Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of (1) conspiracy to commit second-degree murder in aid of racketeering, (2) second-degree murder in aid of racketeering, and (3) using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Petitioner filed for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, contending that his Section 924(c) conviction and its accompanying sentence were unlawful. The district court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability.   On appeal, Petitioner argued that his Section 924(c) conviction was unlawful because (1) it was possibly predicated on conspiracy to commit murder, an offense that no longer qualifies as a crime of violence, and (2) even if it were predicated on substantive murder, that offense also does not qualify as a crime of violence.   The Second Circuit found no merit in Petitioner’s challenges and affirmed. The court held that the error of instructing the jury on the now-invalid predicate was harmless to Petitioner because the jury found facts satisfying the essential elements of guilt on the valid predicate of substantive murder in aid of racketeering which would have sustained a lawful conviction on the firearm offense. Further, the elements of first-degree manslaughter and second-degree murder differ only with respect to the intent element. Here, because the intent element played no part in the Petitioner’s court’s analysis of whether first-degree manslaughter is a violent felony, its reasoning binds the court with respect to whether second-degree murder is a crime of violence. Thus, second-degree murder is categorically a crime of violence under Section 924(c). View "Stone v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are practicing Muslims who believe that they are required under the precepts of their religion to perform five daily congregational prayers with as many other Muslims as are available and wish to participate. Plaintiffs alleged that while they were incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut ("FCI Danbury"), wardens enforced a policy that restricted prayer in groups of more than two to the prison's chapel.   Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant prison officials seeking injunctive relief and damages on the grounds that FCI Danbury's communal prayer policy violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.   The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) in large part, but declined to dismiss Plaintiffs' RFRA claims for damages against Defendants in their individual capacities, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the wardens at the motion-to-dismiss stage.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, concluding that the wardens are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings because the pleadings do not establish that their enforcement of the policy against Plaintiffs was in service of a compelling interest, and it was clearly established at the time of the violation that substantially burdening an inmate's religious exercise without justification violates RFRA. The court explained that a reasonable officer should have known, based on clearly established law, that denying a Muslim inmate the ability to engage in group prayer without any justification or compelling interest, as alleged in the SAC, violates RFRA. View "Sabir v. Williams" on Justia Law

Following a disturbance at a hospital, two New York City police officers arrested Plaintiff and transported her to another hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff asserted false arrest claims, alleging that the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest her for a mental health examination. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that because the police officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a misdemeanor trespass, her false arrest claim was precluded. The district court did not reach the issue of the existence of probable cause for a mental health arrest. The district court also held, in the alternative, that the officers were protected by qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to make a mental health arrest.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that while the district court erred in its probable cause analysis, the officers were protected by qualified immunity. The court explained that even where actual probable cause does not exist, police officers may be entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim if their actions did not violate "clearly established" rights or if "arguable probable cause" existed at the time of the arrest.   Here, the parties disagree as to whether the officers had probable cause to arrest her for an emergency mental health evaluation. The court held that the existence of probable cause to arrest an individual for a criminal violation does not preclude a false arrest claim based on a wrongful arrest for a mental health evaluation. However, nonetheless, the officers here are protected by qualified immunity. View "Guan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant filed his compassionate release motion after exhausting his administrative remedies. The Government conceded that Defendant’s medical conditions arguably met the threshold requirement of an extraordinary and compelling reason but opposed the motion on the grounds that the Section 3553(a) factors weighed against release. Defendant contended primarily that the district court erred in denying his motion pursuant to Section  3582 by refusing to consider new evidence that he says calls into question the validity of his conviction.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.  The court concluded that when considering a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to Section 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court does not have the discretion to consider new evidence proffered for the purpose of attacking the validity of the underlying conviction in its balancing of the Section 3553(a) factors. Facts and arguments that purport to undermine the validity of a federal conviction must be brought on direct appeal or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 or Section 2241. The court affirmed the finding that the district court properly refused to consider such evidence here as to the Section 3553(a) factors and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. View "United States v. Orena" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).  The charge was based on his membership in the Syracuse-based 110 Gang and, more specifically, his distribution, in five separate transactions, of a total of 42.2 grams of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”). Defendant apparently received less than $2500 for these sales, which ultimately resulted in a sentence of ninety-two months’ imprisonment—the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines ranges the district judge calculated.   On appeal, Defendant challenged two factors upon which his sentence was based: (1) the district judge’s decision to apply a two-level increase for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with narcotics distribution, see U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1), and (2) the district judge’s refusal to apply a mitigating role adjustment.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence. The court explained that Defendant’s conviction and sentence stem from his role in furthering the 110 Gang’s violent and extensive criminal enterprise. Yet the district judge failed to analyze Defendant’s criminal conduct against the backdrop of the criminal conduct of other 110 Gang members even though such an analysis might well have qualified Defendant for a mitigating role adjustment. View "United States v. Wynn" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application for naturalization with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). His application was denied when USCIS determined that he was ineligible for naturalization. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal, and in response, the agency sent him a notice to appear at a hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1447(a) After Petitioner failed to appear, the agency affirmed the denial of his application. Petitioner brought an action seeking review alleging, among other things, that the agency failed to follow its own procedures in denying his application. The district court held that, by not attending the hearing, Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 8 U.S.C. Section 1421(c). Because the district court held the exhaustion requirement to be jurisdictional, the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The Second Circuit held that the district court erred when it treated 8 U.S.C. Section 1421(c) as a jurisdictional requirement. However, the court held that Petitioner’s claim may not proceed because the government properly raised Petitioner’s failure to attend the hearing as a failure to exhaust. Thus, Section 1421(c)’s exhaustion requirement must be enforced. Petitioner’s noncompliance with the exhaustion requirement means that he failed to state a claim, and thus the court affirmed the judgment of the district court on that ground. View "Donnelly v. CARRP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a flight attendant for Delta Air Lines. She alleged that, while working on an airplane, she heard a passenger refer to her using a racist remark and reported the passenger’s remark to the pilot. The pilot responded by demanding that Plaintiff “step out on the jet bridge with the passenger,” and when she refused the pilot had her removed from the plane. Plaintiff reported the pilot’s conduct to her supervisor, and within two months of these events Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to random drug testing, wrongfully suspended, and ultimately fired. She filed a complaint in state court, alleging retaliation and vicarious liability under the New York City Human Rights Law. (“NYCHRL”) Delta removed the case to federal district court and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, holding that Leroy failed adequately to allege that Delta had discriminated against her and that she therefore failed to allege retaliation for a protected activity under the NYCHRL.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiff’s claims finding that her complaint did not allege facts adequate to support a good-faith, reasonable belief that Delta engaged in discrimination against her. The court explained that the NYCHRL prohibits retaliation for “opposing [the] employer’s discrimination.” To succeed on a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must at least have a good-faith, reasonable belief that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice. On the facts as alleged, Plaintiff could not have reasonably and in good faith believed that the passenger’s comment or the pilot’s conduct was an unlawful employment practice. View "Leroy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment of conviction on charges including racketeering conspiracy, in violation of the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d) and conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering and attempted murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act (“VICAR”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1959(a)(5). Defendant argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses on which the conviction was based are not “crimes of violence” in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and concluded that Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction remains valid even after Davis because one of the predicate offenses underlying the conviction – attempted murder in aid of racketeering – is a categorical crime of violence. The court explained that to determine whether Defendant’s section 924(c) charge is properly based on a crime of violence, it must determine whether any one of section 924(c) predicate offenses listed in his indictment – racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, attempted murder in aid of racketeering, and murder-for-hire conspiracy – “categorically involve[s] the use of force.” Further, because second-degree murder under New York law is a crime of violence, there can be no doubt that attempt to commit second-degree murder under New York law is itself categorically a crime of violence. This conviction for attempted murder in aid of racketeering serves as one of the predicate offenses underlying Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction. View "United States v. Pastore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment on all claims to Defendants-Appellees Chautauqua County (“the County”) and Correction Officers (“the Officers”) in this civil rights suit concerning the County’s policy of handcuffing inmates in an allegedly painful manner and the Officers’ use of force in extracting Plaintiff from his cell at the Chautauqua County Jail (“the Jail”).   The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on exhaustion grounds with regard to Plaintiff’s claims against the Officers, but that it did err in doing so with regard to his claim against the County. The court explained that that the district court was correct that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had submitted a timely grievance related to his claims against the Officers. The district court erred, however, in holding that the Chautauqua County Jail’s grievance policy applied to his separate claim against the County. By its plain terms, the grievance procedures did not apply to matters outside the jail captain’s control, such as the County handcuffing policy that Plaintiff challenges, and thus there were no administrative remedies for Plaintiff to exhaust with respect to that claim. View "Saeli v. Chautauqua County" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to a 40- month term of imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). In calculating Defendant's advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court concluded that Defendant’s prior conviction for attempted second-degree gang assault in violation of New York Penal Law Sections 120.06 and 110.00 was a qualifying “crime of violence” for which his base offense level would be raised from 14 to 20. On appeal, Defendant argued that his conviction is not a crime of violence under the categorical approach because New York courts have deemed attempted second-degree gang assault a legal impossibility.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held (1) Defendant’s conviction for attempted second-degree gang assault is not a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a)’s force clause. Further, the court could discern no coherent element that constitutes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. (2) Defendant’s intent to have the presence and aid of others actually present does not categorically involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. (3) Defendant’s conviction does not fall within the definition of “attempt[]” as that term is used in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. Section  4B1.2. (4) Attempted second-degree gang assault is not enumerated as “aggravated assault” as that phrase is used in U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a)’s enumerated offenses clause. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law