Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A collection of music publishers alleged infringement of their copyrights in 197 musical works when a series of live concert recordings was made available by Defendants for download and streaming on their websites. Plaintiffs sought damages and a permanent injunction pursuant to the Copyright Act. The district court held on summary judgment that Defendants had no valid licenses and therefore infringed each of the musical works and that the principal was personally liable. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction.   Defendants appealed from the district court’s summary judgment order and the order granting fees and costs. Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the district court’s denial of a permanent injunction, several evidentiary rulings, and the denial of a new trial.   The Second Circuit affirmed the rulings in the summary judgment order to the extent they: (a) held that Defendants failed to obtain a license for any of the audiovisual recordings, and therefore infringed the audiovisual works; (b) concluded that Defendants had no valid affirmative defense, and (c) declined the Publishers’ request for a permanent injunction. The court vacated the ruling in the summary judgment order that Defendants infringed the musical works used in the audio-only recordings by failing to comply with Section 115’s substantive requirements. The court reversed the ruling on summary judgment that Defendant was liable for direct infringement. The court rejected the challenges to evidentiary rulings. The court affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial. Finally, the court vacated the award of attorneys’ fees. View "ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Sagan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s judgment granting Defendant Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (“Sirius XM”)’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice for violations of his right of publicity under California common and statutory law because his claims were preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Section 301. The claims arise from Melendez’s performance under the moniker “Stuttering John” on The Howard Stern Show (the “HS Show”) from 1988 until 2004.   On appeal, Plaintiff asserted that Sirius XM’s use of excerpts of him from the archival episodes in its online and on-air advertisements promoting the HS Show violates his right of publicity under California common and statutory law because his name and likeness have been exploited for Sirius XM’s commercial gain without his permission.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege any use of his name or likeness that is separate from, or beyond, the rebroadcasting, in whole or in part, of the copyrightable material from the HS Show’s archives and, thus, his right of publicity claims are preempted by the Copyright Act. Moreover, because Plaintiff has failed to articulate any allegations that he could add in a second amended complaint that overcome preemption in this case, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that any leave to re-plead would be futile and properly dismissed his claims with prejudice. View "Melendez v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Labor brought a petition seeking review of a final order issued on December 31, 2020 by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission found the phrase “stored in tiers” in the second sentence of 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.176(b) did not apply to pallets of merchandise located in a Walmart Distribution Center in Johnstown, New York.   The Secretary argued that the Commission erred in finding Section 11 1910.176(b) inapplicable to Walmart’s tiered storage system because it unambiguously includes material placed or arranged one above another in tiered storage racks, such as the system used at the Distribution Center. Alternatively, the Secretary also argued that if the Court found the regulation ambiguous, the Court should defer to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded finding that the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation was reasonable. The court explained that the Commission’s cramped definition ignores other types of tiers, including seating arrangements at sporting events and music venues with layers of seats that are independently supported and placed one over the other with gaps between them. There is nothing inconsistent in the remaining language of the standard that militates against an interpretation that shelves can be tiers. Here, the pallets stored on the selective racking became unstable and merchandise on the pallets fell. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Secretary’s competing interpretation of the language of the standard is reasonable. View "Martin J. Walsh v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A. (“Ferrominera”), appealed from the district court’s judgment confirming a foreign arbitral award and granting attorney’s fees and costs in favor of Petitioner Commodities & Minerals Enterprise Ltd. (“CME”). Ferrominera challenges the judgment on three grounds. First, it argues that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction because CME never served a summons on Ferrominera in connection with its motion to confirm the arbitral award. Second, Ferrominera contends that the district court erred in confirming the arbitral award based on purported lack of jurisdiction by the arbitral panel, issues with the scope of the award, and conflicts with United States public policy. Third, it argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees and costs in favor of CME.   The Second Circuit held that a party is not required to serve a summons in order to confirm a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention. The court concluded that the district court properly enforced the arbitral award, but that it erred in awarding attorney’s fees and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court wrote that CME complied with the service of notice requirements of the New York Convention and the FAA, and the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Ferrominera. Further, the court explained that Ferrominera has not borne its burden to show that the arbitration agreement is invalid where, as here, it has put forth no arguments whatsoever under the applicable law. View "Commodities & Minerals Enterprise Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A." on Justia Law

International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. (“IFF”), a U.S.-based seller of flavoring and fragrance products, acquired Frutarom Industries Ltd. (“Frutarom”), an Israeli firm in the same industry. Leading up to the merger, Frutarom allegedly made material misstatements about its compliance with anti-bribery laws and the source of its business growth. Plaintiffs, who bought stock in IFF, sued Frutarom, alleging that those misstatements violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint. The court concluded that Plaintiffs lack statutory standing to sue. Under the purchaser-seller rule, standing to bring a claim under Section 10(b) is limited to purchasers or sellers of securities issued by the company about which a misstatement was made. Plaintiffs here lack standing to sue based on alleged misstatements that Frutarom made about itself because they never bought or sold shares of Frutarom. View "Menora Mivtachim Ins. Ltd. v. Frutarom Indus. Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Donald J. Trump and Movant-Appellant the United States of America appealed from a district court’s judgment denying their motion to substitute the United States in this action pursuant to the Westfall Act of 1988. On appeal, Appellants argued that substitution is warranted because the President of the United States is a covered government employee under the Westfall Act, and because Trump had acted within the scope of his employment when he made the allegedly defamatory statements denying Plaintiff-Appellee’s 2019 sexual assault allegations.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the President of the United States is not an employee of the government under the Westfall Act. And the court vacated the district court’s judgment that Trump did not act within the scope of his employment, and certified that question to the D.C. Court of Appeals.   The court certified the following question: Under the laws of the District, were the allegedly libelous public statements made, during his term in office, by the President of the United States, denying allegations of misconduct, with regards to events prior to that term of office, within the scope of his employment as President of the United States? View "E. Jean Carroll v. Donald J. Trump" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Southern District Court  concluded that Lincoln Life & Annuity Company of New York was not obligated under New York Insurance Law Section 3203(a)(2) to refund a payment that Plaintiff had deposited into a policy account associated with her life insurance policy five months before she died. Because no New York court has  analyzed this provision of New York insurance law, and because insurance policy implicates significant New York State interests, the Second Circuit deferred a decision on this appeal in order to certify the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: Whether a planned payment into an interest-bearing policy account, as part of a universal life insurance policy, constitutes a “premium actually paid for View "Nitkewicz v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s judgment granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Plaintiff argued that Defendant police officers violated clearly established law by purportedly using a police canine for a purpose for which it was not trained, failing to give Plaintiff a warning before releasing the canine, and allowing the canine to continue biting Plaintiff after he ceased actively resisting, subjecting Plaintiff to a dog bite that may have lasted for two minutes, and otherwise improperly escalating the use of force. Plaintiff further argued that the district court erred by failing to construe disputed facts and draw reasonable inferences in his favor.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant officers violated clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known and conclude that the defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that the district court did not commit reversible error in evaluating Defendants’ summary judgment motion. View "McKinney v. City of Middletown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs deliver baked goods by truck to stores and restaurants in designated territories within Connecticut. They brought an action in district court on behalf of a putative class against Flowers Foods, Inc. and two of its subsidiaries, which manufacture the baked goods that the plaintiffs deliver. Plaintiffs allege unpaid or withheld wages, unpaid overtime wages, and unjust enrichment pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and Connecticut wage laws. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the case.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration and dismissing the case. The court explained that it concludes that an individual works in a transportation industry if the industry in which the individual works pegs its charges chiefly to the movement of goods or passengers, and the industry’s predominant source of commercial revenue is generated by that movement. Here, because Plaintiffs do not work in the transportation industry, they are not excluded from the FAA, and the district court appropriately compelled arbitration under the Arbitration Agreement. View "Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries" on Justia Law

Plaintiff National Rifle Association of America (the "NRA") claims that Defendant, the former Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), violated its rights to free speech and equal protection when she investigated three insurance companies that had partnered with it to provide coverage for losses resulting from gun use and encouraged banks and insurance companies to consider discontinuing their relationships with gun promotion organizations. The NRA contends that Defendant used her regulatory power to threaten NRA business partners and coerce them into disassociating with the NRA, in violation of its rights.   The district court dismissed the equal protection claim on the basis that Defendant was protected by absolute immunity, but it declined to dismiss the free speech claims, concluding that the NRA plausibly alleged its claims and issues of fact existed as to whether she was protected by qualified immunity.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that here, the various cases addressing the issue did not provide clear and particularized guidance but involved very different circumstances and much stronger conduct. The cases do not clearly establish that Defendant’s statements, in this case, were unconstitutionally threatening or coercive. Qualified immunity balances the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise their power irresponsibly with the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties responsibly. Here, the Complaint's factual allegations show that, far from acting irresponsibly, Defendant was doing her job in good faith. View "National Rifle Association of America v. Maria T. Vullo" on Justia Law