Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a police officer for the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”), sued the MTA under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), alleging that the MTA negligently failed to provide him with a safe workplace when it sent him on patrol in a vehicle without a prisoner compartment. A jury found the MTA liable and awarded Plaintiff damages. The MTA moved for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that it is immune from liability pursuant to the governmental function defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because it lacked expert testimony. The district court denied that motion, holding that the governmental function defense does not apply in FELA cases.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the FELA does not abrogate the governmental function defense, and therefore the defense is available in FELA cases. Though the governmental function defense was available for the MTA to assert, the MTA failed to show that the defense barred liability in this case. Here, the defense did not apply on the merits in this case, however, because the MTA has failed to show that it performed a discretionary governmental function when committing the allegedly negligent acts. Additionally, the court held that expert testimony was not required in this case. Further, the court could not say that the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict for Plaintiff was legally insufficient. View "Ojeda v. MTA" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought scheme liability claims in a 2017 enforcement action against Rio Tinto plc, Rio Tinto Limited, and its CEO and CFO, pursuant to Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and pursuant to Section 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”). Citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Lentell”), the district court dismissed the scheme liability claims in a March 2019 order (the “Dismissal Order”) on the ground that the conduct alleged constituted misstatements and omissions only, and is, therefore, an insufficient basis for scheme liability.   On appeal, the SEC contended that Lorenzo abrogates Lentell.  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling finding that Lentell remains sound. The question on appeal was whether misstatements and omissions--without more--can support scheme liability pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) promulgated thereunder, and Securities Act Section 17(a)(1) and (3).   The court explained that while Lorenzo acknowledges that there is leakage between and among the three subsections of each provision, the divisions between the subsections remain distinct. Until further guidance from the Supreme Court, Lentell binds: misstatements and omissions can form part of a scheme liability claim, but an actionable scheme liability claim also requires something beyond misstatements and omissions, such as dissemination. View "SEC v. Rio Tinto" on Justia Law

Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited, (“Esso”) the Nigerian subsidiary of an international oil corporation, asked federal courts in the United States to enforce an arbitral award of $1.8 billion, plus interest, against the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC”) that Nigerian courts have partially set aside. Courts in Nigeria previously set aside the Award in part. Nonetheless, Esso seeks enforcement of the entire Award under the New York Convention. NNPC urges dismissal of Esso’s suit for lack of personal jurisdiction and on the basis of forum non-conveniens, and it opposes the petition for enforcement on the merits.   The Second Circuit determined affirmed the district court’s rulings because its factual determinations were meticulous and its legal conclusions sound. The court held that NNPC has standing on cross-appeal to challenge the denial of its motion to dismiss, even though the district court ruled in its favor on the merits. NNPC has such standing because our partial vacatur on the merits revives the action against it, and it may face an adverse ruling on remand. On considering NNPC’s challenges to the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction and forum non-conveniens.   The court wrote that although the district court should have broadened its analysis under the Pemex standard, it ultimately agreed with its conclusion that U.S. courts owe the Nigerian judgments setting aside the Award comity.  The court concluded, however, that the district court went too far by refusing to enforce not only those parts of the Award that the Nigerian courts set aside but also those parts of the Award that remain viable under the Nigerian judgments. View "Esso Expl. and Prod. Nigeria Ltd. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appealed the judgment of the district court ordering the U.S. Secret Service, a component of DHS, to release certain records that Plaintiff-Appellee requested under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. Section 552.   The Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court on two grounds. First, the records are not “agency records” subject to the FOIA. Second, even if the records were eligible for disclosure under the FOIA, Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(C), would shield the records from disclosure. The court explained that the Secret Service obtained records from the campaign and transition subject to an understanding of confidentiality in order to provide security services to the presidential candidate and President-elect. Under these circumstances, the agency did not exercise control sufficient to convert the records into agency records subject to disclosure under the FOIA. View "Behar v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Appellant American Plan Administrators (“APA”) appealed an order transferring to the Southern District of Florida its motion to quash a third-party subpoena. Appellee South Broward Hospital District (“South Broward”), which obtained the subpoena, moved to dismiss the appeal as taken from a non-final order. APA opposed, arguing that the collateral order doctrine applies to permit our review of the order.   At issue was whether an order transferring a motion to quash a third-party subpoena to the court that issued the subpoena, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f), is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine or is instead a non-final order that may be effectively reviewed after final judgment.   The Second Circuit granted Appellee’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The court held that a Rule 45(f) transfer order is non-final and not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it may be effectively reviewed by the transferee circuit after final judgment. View "Am. Plan Adm'rs v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist." on Justia Law

Appellee held a 99% interest in 72 Grandview LLC, which in turn owned a residential property that Appellee occupied as her primary residence. Appellant Bayview Loan Servicing LLC  (“Bayview”) initiated a foreclosure action in which both 72 Grandview LLC and Appellee were named as defendants. After Bayview obtained a judgment that authorized it to proceed with a foreclosure sale, Appellee a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and notified Bayview that, in her view, proceeding with the foreclosure sale would violate the automatic stay that took effect when she filed her bankruptcy petition. Nonetheless, Bayview proceeded with the foreclosure sale without relief from the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court.   Appellee then sought sanctions against Bayview, arguing that Bayview willfully violated the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court denied Appellee’s motion, but the district court reversed that decision and remanded for the calculation of fees and other damages that would be charged as sanctions.   Bayview appealed and the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court held that two of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provisions, 11 U.S.C. Sections 362(a)(1) and (a)(2), are violated by an entity that proceeds with the foreclosure sale of a property when the debtor is a named party in the foreclosure proceedings, even if the debtor holds only a possessory interest in the property. Bayview willfully violated the automatic stay when it proceeded with the foreclosure sale while knowing that Appellee had filed a bankruptcy petition. View "In re: Eileen Fogarty" on Justia Law

After a three-and-a-half-year delay, a jury convicted Appellant of conspiring to launder the proceeds generated by a network of Brooklyn medical clinics. Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence. He argued that the district court erred when it denied his motions to dismiss based on violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3161 et seq. Specifically, Appellant claimed that the district court improperly excluded time based on the complexity of the case without determining, on the record, why the case was complex or that such exclusions outweighed the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. He contended that the excessive pre-trial delay, to which he objected, arose not from the supposed complexity of the prosecution but rather because the Government delayed production of certain documents possessed by state and federal agencies that had participated in the joint investigation and prosecution of Appellant.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, vacated Appellant’s conviction and sentence, and remanded to the district court. The court held that the district court’s exclusion of time during at least two long periods of delay was insufficient under the Speedy Trial Act.   The court explained that the Speedy Trial Act was designed to enforce the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial. Here, the district court failed in this responsibility. It neither held the Government accountable for its discovery obligations nor appropriately considered the causes and implications of the extraordinary delays introduced by the Government’s dilatory conduct of discovery. View "United States v. Pikus" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of a December 14, 2018, decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA") affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (the "IJ") denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT").   The Second Circuit granted Petitioners' petition for review and held that to qualify as a "refugee" under the INA, a dual national asylum applicant need only show persecution in any singular country of nationality. The court explained that to be eligible for asylum and withholding of removal, an individual must be a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. Section 1158(b)(1)(A). But this is only one step in the asylum process. Even if an individual is a refugee, there are other bars to asylum, see 8 U.S.C. Sections 1158(a)(2) (exceptions to authority to apply for asylum), 1158(b)(2) (exceptions to eligibility for asylum), and even assuming all bars are overcome, the decision of whether to grant a particular asylum application is still a matter of discretion for the Attorney General. Further, the court held that to be considered a "refugee" under Section 1101(a)(42)(A), a dual national need only show persecution in any singular country of nationality. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's December 14, 2018, decision, and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings in accordance with the proper legal standard. View "Zepeda-Lopez, et al. v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned a home in Ontario County, New York. Following foreclosure, the couple filed for protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and filed a complaint seeking to avoid the loss of their home on the grounds that it was a fraudulent conveyance. The Bankruptcy Court set aside the transfer, and the County appealed, raising two questions. The first is whether the Plaintiffs had standing to bring the avoidance proceeding. The second is whether the transfer effected by Ontario County in foreclosing on the lien was entitled to the presumption of having yielded “reasonably equivalent value” under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment finding that the district court correctly held that the transfer of Plaintiffs’ home to the County was not entitled to the presumption of having provided “reasonably equivalent value” under Section 548.   The court explained that the County incorrectly interprets Section 522(c)(2)(B) as barring Plaintiffs from claiming the federal homestead exemption when it merely provides that exempt property remains liable for a tax lien. They are not attempting to avoid paying the tax lien; they are attempting to avoid a transfer of the property. Accordingly, Section 522(c)(2)(B) does not deprive the Plaintiffs of standing under Section 522(h).   The court further wrote that the County’s position would produce results that are fundamentally at odds with the goals of bankruptcy law. Here, it would give the County a windfall at the expense of the estate, the other creditors, and the debtor which is precisely what the Code’s fraudulent conveyance provisions are intended to prevent. View "Gunsalus v. County of Ontario" on Justia Law

Police received reports of a gunshot fired from the roof of a building. Officers responded to the scene within two minutes, at which point they observed Defendants exiting a building. While officers were not sure which building the shots were fired from, the building Defendants were exiting was in the immediate area. Officers noticed one of the Defendants bladed his body away from them, and both Defendants had their hands in their pockets. When asked to remove their hands from their pockets, Defendants complied. However, at this point, officers noticed a bulge in one of the Defendant's pockets. A passerby informed officers that he had seen Defendants coming down from the building's rooftop. Officers frisked one of the Defendants, recovering a firearm.Defendants entered guilty pleas each to a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 2, preserving their right to appeal the court's adverse decision on their motion to suppress.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion to suppress, finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to initiate a pedestrian stop as well as to conduct a pat-frisk of the Defendant who had a bulge in his pocket. View "United States v. Hawkins" on Justia Law