Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Seneca Nation brought a lawsuit seeking relief from New York State, the New York Thruway Authority, and the Thruway Authority’s Executive Director (collectively “Defendants”) for ongoing use of an invalid easement over its tribal land. Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. Defendants contend that the Nation is collaterally estopped from bringing this present action based on a 2004 judgment of this court and that this lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Seneca Nation does not assert property rights over land to which New York State has traditionally held the title and does not seek a declaration that the State’s laws and regulations do not apply to the area in dispute. Therefore, the quiet title exception to Ex parte Young outlined by the Court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe has no application here. Accordingly, the lawsuit falls under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, neither collateral estoppel nor the Eleventh Amendment bars the Nation from proceeding in this case. View "Seneca Nation v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment sentencing him to 36 months in prison following his conviction by a jury of witness retaliation. Defendant challenged the manner in which the district court conducted jury selection, arguing primarily that the district court neglected to adequately screen prospective jurors for bias against gang members and that the voir dire process was too abbreviated to allow for informed peremptory and for-cause challenges.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that, under these circumstances, the district court exceeded its discretion by failing to sufficiently account for the risk of gang-related bias among prospective jurors. The court explained that the district court’s failure on voir dire to explore or to take other steps specifically to counter such potential prejudice unfairly deprived Defendant of the opportunity to unearth a pervasive bias relevant to an issue pivotal to the government’s case against him. Accordingly, the court held that the district court abused its discretion. View "United States of America v. Nieves" on Justia Law

Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union Immigrants’ Rights Project (“ACLU”) brought a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) suit in district court to compel Defendant, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), to produce agency records in the form of electronic spreadsheet data pertaining to five stages of the immigration enforcement and deportation process. ICE produced 21 spreadsheets of responsive data but did not comply with ACLU’s request to replace exempt Alien Identification Numbers (“A-Numbers”) on such spreadsheets with anonymized unique identifiers (“Unique IDs”). ACLU submits that such Unique IDs could be any combinations of numbers, letters, or symbols that, while meaningless in themselves, would allow ACLU to track datapoints pertaining to individual (but unidentified) aliens across ICE databases. The district court granted ICE’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that ACLU’s requested substitution effectively required ICE to create new records.   The Second Circuit reversed the award of summary judgment to ICE and remanded. The court reasoned that by redacting A-Numbers from the spreadsheets, it produced conveying datapoints by event rather than by person, ICE not only shielded the FOIA-exempt personal identifying information (“PII”) documented by the A-Numbers but also effectively deprived the public of access to nonexempt records in the same person-centric manner available to the agency. The court explained that the substitution of Unique IDs for A-Numbers does not create any new agency records and is a reasonable step to shield the exempt content of A-Numbers while preserving the function necessary to afford public access to non-exempt records in the same person-centric form or format available to the agency. View "ACLU Immigrants' Rts. Project v. ICE" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed various issues arising from his 2017 amended judgment of conviction for Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses in district court. The Second Circuit addressed two of Defendant’s arguments—first that the order of forfeiture entered against him should be vacated because the district court failed to enter a preliminary order prior to sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B); second, that he was improperly convicted of possessing firearms as a felon, Counts Twelve through Fourteen because the government did not prove that he knew that he was a felon.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that Defendant asserted that forfeiture is unlike restitution, which was at issue in Dolan because restitution is intended to assist the victims of crimes. Forfeiture and restitution indeed serve different purposes: restitution is for “remediating a loss,” while forfeiture is for “disgorging a gain.” But that distinction is less material here. Forfeiture also serves other important purposes, and the court saw no reason why, for purposes of timing, restitution and forfeiture should be treated differently under these circumstances. Defendant also argued that the government alone is responsible for preserving the value of seized assets, but for support, he cites only an inapposite customs statute. However, the court found that Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice sufficient to void the forfeiture order. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment of conviction following his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 kilograms (kg) of marijuana. During a reverse-sting operation, Defendant took possession of 10 kg of real and “sham” cocaine from an undercover agent and agreed to take possession of 40 kg more. After his arrest, Defendant told law enforcement that he thought he was picking up marijuana or money, not cocaine. Defendant later entered a plea agreement, in which he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute marijuana. At sentencing, the government raised and the district court considered the 50 kg of cocaine as part of Defendant’s “relevant conduct” under Sentencing Guideline Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Defendant to 36 months imprisonment.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court concluded that (1) the plea agreement permitted the government to raise that quantity of cocaine at sentencing, (2) the government was not judicially estopped from doing so, and (3) the district court did not err by considering the 50 kg of cocaine as part of Defendant’s “relevant conduct” because Guideline Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) does not require scienter as to drug type when a defendant is directly and personally involved in a drug transaction. View "United States v. Helm" on Justia Law

In 2021, Second Circuit issued an opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the convictions of Defendants after trial in the district court. Among other things, the Second Circuit affirmed Defendants’ convictions under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) for brandishing firearms during and in relation to attempted Hobbs Act robberies. The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded to the Second Circuit for further consideration in in light of its decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). See McCoy v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2863 (2022); Nix v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2860 (2022).   The Second Circuit reversed Defendants’ section 924(c) convictions on Counts 4 and 6 for brandishing firearms during and in relation to attempted Hobbs Act robberies. The court agreed after Taylor, attempted Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A). More specifically, the Supreme Court explained that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence pursuant to section 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause because an attempt does not categorically require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force against the person or property of another. View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a South Asian-American woman, began working for Bloomberg’s Dubai news bureau as a Persian Gulf economy and government reporter. Plaintiff informed Bloomberg that she wished to transfer to its New York or Washington, D.C. bureaus because of her husband’s job location. Plaintiff ultimately obtained a position at Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”) in the Washington, D.C. bureau reporting on cybersecurity.   When Plaintiff subsequently asked why she had not been considered for the U.N. position, her team leader responded that Plaintiff had never said that she wanted to cover foreign policy; he also advised her that she had to advocate for herself if she wanted to advance at Bloomberg. On behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff – now a resident of California – filed a class-action lawsuit in New York state court against Bloomberg and several of its employees; shortly thereafter, she amended her complaint. Thereafter, Bloomberg moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims against Bloomberg, including her NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims based on Bloomberg’s failure to promote her to positions in New York.   The Second Circuit concluded that the issue implicates a host of important state interests. Thus it reversed the district court’s decision and certified the following question: whether a nonresident plaintiff not yet employed in New York City or State satisfies the impact requirement of the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”) or the New York State Human Rights Law (the “NYSHRL”) if the plaintiff pleads and later proves that an employer deprived the plaintiff of a New York City- or State-based job opportunity on discriminatory grounds. View "Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and unlawful use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. In his plea agreement, Petitioner waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his convictions and sentence so long as the district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment equal to or less than 106 months. He was sentenced principally to 96 months imprisonment. Petitioner appealed the district court’s order denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and his corresponding sentence. He contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), invalidate his conviction on that count. The government disputes primarily that Petitioner’s guilty plea to the section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction rested solely on Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, contending that the conviction also rested on the predicate crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The government asserts that the record is sufficient to support Petitioner’s guilt based on attempted Hobbs Act robbery.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Petitioner relief under section 2255, vacated Petitioner’s conviction and related sentence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1); and remanded to allow resentencing. The court explained that on de novo review, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence.” Thus, the court concluded that Petitioner’s conviction under section 924(c)(1)(A) is invalid. View "Hall v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guyana, sought a review of a decision of the BIA affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering Petitioner’s removal based on a prior aggravated felony conviction. At issue is whether Petitioner’s conviction for attempted first-degree assault in violation of New York Penal Law Sections 110.00, 120.10(1) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 16(a).   The Second Circuit concluded that it is and denied the petition for review. The court explained that Petitioner’s argument that NYPL Section 120.10(1) is not a crime of violence because the statute does not use the words “physical force” fails because the intent to cause serious physical injury, particularly in combination with the deadly weapon or dangerous instrument element, necessarily encompasses the use of violent force required under Section 16(a). View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

An attorney appealed from orders of the Committee on Grievances of the Board of Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (the “Committee”) finding her liable for violating various provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and imposing sanctions for these violations, including a six-month suspension from practicing law in the Eastern District. On appeal, the attorney argued that the Committee (1) deprived her of due process by failing to afford her with reasonable notice of the charges and an adequate opportunity to defend against the charges, (2) failed to substantiate each element of the charges by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) imposed a punishment that was excessive in light of the putative lack of harm to the public. She has also requested that we maintain her appeal under seal, arguing that public disclosure of her identity would cause her reputational harm.   The Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the Committee and ordered that the docket in this appeal, and all its contents, be unsealed. The court explained that the attorney violated her most basic duty to the vulnerable clients who depended on her: to provide them with diligent, competent representation. Along the way, her neglectful and discourteous conduct harmed the administration of justice itself. The Committee’s evidence establishing as much was unassailable. Further, the court wrote that to the extent that the attorney’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge relies on her contention that it was improper for the Committee to consider filings and transcripts from her non-disciplinary matters in the Eastern District, it fails. View "In re Demetriades" on Justia Law