The district court agreed, and granted the motion. The court declined, however, to resentence Defendant de novo.   Defendant argued that this was an error, either because de novo resentencing was mandatory, or because the district court abused its discretion in declining to resentence Defendant de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Section 2255's statutory text vests district courts with the discretion to decide when to conduct a de novo resentencing and that de novo resentencing was not mandatory here. The court also concluded that because resentencing Defendant would have been “strictly ministerial,” resulting in the same sentence of mandatory life imprisonment that he received in the first instance, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Peña" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial Defendant was convicted of numerous crimes related to his leadership of two organizations, a self-styled executive coaching and self-help organization called NXIVM and a secret society called DOS. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for sex trafficking crimes. At the center of his appeal is the meaning of “commercial sex act,” which Section 1591 defines as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” He contended that evidence the Government submitted at trial showing that individuals received benefits, such as privileged positions within an organization, is insufficient to sustain his sex trafficking convictions.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that Section 1591 requires neither that a “[]thing of value” have a monetary or financial component nor that the sexual exploitation is conducted for profit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the October 30, 2020 judgment as it concerns Defendant’s sex trafficking offenses: the sex trafficking conspiracy (Count 5), the sex trafficking of N  (Count 6), the attempted sex trafficking of J (Count 7), and the racketeering act of sex trafficking of N (Act 10A).   The court further explained that the phrase “anything of value” need not have a monetary or financial component, and the actionable sexual exploitation need not have been conducted for profit. The jury was neither misinformed nor misled. Moreover, the court concluded that the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury and that Defendant was afforded at least “the minimum that due process requires.”. View "United States v. Raniere" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this putative class action against more than twenty banks and brokers, alleging a conspiracy to manipulate two benchmark rates known as Yen-LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR. He claimed that he was injured after purchasing and trading a Euroyen TIBOR futures contract on a U.S.-based commodity exchange because the value of that contract was based on a distorted, artificial Euroyen TIBOR. Plaintiff brought claims under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sought leave to assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).   The district court dismissed the CEA and antitrust claims and denied leave to add the RICO claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by holding that the CEA claims were impermissibly extraterritorial, that he lacked antitrust standing to assert a Sherman Act claim, and that he failed to allege proximate causation for his proposed RICO claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that fraudulent submissions to an organization based in London that set a benchmark rate related to a foreign currency—occurred almost entirely overseas. Here Plaintiff failed to allege any significant acts that took place in the United States. Plaintiff’s CEA claims are based predominantly on foreign conduct and are thus impermissibly extraterritorial. As such, the district court also correctly concluded that Plaintiff lacked antitrust standing because he would not be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. Finally, Plaintiff failed to allege proximate causation for his RICO claims. View "Laydon v. Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., et al." on Justia Law

The United States appealed the district court’s judgment sentencing Defendant to 60 months' imprisonment following his plea of guilty to bank robbery, entering the banks with intent to commit larceny, bank larceny, and interstate communication of a threat to injure. The district court declined to sentence Defendant as a career offender under Sentencing Guidelines Section 4B1.1, ruling that a predicate advanced by the government for the enhancement—Defendant’s 2002 conviction of third-degree attempted criminal sale of a  controlled substance under New York Penal Law Sections 220.39(1) and 110--was not a proper predicate because New York's controlled substances schedule included naloxegol, which was removed from the federal controlled substances schedules. On appeal, the government contended that the district court misinterpreted the Guidelines by failing to compare the New York schedule to the federal schedules as they existed at the time of Defendant’s state-law conviction in 2002.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court found no merit in the government’s contention. The court explained that while there is much to be said for looking to federal criminal law as it stood at the time Defendant engaged in the conduct that constitutes his present offense, rather than at the time of sentencing for his present offense, the court need not decide between the two in this case because either leads to affirmance. Federal criminal law--both at the time of this conduct and at the time of sentencing for it--was narrower than the state law that governed Defendant’s 2002 conviction. View "USA v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Defendant, indicted for participating in a successful murder-for-hire scheme, was ordered detained pending trial. Defendant appealed the district court’s decision not to reopen his detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. Section 3142(f) after the U.S. Department of Justice confirmed that it would not seek the death penalty against him.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision not to reopen Defendant’s detention hearing and denied Defendant’s motion for bail. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to revisit its detention ruling. In its initial detention determination, the district court had assumed that the death penalty would not be sought, and so the government’s later confirmation of that point did not materially change the detention calculus. Moreover, the district court’s consideration of the strength of the evidence that Defendant committed the charged offense, as part of its assessment of whether Defendant posed a danger to the community or a risk of flight, was consistent with the Bail Reform Act and did not undermine the presumption of innocence, which is a trial right. View "United States v. Zhang" on Justia Law