Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought an employment action claiming that his employer, Salisbury Bank and Trust Company (the "Bank") discharged him in violation of New York Labor Law Section 201-d because he chose to campaign for election to a seat in the New York State Assembly. The district court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff voluntarily resigned and was not constructively discharged.   On appeal, Plaintiff made two principal arguments. First, he contends that the Bank unlawfully "forced" him to decide between "termination or his protected political activity" and that, as a result, his departure from the Bank was involuntary. Second, he argued that the Bank has only proffered as a reason for its actions his statutorily "protected political activities."   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The court explained that even though the Bank claims that it had not decided to discharge Plaintiff when it learned of his "Decision," on this record a reasonable jury could find that the Bank had already concluded that Plaintiff would be discharged if he did not give up his campaign. For these reasons, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action by being forced to choose between his campaign and his job in violation of New York Labor Law. Further, a reasonable jury could find that the Bank's actions violated New York Labor Law Section 201-d because the bank failed to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action it took against Plaintiff. View "Truitt v. Salisbury Bank and Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as a receiver for debtor FutureNet Group, Inc., sued FutureNet’s judgment creditors – GTR Source, LLC (“GTR”) and Capital Merchant Services, LLC (“CMS”) – and the New York City Marshal for allegedly violating New York’s procedural rules when they executed state-court judgments against FutureNet. In the action against GTR and the Marshal, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, concluding principally that FutureNet would not suffer any injury even if the executions and levies were procedurally defective, since the seized property was used to satisfy valid underlying judgments. In a similar action against CMS, the district court dismissed the suit based on issue preclusion, finding that Plaintiff’s claims hinged on the same question of law at the heart of the GTR case. The district court also held that, absent preclusion, dismissal was appropriate because FutureNet suffered no damages. Plaintiff was subsequently replaced by two of FutureNet’s senior creditors, Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. and Plymouth Management Company, which now challenge both district-court decisions.   Now guided by the New York Court of Appeals’s decision that Article 52 of the CPLR is a judgment debtor’s exclusive avenue for relief from a procedurally defective execution and levy, the Second Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgments dismissing Plaintiffs’ actions. The court explained that the New York Court of Appeals unequivocally held that a judgment debtor must “bring an appropriate action pursuant to CPLR 12 Article 52” for relief from a procedurally defective execution and levy. Here, FutureNet has not done so. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC; Cap. Merch. Servs.," on Justia Law

Plaintiff Aetna Life Insurance Company brought suit against Big Y Foods, Inc., for reimbursement of Aetna's payments for medical services on behalf of a woman after she was injured at a Big Y Foods, Inc. supermarket store. Aetna moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the Medicare Secondary Payer Act gave Medicare Advantage organizations such as Aetna a private cause of action to seek reimbursement of conditional payments for medical services from tortfeasors such as Big Y and that no genuine issue of material fact remained. The district court granted Aetna's motion, and Defendant appealed.
The Second Circuit affirmed concluding that the Medicare Secondary Payer Act grants a private cause of action to Medicare Advantage organizations such as Aetna and that no genuine issue of material fact remains. Big Y argued that even if Aetna has a private cause of action under the MSP Act, there are genuine issues of material fact remaining as to whether Big Y has the responsibility to reimburse Aetna for the medical expenses Aetna incurred. The court wrote that Big Y's argument is directly contradicted by the statute. Further, Big Y does not dispute that the victim filed a claim against Big Y seeking compensation for the personal injuries that she sustained; that Big Y settled that claim with the victim paying her $30,000; and that Big Y knew that Aetna was asserting a lien against Big Y for Aetna’s payment of the woman’s medical expenses. Thus, Big Y is responsible for payment as a matter of law. View "Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Big Y Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of his Title VII discrete act and hostile work environment claims against the Federal Aviation Administration. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s claims were properly dismissed. The court first concluded that Plaintiff’s failure-to-train claim is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which requires that a claimant initiate an administrative review of his employment discrimination claim within 45 days of the allegedly discriminatory conduct. Further Plaintiff failed to point to any particular discrete and actionable unlawful employment practice that occurred in the 45 days before he initiated an administrative review of his claims. The continuing violation doctrine does not allow Plaintiff to pursue alleged incidents of unlawful practices that occurred before the 45-day period, as the doctrine is inapplicable to discrete act claims. Second, as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that his employer’s alleged failure to train him or the other alleged incidents of hostile behavior in the workplace was motivated by hostility to his race, color, or national origin. View "Tassy v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Workers at Amazon’s JFK8 fulfillment center and members of their households (together, “Plaintiffs”) challenge workplace COVID-19 policies, practices, and procedures at JFK8. Their suit against Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Services LLC (together, “Amazon”) asserted causes of action under New York law for public nuisance, breach of the duty to protect the health and safety of employees under New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) Section 200, violation of NYLL Section 191 for failure to pay, on time and in full, COVID-19 sick leave under New York’s COVID-19 sick leave law, and injunctive relief against future violations of NYLL Section 191.   The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ public nuisance and NYLL Section 200 claims without prejudice under the primary jurisdiction doctrine dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ NYLL Section 191 claims, concluding that COVID-19 leave payments are not “wages” as defined by Section 191.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ public nuisance and NYLL Section 191 claims; and vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ NYLL Section 200 claim and remanded to the district court for further proceedings on that claim. The court rejected Amazon’s contention that the court should partially dismiss the appeal. The court agreed with Plaintiffs that the district court wrongly applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine to their public nuisance and NYLL Section 200 claims. Ultimately, however, only their Section 200 claim survives. The court held Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for public nuisance under New York law because they do not allege a special injury and Section 11 of the New York Workers’ Compensation Law does not preclude injunctive relief under NYLL Section 200. View "Palmer v. Amazon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this putative class action against more than twenty banks and brokers, alleging a conspiracy to manipulate two benchmark rates known as Yen-LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR. Plaintiff brought claims under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sought leave to assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The district court dismissed the CEA and antitrust claims and denied leave to add the RICO claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by holding that the CEA claims were impermissibly extraterritorial, that he lacked antitrust standing to assert a Sherman Act claim, and that he failed to allege proximate causation for his proposed RICO claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the conduct—i.e., that the bank defendants presented fraudulent submissions to an organization based in London that set a benchmark rate related to a foreign currency—occurred almost entirely overseas. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege any significant acts that took place in the United States. Plaintiff’s CEA claims are based predominantly on foreign conduct and are thus impermissibly extraterritorial. Further, the court wrote that the district court also correctly concluded that Plaintiff lacked antitrust standing because he would not be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. Lastly, the court agreed that Plaintiff failed to allege proximate causation for his RICO claims. View "Laydon v. Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud. On appeal, Defendant argued that her pretrial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to transmit a plea offer from the government to Defendant before it expired, thereby depriving her of the chance to plead guilty under the terms of the offer.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction. The court concluded that Defendant has waived any claim that the alleged error violated her Sixth Amendment rights. Unlike the defendant in Frye, Defendant learned of her expired plea offer and received new court-appointed counsel two months before trial. She nonetheless chose to go to trial rather than to plead guilty or to petition the court for reinstatement of the offer. This knowing and the voluntary choice was inconsistent with seeking the benefit of the expired plea offer and thus constitutes waiver.
The court further found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Defendant’s other fraudulent activity that was similar and/or related to the charged conduct; the court did not err by allowing the government to introduce certain “red flag” emails from an outside attorney for the limited purpose of proving her knowledge, and the court’s decision to instruct the jury on conscious avoidance was proper. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

The Sears Holdings Corporation and its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors” or “Sears”) carried approximately $2.68 billion of first- and second-lien secured debt at the time of its bankruptcy petition. The holders of the second-lien debt alleged that they were paid less than the value of the collateral that secured their claims. To recoup the difference, the second-lien holders sought relief under section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, arguing that the value of their collateral decreased during the course of the bankruptcy proceeding, which entitled them to priority payment of the difference. The bankruptcy court disagreed, finding that the value of the second-lien holders’ collateral had not decreased since the date the Debtors filed for bankruptcy and that, in fact, the second-lien holders had received more than the value of their collateral.   On appeal, the second-lien holders raise a number of objections to the bankruptcy court’s valuation methodology, as well as to its valuation of several specific categories of collateral. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the bankruptcy court committed no legal or factual error in its decision to value the collateral based on NOLV. The bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that the second-lien holders failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the NBB’s value, and therefore did not err by valuing the NBB at zero. Similarly, the bankruptcy court did not err by deducting their full face value from the value of the collateral. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not commit clear error by denying the second-lien holders’ section 507(b) claims. View "In re Sears Holdings Corp." on Justia Law

On appeal from the district court’s judgment declaring valid and enforceable against Appellants instruments governing a debt issue—notes, indenture, and pledge agreement. The district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, holding the notes, pledge agreement, and indenture valid and enforceable under New York law, and denied Appellants’ cross-motion, which argued the documents were void under the law of Venezuela, the jurisdiction of the issuer of the notes, and that the court should decline to enforce the notes on the basis of the act-of-state doctrine.   The Second Circuit deferred a decision and certified the following questions on the issue to the New York Court of Appeals: 1. Given PDVSA’s argument that the Governing Documents are invalid and unenforceable for lack of approval by the National Assembly, does New York Uniform Commercial Code section 8-110(a)(1) require that the validity of the Governing Documents be determined under the Law of Venezuela, “the local law of the issuer’s jurisdiction”? 2. Does any principle of New York common law require that a New York court apply Venezuelan substantive law rather than New York substantive law in determining the validity of the Governing Documents? 3. Are the Governing Documents valid under New York law, notwithstanding the PDV Entities’ arguments regarding Venezuelan law? View "PDVSA, et al. v. MUFG Union Bank, GLAS Americas" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to uphold the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An Immigration Judge, as authorized by Congress, conducted the removal proceeding via video teleconference.   The Second Circuit concluded that the Fifth Circuit is the proper venue for his petition for review because jurisdiction vested in Louisiana and there was no change of venue after removal proceedings commenced. Still, in light of Petitioner’s understandable confusion about the proper venue for his petition, the period of time in which the petition has been pending before this Court, and the fact that his counsel is based in New York, the court denied the government’s motion to transfer. Thus, the court proceeded to consider Petitioner’s motion for a stay of removal, which the court denied due to Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate either a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim or that he will be irreparably injured absent a stay. View "Sarr v. Garland" on Justia Law