Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner participated in the bombings of American embassies in Africa. The attacks killed 224 people. In 2001, he was convicted of 266 counts and sentenced to 264 concurrent life terms of imprisonment, to be followed by a consecutive 10-year term of imprisonment, in turn, to be followed by a consecutive 30-year term of imprisonment. He later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his conviction for using an explosive device during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). That conviction yielded the 30-year sentence that is to follow his other terms of imprisonment. Petitioner argues that the conviction’s predicate offense no longer qualifies as a “crime of violence” following United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and declined to consider Petitioner’s claim. The court held that the concurrent sentence doctrine allows a court to decline to review a challenged sentence when another is valid and carries the same or greater duration of punishment, such that the overall sentence would not change even if the challenge were successful. Here, the doctrine applies because he is challenging a conviction and resulting sentence that runs consecutively to one or more unchallenged life sentences. View "Al-'Owhali v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit seeking long-term disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) from Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company. The district court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his disability plan’s administrative remedies. Plaintiff asserted that his administrative remedies should have been deemed exhausted because Hartford, in violation of the applicable ERISA regulation, failed to provide a final decision on his benefits within 45 days of his administrative appeal.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s. The dispositive question on appeal was whether a valid benefit determination on review must determine whether a claimant is entitled to benefits. Based on the regulation’s plain language, structure, and purpose, the court held that it must. The court further held that, because Hartford did not extend the benefit determination period, duty to exhaust had ceased by the 46th day, the day he filed his federal case.The court further explained that the text of the Sec 503-1 supports Plaintiff’s argument that he did not receive a timely benefit determination on review. Finally, Section 503-1’s text, structure, history, and purpose are fully consistent. A “benefit determination on review” must finally decide the claimant’s benefits within 45 days, assuming the absence of special circumstances that require an extension. By the 46th day after his appeal, Hartford had not determined Plaintiff’s benefits nor extended its review time. So, Plaintiff was deemed to have exhausted his plan remedies and could bring suit in federal court. View "McQuillin v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for various federal crimes based on his participation in a global crime ring. Before his sentencing hearing, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the United States, closing down courts. Eventually, and with Defendant's and his attorney's consent, the district court sentenced defendant via video. On appeal, defendant claims that the district court's procedures under the CARES Act was insufficient to find he waived his right to an in-person sentencing.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's claims on appeal. Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 43 generally compels the defendant’s physical presence in the courtroom and a defendant can waive this right under only very limited circumstances. However, the CARES Act permits a district court to hold a felony sentencing hearing by videoconference if all conditions are met. See United States v. Coffin, 23 F.4th 778 (7th Cir. 2022).Here, defendant orally consented to the hearing after being told by the court that his sentencing may be delayed if he insisted on an in-person hearing. The district court's decision that immediate video sentencing was in defendant's best interest was reasonable because defendant was asking for a time-served sentence, and an immediate sentence would allow him to more quickly appeal an adverse sentence. View "United States v. Leroux" on Justia Law

The appeal involved involves five lawsuits in which visually impaired Plaintiffs sued Defendant stores under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for failing to carry braille gift cards. The complaints alleged that Plaintiffs live near Defendants’ stores, have been customers in the past, and intend to purchase gift cards when they become available in the future. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ ADA claims for lack of standing.   The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that Plaintiffs’ conclusory, boilerplate allegations fail to establish standing. The court explained that missing from Plaintiffs’ allegations is any explanation of how Plaintiffs were injured by the unavailability of braille gift cards or any specificity about Plaintiffs’ prior visits to Defendants’ stores that would support an inference that Plaintiffs intended to return. In the ADA context a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief has suffered an injury in fact when: “(1) the plaintiff alleged past injury under the ADA; (2) it was reasonable to infer that the discriminatory treatment would continue; and (3) it was reasonable to infer, based on the past frequency of plaintiff’s visits and the proximity of defendants’ [businesses] to plaintiff’s home, that plaintiff intended to return to the subject location.” Here, the court reasoned that Plaintiffs have offered only “naked assertions” of intent to return to Defendants’ stores if they offer braille gift cards. This reliance on a mere “profession of an intent to return to the places” previously visited is “not enough” to establish standing for prospective relief. View "Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd." on Justia Law

A former faculty member appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing (A) claims against the university principally for violation of his right to due process, and for gender and national origin discrimination in violation of, respectively, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (B) claims that documents issued by the United States Department of Education violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the  Spending Clause of the Constitution. The district court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings finding that Title IX does not authorize a private right of action for discrimination in employment and that the complaint failed to state a claim for national-origin discrimination under Title VI. The court granted the United States Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment in part finding merit only in Plaintiff’s contention that Title IX allows a private right of action for a university's intentional gender-based discrimination against a faculty member. The court found that the complaint contained sufficient factual assertions to permit a plausible inference that Plaintiff was disciplined following irregular investigative procedures in circumstances permitting a plausible inference of bias on the basis of gender in violation of Title IX. Plaintiff’s Title VI claim, viewed within the same analytical framework as that applicable to his Title IX claim, lacks sufficient factual assertions to permit a plausible inference that Plaintiff was disciplined in whole or in part on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title VI. View "Vengalattore v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

Connecticut State Police Union (“CSPU”) brought suit against the Commissioner of Connecticut’s Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (the “Commissioner”), alleging that the FOIA-related portions of the state law violated the Contracts Clause and moved for a preliminary injunction. The law at issue is Public Act 20–1: An Act Concerning Police Accountability (“the Act”). Section 8 of the Act took aim at FOIA exemptions under Connecticut law.   The district court denied the motion primarily on the ground that the CSPU was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim since the law was reasonable and necessary to promote transparency and accountability for law enforcement. The Second Circuit affirmed concluding that the law served a legitimate public purpose and that the legislature, in passing it, acted not self-servingly but in the public interest.   The court explained that determine whether a law violates the Contracts Clause, it asks (1) whether the contractual impairment is substantial, (2) whether the law serves “a legitimate public purpose such as remedying a general social or economic problem,” and (3) whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are reasonable and necessary.  Here, the Act served two legitimate public purposes: ensuring the transparency and accountability of law enforcement and promoting “FOIA’s strong legislative policy in favor of the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.” Moreover, because the district court did not err in concluding that the CSPU could not succeed on the merits of its claim, the court did not need to address the remaining prongs of the preliminary injunction test. View "Conn. State Police Union v. Rovella" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the Estate of her ex-husband and against his widow individually and as administratrix of the Estate, claiming that her ex-husband misrepresented the value of his real estate investments during divorce proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the ground that the discovery rule did not apply to Plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the claims as time-barred; the district court did not consider whether Plaintiff’s claims should be tolled.   On appeal, Plaintiff invoked the discovery rule and equitable estoppel to argue that this suit, initiated more than thirteen years later, is nevertheless timely. The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court further remanded for consideration the doctrine of equitable estoppel as to one of the contested investments.   The court reasoned that the discovery rule is not a tool to aid speculation or to validate a hunch. As Plaintiff has not shown that she had any “knowledge of facts” supporting the fraud within two years prior to initiating suit, she cannot invoke the discovery rule to save her claims. Further, Plaintiff failed to investigate her ex-husband’s assurances that his real estate investments were worth nothing, notwithstanding warning signs and ample opportunity to do so during the divorce proceedings. View "Koral v. Alsou Saunders, Est. of Gregg Saunders" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, sued her former employer, alleging a variety of employment law violations. Defendant moved to dismiss her suit and to compel arbitration. Defendant supported the motion by presenting an arbitration agreement bearing what appeared to be the worker’s electronic signature. In a sworn declaration, however, the worker categorically and specifically denied that the signature was hers. She also pointed to other circumstantial evidence as to its inauthenticity. The district court concluded that the worker’s evidence was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact, and so granted the restaurant’s motion.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. The court held that the district court erred when it disregarded Plaintiff’s sworn declaration as “nothing more than a de facto extension of [her] pleadings.”The court explained that it resolves agreement-formation questions by applying the law of the state at issue. Here, under New York law, when moving to compel arbitration, “[t]he party seeking . . . arbitration bears an initial burden of demonstrating that an agreement to arbitrate was made.” As such, the burden shifted to Plaintiff, who needed to counter with at least “some evidence . . . to substantiate [her] denial” that an agreement had been made. Here, Plaintiff’s detailed accounting, under oath, is “some evidence” that she did not agree to arbitration. Thus, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether she ever received, or became aware of, Defendant’s arbitration agreements, regardless of whether she ultimately signed them. View "Barrows v. Brinker Restaurant Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff A&B Alternative Marketing Inc. (“A&B”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, International Quality Fruit Inc. (“IQF”), H&A International Fruit 14 Corp. (“H&A”), and others alleging violations of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (“PACA”) stemming from Defendants’ failure to pay A&B for produce purchased on credit.   The District Court entered an order denying Defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion and granting A&B’s motion for default judgment. Defendants challenged the District Court’s order only on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate A&B’s claims. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court reasoned that neither of the two statutory requirements Defendants relies on is jurisdictional.   Defendants asserted that A&B failed to show that Defendants engaged in the business of selling in wholesale or jobbing quantities and that the invoice cost of their purchases of perishable agricultural commodities in any calendar year was in excess of $230,000.  But A&B alleges that both IQF and H&A “purchased perishable agricultural commodities exceeding $230,000.00 annually and/or purchas[ed] at least 2,000.00 lbs. of perishable agricultural commodities on any one day.”  Accordingly, A&B has sufficiently shown that Defendants meet the relevant statutory requirements.   Second Defendants claimed that A&B failed to provide evidence that the alleged transactions were carried out in “interstate or foreign commerce.” However, A&B submitted evidence that it purchased the produce in question from Pennsylvania growers or merchants for resale in New York. View "A&B Alternative Mktg. Inc. v. Int'l Quality Fruit Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against the International Criminal Police Organization (“Interpol”), charging negligent infliction of emotional distress and violation of his right to due process of law under the New York State Constitution after Interpol refused to delete a so-called “red notice” identifying Plaintiff as a convicted criminal in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”).   The district court granted Interpol’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Interpol is a protected organization under the International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”), 22 U.S.C. Sections 288-288l, and thus enjoys the same immunity from suit normally enjoyed by foreign sovereigns.   The Second Circuit affirmed concluding that the term “public international organizations” as used in 22 U.S.C. Section 288 includes any international organization that is composed of governments as its members, regardless of whether it has been formed by international treaty. Further, the court found that Interpol qualifies as a “public international organization” for the purposes of 22 U.S.C. Section 288 because its members are official government actors whose involvement is subject to control by participating nations. Next, the Headquarters Agreement between Interpol and the Government of France does not constitute an immunity waiver that would permit the present suit in a United States district court. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery prior to dismissal. View "El Omari v. The International Criminal Police Organization" on Justia Law