Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Givaudan SA, a Swiss multinational manufacturer of flavors and fragrances, entered into a business relationship with Conagen Inc., a Massachusetts-based synthetic biology company. In 2016, the two companies executed a term sheet outlining several potential transactions, including Givaudan's purchase of a 5% equity stake in Conagen for $10 million and an exclusivity agreement for Conagen's intellectual property. Givaudan paid the $10 million and received the shares, but negotiations on the exclusivity agreement failed.Givaudan sued Conagen in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, seeking the return of its $10 million. After a bench trial, the district court found Conagen not liable on all claims and dismissed the case. Givaudan appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Givaudan failed to prove damages, an essential element of a breach of contract claim under Delaware law. The court found that the $10 million payment for the 5% equity stake was a completed transaction and not contingent on the successful negotiation of the exclusivity agreement. The court also determined that the term sheet was a binding preliminary agreement that established a duty to negotiate in good faith, but Givaudan did not incur any costs or expenses that would qualify as reliance damages. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Givaudan v. Conagen" on Justia Law

Robert Sylvester Kelly, also known as R. Kelly, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of racketeering and Mann Act violations. The evidence presented at trial showed that Kelly, with the help of his associates, exploited his fame to lure and abuse young girls and women over a period of twenty-five years. Kelly isolated his victims, controlled their lives, and subjected them to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.The district court sentenced Kelly to 360 months' imprisonment for racketeering and additional concurrent sentences for the Mann Act violations. Kelly was also fined and ordered to pay restitution to two victims. Kelly appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the state laws underlying his federal convictions, the empaneling of certain jurors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Kelly's appeal. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Kelly's convictions, including the underlying state and federal violations. The court also held that the New York state law was constitutional as applied to Kelly and that Kelly's challenges to the California state law were untimely. The court found no evidence of juror bias or ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. The court also upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders, finding no abuse of discretion.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Kelly's arguments on appeal were without merit. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

John Doe, an individual with a serious mental illness, sued James V. McDonald, M.D., New York’s Commissioner of Health, and other defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Doe alleged that New York State regulations discriminated against him by preventing his readmission to Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, a Transitional Adult Home (TAH) where he previously resided. After filing the suit, the State allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations to permit readmission of former TAH residents with serious mental illness, and removed Oceanview’s classification as a TAH.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Doe lacked standing. The district court granted the State leave to file an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State contended that the district court erred in finding standing because Doe lacked a concrete plan to leave and seek readmission to Oceanview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the State’s jurisdictional challenge should be assessed as a question of mootness, not standing, because it addressed events occurring after Doe filed the suit. The court found that Doe’s suit was moot because the State had allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations, and removed Oceanview’s TAH classification. Consequently, there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation would recur.The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doe v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Sealed Appellant 1, the former CEO of a publicly traded company, and Sealed Appellants 2 and 3, a lawyer and law firm that represented him and the company, appealed an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court compelled Sealed Appellants 2 and 3 to produce documents withheld under attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury subpoenas. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied, as there was probable cause to believe that communications between Sealed Appellants 1 and 2 were made to criminally circumvent the company’s internal controls.The district court concluded that the company had an internal control requiring its legal department to review all significant contracts. It found that Sealed Appellant 1 and Sealed Appellant 2 concealed settlement agreements with two former employees who had accused Sealed Appellant 1 of sexual misconduct. These agreements were not disclosed to the company’s legal department or auditors, violating internal controls and resulting in false statements to auditors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It first determined that it had jurisdiction under the Perlman exception, which allows for immediate appeal when privileged information is in the hands of a third party likely to disclose it rather than face contempt. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the crime-fraud exception. It held that there was probable cause to believe that the communications were made to circumvent internal controls, thus facilitating or concealing criminal activity. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling the production of the documents. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 13, 2023" on Justia Law

Cardinal Motors, Inc. filed a lawsuit against H&H Sports Protection USA Inc., alleging that H&H unlawfully copied the design of its motorcycle helmet, "The Bullitt." Cardinal claimed trade dress infringement and unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and analogous state laws. Cardinal described two alternative trade dresses for The Bullitt: the "General Trade Dress" and the "Detailed Trade Dress," each specifying various design features of the helmet.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Cardinal's complaint with prejudice, ruling that Cardinal failed to articulate a precise expression of the trade dress, including how it was distinct. The court focused on the General Trade Dress and did not separately consider the sufficiency of the Detailed Trade Dress, assuming it was inadequate based on the General Trade Dress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its application of the articulation requirement for trade dress infringement cases. The appellate court clarified that the articulation requirement is separate from the distinctiveness requirement. A plaintiff satisfies the articulation requirement by listing with precision the features that comprise its trade dress, without needing to prove distinctiveness at this stage.The Second Circuit held that both the General Trade Dress and the Detailed Trade Dress were articulated with the requisite precision. Therefore, the district court's dismissal was incorrect. The appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Cardinal's trade dress claims meet the elements of distinctiveness, likelihood of confusion, and nonfunctionality. The district court was also instructed to address Cardinal's state law claims of unfair competition. View "Cardinal Motors, Inc. v. H & H Sports Prot. USA Inc." on Justia Law

Xerox Corporation filed a petition under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) for injunctive and declaratory relief against Local 14A, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Xerographic Division Workers United (the Union). After the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Xerox and the Union expired, Xerox terminated retiree benefits. The Union argued that Xerox could not unilaterally terminate vested benefits and sought to enforce the expired agreement’s arbitration provision. Xerox sought to stay and enjoin arbitration.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York granted Xerox’s petition, concluding that the Union’s grievance was not arbitrable under the expired CBA. The district court reasoned that the Union failed to identify language in the agreement that could be understood to have promised vested benefits beyond the agreement’s expiration. Additionally, the reservation-of-rights clause in plan documents barred an interpretation that benefits had vested.On appeal, the Union argued that the district court erred. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the Union. The appellate court found that the Union identified language that could be reasonably understood as guaranteeing benefits beyond the contract’s expiration or as constituting deferred compensation. Furthermore, the reservation-of-rights clause in plan documents did not conclusively bar an interpretation that benefits had vested. To discern the parties’ intent, the appropriate trier of fact would need to consult extrinsic evidence.Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Xerox Corporation v. Local 14A, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Xerographic Division Workers United" on Justia Law

The case involves the surviving relatives of Quinn Lucas Schansman, a passenger on Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), which was shot down over eastern Ukraine by a missile launched from territory controlled by the Russian Federation-backed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). The plaintiffs allege that Sberbank of Russia PJSC (Sberbank) provided material support to the DPR by facilitating money transfers from donors to the DPR via correspondent accounts in the United States, which they claim proximately caused the downing of MH17.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Sberbank’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on foreign sovereign immunity grounds. Sberbank argued that it was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) after the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation acquired a majority share in Sberbank. The district court found that Sberbank was presumptively immune under the FSIA but that the commercial activity exception applied, as the claims were based on commercial activities carried out in the United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that Sberbank is presumptively immune under the FSIA due to its majority ownership by the Russian Ministry of Finance. However, the court also held that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies to Sberbank’s conduct, as the alleged claims are based on commercial activities—facilitating money transfers—carried out in the United States. Additionally, the court held that the ATA’s immunity provisions apply to instrumentalities of foreign states and that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies equally to actions brought under the ATA. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schansman v. Sberbank" on Justia Law

Debtor-Appellant Avianca Holdings S.A. agreed to pay additional rental payments to Creditors-Appellees Burnham Sterling and Company LLC and Babcock & Brown Securities LLC under 20 aircraft leases. Avianca failed to make certain payments that were due more than 60 days after filing for bankruptcy but before the leases were assumed or rejected. The creditors moved to compel payment under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(5), which requires timely performance of obligations arising from or after 60 days post-bankruptcy filing under an unexpired lease of personal property until the lease is assumed or rejected.The bankruptcy court granted the creditors' motion, concluding that Avianca's obligation to pay arose when the payments came due under the lease terms. Avianca appealed, arguing that the obligation arose pre-petition when the leases were executed. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, agreeing that the obligations arose as the payments came due.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(5), a debtor's obligation to make payments arises when the payments come due according to the lease terms, not when the lease was executed. The court emphasized that the statutory language requires the debtor to perform obligations that originate from or after 60 days post-petition, aligning with the "billing date" approach rather than the "accrual" approach. The court also noted that this interpretation is consistent with the broader statutory scheme and bankruptcy policy, which aims to balance creditor protection with the debtor's ability to reorganize. View "In re Avianca Holdings S.A." on Justia Law

Shanda Games Limited, a video game company registered in the Cayman Islands, issued proxy materials as part of a freeze-out merger. The lead plaintiff, David Monk, alleged that these materials were materially misleading, causing him to accept the merger price instead of exercising his appraisal rights. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Monk’s claims, stating he failed to properly allege loss causation.The district court found that Monk had adequately pleaded that Shanda made two material misstatements but ruled that Monk had failed to plead reliance because the market in ADS was not efficient after the merger announcement. The court also held that the statements about the merger's fairness were inactionable opinions. Monk's motion for reconsideration was denied in part and granted in part, and his motion to add another lead plaintiff was denied. Monk filed a second amended complaint, which was again dismissed for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in dismissing Monk’s claims. The appellate court concluded that Monk adequately alleged material misstatements, including the preparation of financial projections, the projections themselves, and the fairness of the merger. The court also found that Monk adequately pleaded scienter, reliance, and loss causation. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Shanda Games Ltd. Securities Litigation" on Justia Law

The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief, Harry B. Wallace, challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. They argued that the Andros Order, a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the Nation, allowed them to fish freely and preempted the DEC’s regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the DEC from enforcing these regulations against the Nation’s members in their customary fishing waters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Andros Order is not federal law preempting New York’s fishing regulations. The court also found that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Basil Seggos in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims against Commissioner Seggos under the Ex parte Young exception. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to resolve Daubert motions or privilege disputes before ruling on the summary judgment motions. Finally, the court held that the Andros Order is not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and has not been ratified by the United States. Therefore, the Andros Order does not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos" on Justia Law