Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Four former employees of grocery store chains, who participated in a defined contribution 401(k) retirement plan, brought a putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). They alleged that the plan’s fiduciaries mismanaged the plan by failing to prudently select and monitor investment options, failing to act solely in the interest of plan participants, and allowing excessive fees and improper compensation arrangements. The plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves, the plan, and a proposed class of similarly situated participants.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of Article III standing, finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged any concrete injury to their individual accounts from the alleged mismanagement of certain investment options or from the plan’s compensation arrangements. The district court concluded that because the plaintiffs had not invested in the specific funds they challenged, or had not shown that the alleged breaches affected their own accounts, they lacked standing to pursue those claims. The court did find standing for some claims related to funds in which the plaintiffs had invested, but ultimately dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim and denied leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims for lack of standing. The Second Circuit held that participants in a defined contribution plan must plausibly allege a concrete, individualized financial injury to establish Article III standing for monetary relief under ERISA. Because the plaintiffs did not allege that they suffered losses in their own accounts from the challenged conduct, they lacked both individual and class standing for those claims. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Collins v. Ne. Grocery, LLC" on Justia Law

Two New York residents applied for concealed carry firearm licenses under the state’s licensing laws. Their applications were reviewed by a county court judge acting as a statutory licensing officer, who denied both applications. The judge found that one applicant’s criminal arrest history and failure to disclose it demonstrated a lack of maturity and responsibility, while the other applicant’s criminal history, including a youthful-offender adjudication for robbery, similarly indicated he was not qualified for a license.After their applications were denied, the applicants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. They sued the judge in both his individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the claims against the judge in his individual capacity, holding that absolute judicial immunity applied because the judge was acting in a judicial role. The court also dismissed the official-capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, finding that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement and § 1983’s limitations barred such claims against a judge acting in this capacity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit held that judges deciding firearms license applications under New York law act in a judicial capacity and are therefore entitled to absolute immunity from individual-capacity suits for damages. The court further held that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement bars claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against state court judges in their official capacity when they act as neutral adjudicators without a personal or institutional stake in the challenged law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Kellogg v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Brandon Prawl was convicted after a jury trial of several offenses arising from heroin distribution activities in Schenectady, New York. The evidence at trial showed that Prawl sold heroin to an undercover investigator on four occasions in September 2019, often retrieving the drugs from an apartment at 1526 Devine Street. On October 4, 2019, police raided the apartment and found Prawl in a bedroom with his identification card listing the apartment as his address. In the same room, officers discovered heroin, drug paraphernalia, and an unloaded handgun with a loaded magazine nearby. Prawl did not have a license for the firearm.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Judge Suddaby) presided over the trial. Prawl was indicted for four counts of heroin distribution, one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin. At trial, the government’s arguments and the district court’s jury instructions linked the firearm possession charge to Prawl’s possession with intent to distribute heroin on October 4, rather than to the September sales as specified in the indictment. Prawl did not object to this at trial. The jury convicted him on all counts, and he was sentenced to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Prawl challenged only his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He argued that the evidence was insufficient and that the indictment was constructively amended in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, that Prawl had abandoned his constructive amendment claim on appeal, and that, even if not abandoned, any error was not plain. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Prawl" on Justia Law

Two defendants were charged and convicted for their roles in a large-scale ATM skimming operation that spanned the United States, Europe, and Mexico, resulting in millions of dollars in losses to financial institutions and individual account holders. The scheme involved installing skimming devices and hidden cameras on ATMs to steal debit card numbers and PINs, creating counterfeit cards, withdrawing cash from victims’ accounts, and laundering the proceeds overseas. One defendant was primarily involved in sending and receiving skimming devices and laundering money, while the other built and distributed skimming devices, supervised cash-outs, and was found with skimming equipment and counterfeit cards in his garage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over the trial. One defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts, while the other pled guilty to most charges and was convicted by a jury of aggravated identity theft. Both received below-Guidelines sentences (92 and 120 months) and were ordered to pay restitution in installments, with the option to use the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan (IFRP). The defendants appealed, jointly challenging their aggravated identity theft convictions, and individually raising issues regarding the suppression of evidence, sentencing enhancements, and the restitution payment schedule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that debit card numbers and PINs are “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, thus supporting the aggravated identity theft convictions. The court also upheld the denial of the suppression motion, finding the search of the garage lawful as a protective sweep incident to arrest. The court found no procedural or substantive error in the sentences. However, it vacated the restitution order for one defendant and remanded for clarification of the installment payment schedule during incarceration. All other aspects of the convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "United States of America v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service sent a notice of deficiency to two taxpayers regarding their 2018 income tax return. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer generally has ninety days from the date the notice is mailed to file a petition with the United States Tax Court to challenge the deficiency. In this case, the taxpayers’ counsel filed the petition nine days after the ninety-day deadline had passed.The United States Tax Court, presided over by Chief Judge Kerrigan, found that the IRS had properly mailed the notice and that the petition was untimely. Relying on longstanding precedent, the Tax Court concluded that the ninety-day deadline in section 6213(a) of the Internal Revenue Code was jurisdictional, meaning that missing the deadline deprived the court of the power to hear the case. The Tax Court therefore dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The taxpayers appealed this dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s dismissal de novo. The Second Circuit held that, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, the ninety-day deadline in section 6213(a) is not jurisdictional but is instead a nonjurisdictional, claim-processing rule. The court further held that this deadline is subject to equitable tolling, meaning that the Tax Court may consider late petitions if the taxpayers can show that equitable tolling is warranted. The Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for the Tax Court to determine whether the taxpayers are entitled to equitable tolling. View "Buller v. Comm'r" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee of a dental supply company, suffered a traumatic brain injury and later filed a claim for long-term disability (LTD) benefits under her employer’s LTD plan, which was insured and administered by an independent insurance company. After her claim was denied, she left her job and entered into a separation agreement with her employer. This agreement included a broad release of claims against the employer and its “parents, subsidiaries, related or affiliated entities,” as well as their agents, including claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Before signing, the plaintiff sought clarification from her employer about whether the release would affect her ability to pursue her LTD claim against the insurer. The employer’s representatives assured her that the insurer was a separate, independent entity and that the agreement would not impact her ability to appeal the denial of her LTD claim.After the insurer denied her appeal, the plaintiff sued the insurer in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging violations of ERISA. The insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the release in the separation agreement barred her claims. The district court agreed, holding that the insurer was covered by the release and that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived her ERISA claims against it. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, and the plaintiff appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff did not knowingly and voluntarily release her ERISA claims against the insurer. The court emphasized the employer’s express assurances to the plaintiff that the release would not affect her LTD claim and found no evidence to create a genuine dispute on this point. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schuyler v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada" on Justia Law

Brian Flores, a current NFL coach, brought a putative class action against the National Football League and several of its member clubs, including the Denver Broncos, New York Giants, and Houston Texans, alleging racial discrimination under federal, state, and local law. Flores’s claims stemmed from his interviews and employment experiences with these teams, during which he alleged discriminatory hiring practices. His employment contracts with various NFL teams incorporated the NFL Constitution, which contains a broad arbitration provision granting the NFL Commissioner authority to arbitrate disputes between coaches and member clubs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration based on Flores’s employment agreements. The District Court granted the motion for claims against the Miami Dolphins, Arizona Cardinals, and Tennessee Titans, but denied it for Flores’s claims against the Broncos, Giants, Texans, and related claims against the NFL. The court found the NFL Constitution’s arbitration provision illusory and unenforceable under Massachusetts law, as it allowed unilateral modification by the NFL and lacked a signed agreement in one instance. The District Court also denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s orders. The Second Circuit held that the NFL Constitution’s arbitration provision, which vested unilateral substantive and procedural authority in the NFL Commissioner, did not qualify for protection under the Federal Arbitration Act and was unenforceable because it failed to guarantee Flores the ability to vindicate his statutory claims in an impartial arbitral forum. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion for reconsideration, concluding there was no abuse of discretion. View "Flores v. N.Y. Football Giants" on Justia Law

After Congress enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017, which capped the federal deduction for state and local taxes (SALT) at $10,000, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and the Village of Scarsdale created or planned programs allowing residents to make contributions to state-administered charitable funds in exchange for significant state or local tax credits. These programs were designed to help residents recover some of the lost federal tax benefit by allowing them to claim a federal charitable deduction for the full amount contributed, despite receiving a state or local tax credit in return. In response, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Treasury Department issued a regulation (the “Final Rule”) requiring taxpayers to reduce their federal charitable deduction by the amount of any state or local tax credit received for the contribution.The States and Scarsdale sued the IRS and Treasury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the Final Rule exceeded the IRS’s statutory authority under 26 U.S.C. § 170 and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding the IRS’s interpretation reasonable under Chevron deference and holding the rule was not arbitrary or capricious.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that New York and Scarsdale had Article III standing, and that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit because there was no alternative procedure for the plaintiffs to challenge the rule. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron, the Second Circuit independently interpreted § 170 and concluded that the IRS’s rule was consistent with the statute’s quid pro quo principle. The court also found the rule was not arbitrary or capricious. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "New Jersey v. Bessent" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man convicted in New York state court of attempted second-degree murder, attempted first-degree robbery, and criminal possession of a weapon, following an incident in which he attempted to rob a man and then fired at both the intended victim and responding police officers. During jury selection, the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike several Black prospective jurors. Defense counsel objected, arguing that these strikes were racially discriminatory under Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court appeared to agree that two of the strikes violated Batson, but due to an administrative error, the dismissed jurors could not be recalled. Defense counsel did not object to the lack of a Batson remedy, and the trial proceeded with the selected jury.On direct appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court found that the Batson claim was unpreserved for appellate review because defense counsel had not objected to the absence of a remedy at trial. The court also rejected the argument that counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, arguing that his counsel’s failure to seek a Batson remedy constituted ineffective assistance. The district court denied the petition, holding that the claim was procedurally defaulted and that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the petitioner failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel lacked strategic reasons for not seeking a Batson remedy. The court declined to require defense counsel to pursue Batson remedies at the expense of their client’s strategic interests. The judgment denying habeas relief was affirmed. View "Carew v. Morton" on Justia Law

A construction worker employed by a subcontractor was injured when a scaffold collapsed at a Manhattan worksite. The worker sued the property owner and general contractor in New York Supreme Court, alleging negligence and violations of state labor laws. The owner’s insurer, Liberty Insurance Corporation, sought a declaration in federal court that the subcontractor’s insurer, Hudson Excess Insurance Company, was obligated to defend and indemnify the owner as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s commercial general liability policy. The subcontract between the general contractor and the subcontractor required the latter to provide insurance coverage for the owner and general contractor.In the New York Supreme Court, summary judgment was granted to the injured worker on some claims, while other claims remained pending. The court denied summary judgment to the owner on its contractual indemnification claim against the subcontractor, finding factual questions about the scope of the subcontractor’s work. Later, after the federal district court’s decision, the state court dismissed all third-party claims against the subcontractor, finding the indemnity provision in the subcontract invalid due to lack of a meeting of the minds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s finding, after a bench trial on stipulated facts, that the subcontractor’s actions proximately caused the worker’s injuries and that Hudson owed a duty to indemnify the owner under the policy. The Second Circuit held that the later state court decision did not alter this result. However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Liberty, holding that Hudson was entitled to a statutory safe harbor under New York Insurance Law, and thus was not required to pay Liberty’s attorney’s fees for the federal action. View "Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Hudson Excess Insurance Co." on Justia Law