Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Bristol-Myers's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in a securities class action brought by investors. This securities class action arose from a failed clinical trial conducted to ascertain whether a cancer drug in development would be more effective than chemotherapy in treating a specific type of lung cancer. The second amended complaint alleged that the drop in stock price was attributable to the study's failure, and that Bristol-Myers had obscured the risk of such failure by declining to disclose the precise PD-L1 expression threshold in cancer cells and by misrepresenting that the study focused on patients "strongly" expressing PD-L1.The court concluded that the investors failed to adequately allege a material misstatement or omission or facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. In this case, rates of PDL1 expression remained a topic of research throughout the putative class period; there was no generally understood meaning of "strong" expression that contradicted Bristol-Myers’s use of the term to mean 5%; and some observers correctly predicted Bristol-Myers's use of a 5% threshold before it was publicly disclosed. Furthermore, the complaint alleges no facts indicating that Bristol-Myers had an obligation to disclose the precise threshold; Bristol-Myers cautioned the public that it would not do so; and the complaint fails to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. View "Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, ten nurses and their former attorney, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as well as common law claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution under New York law against defendants, alleging that Defendants Spota and Lato improperly prosecuted them for child endangerment, endangerment of a physically disabled person, and related charges by fabricating evidence and engaging in other improper conduct before a grand jury, in violation of plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights and New York state law. The district court found that Spota and Lato were entitled to absolute immunity for starting the criminal prosecution and presenting the case to the grand jury, and it dismissed plaintiffs' claims arising from any alleged misconduct during that prosecutorial stage. The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of the prosecutors and the DA's Office as to the remaining claims.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that although Spota and Lato may have unlawfully penalized plaintiffs for exercising the right to quit their jobs on the advice of counsel, under the court's precedent both of them are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions during the judicial phase of the criminal process. In regard to plaintiffs' claim that Spota and Lato fabricated evidence during the investigative phase of the criminal process, the court agreed with the district court that there was insufficient admissible evidence of fabrication to defeat summary judgment. View "Anilao v. Spota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the USTA discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and discriminatorily interfered with his employment contract with AJ Squared Security, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, by rejecting his temporary assignment as a security guard for the 2016 U.S. Open.The Second Circuit concurred with the district court that plaintiff has failed to state any claim for relief under Title VII or section 1981. The court concluded that plaintiff did not plausibly allege the existence of an employer-employee relationship necessary to sustain his Title VII claims. Furthermore, plaintiff did not allege any facts to support his claim under section 1981 that, but for his race, the USTA would not have interfered with his employment contract. However, because plaintiff—represented by court-appointed counsel for the first time on appeal—has indicated that he can plead further allegations of a "joint employer" relationship, and because he has plausibly alleged that the USTA rejected his assignment in retaliation for his protected activities against a USTA subcontractor, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and remanded with instructions that plaintiff be permitted to amend his complaint as to that claim. The court affirmed as to the Title VII and section 1981 claims. View "Felder v. United States Tennis Association" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit certified the following questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court: 1. Under Connecticut law, can a proceeding before a nongovernment entity ever be deemed quasi-judicial for purposes of affording absolute immunity to proceeding participants? 2. If the answer to the first question is “yes,” what requirements must be satisfied for a non-government proceeding to be recognized as quasi-judicial? Specifically, a. Must an entity apply controlling law, and not simply its own rules, to facts at issue in the proceeding? See Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. at 246, 510 A.2d 1337; see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts 114, at 818-19 (5th ed. 1984). b. How, if at all, do the “power” factors enumerated in Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 567, 606 A.2d 693, and Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. at 85, 856 A.2d 372, apply to the identification of a non-government entity as quasi-judicial; and, if they do apply, are these factors “in addition” to, id., or independent of, a preliminary law-tofact requirement? c. How, if at all, does public policy inform the identification of a non-government entity as quasi-judicial and, if it does, is this consideration in addition to, or independent of, a law-to-fact requirement and the enumerated Kelley/Craig factors? d. How, if at all, do procedures usually associated with traditional judicial proceedings—such as notice and the opportunity to be heard; the ability to be physically present throughout a proceeding; an oath requirement; the ability to call, examine, confront, and cross-examine witnesses; the ability to be represented by counsel—inform the identification of a proceeding as quasi-judicial? See Craig v. Stafford Const., Inc., 271 Conn. at 87-88, 856 A.2d 372; Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 568-70, 606 A.2d 693.3. If it is possible under Connecticut law to identify a nongovernment proceeding as quasi-judicial, then, in light of responses to the above questions, was the 2018 Yale University UWC proceeding at issue on this appeal properly recognized as quasi-judicial? 4. If the answer to Question 3 is “yes,” would Connecticut extend absolute quasi-judicial immunity to defendant Jane Doe for her statements in that UWC proceeding? 5. If the answer to Question 3 is “no,” would Connecticut afford defendant Jane Doe qualified immunity or no immunity at all? View "Khan v. Yale University" on Justia Law

The PBA appeals the district court's order denying its motion to intervene in the consolidated cases captioned In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, asserting interests in the litigation that it argues the parties to the actions cannot adequately represent. Therefore, the PBA claims it is entitled to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in holding that the PBA did not have a cognizable interest in the personal safety of its member officers at the merits stages of the actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and that such interests were adequately represented. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of intervention with respect to the actions seeking declaratory injunction relief, and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention with respect to those actions seeking neither declaratory nor injunctive relief. View "Payne v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 2016, Clenista, then on supervised release for another federal methamphetamine-distribution conviction pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A). The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum term of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. Clenista moved for compassionate release in 2020, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1).The district court denied Clenista's motion. The court assumed that Clenista had shown extraordinary and compelling circumstances, but ultimately determined that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed against granting compassionate release. The Second Circuit affirmed. While defendants who received a mandatory minimum sentence are eligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1), the district court did not abuse its discretion when it placed weight on the need to recognize the seriousness of Clenista's offense, to provide a just punishment, to protect the public from further such activity and Clenista’s characteristics, rather than on changed circumstances, such as Clenista’s age and health and the pandemic. View "United States v. Clenista" on Justia Law

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires defendants convicted of certain crimes to reimburse their victims for “lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense,” 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4). The Second Circuit previously held that “other expenses” could include attorneys’ fees incurred by victims while helping the government investigate and prosecute the defendant and costs incurred while privately investigating the defendant. The Supreme Court subsequently held that “the words ‘investigation’ and ‘proceedings’ are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings.”Afriyie was convicted of securities fraud after trading on inside information he misappropriated from his employer, MSD. The district court entered the restitution order, covering the fees MSD paid its law firm to guide MSD’s compliance with investigations by the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the SEC; to help prepare four MSD witnesses to testify at Afriyie’s criminal trial; and to represent MSD during the post-verdict restitution proceedings.The Second Circuit held that attorneys’ fees can sometimes be “other expenses” but a victim cannot recover expenses incurred while participating in an SEC investigation. Restitution is appropriate only for expenses associated with criminal matters; civil matters, including SEC investigations, even if closely related to a criminal case do not qualify. View "United States v. Afriyie" on Justia Law

In connection with his leading role in a Chinese construction company in 2010-2016, Zhong was convicted of forced-labor conspiracy 18 U.S.C. 1594(b); forced labor, section 1589(a) and (b); concealing passports and immigration documents in connection with forced labor, section 1592(a); alien smuggling conspiracy, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I); and visa fraud conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371.The Second Circuit vacated in part. The district court committed evidentiary errors that may have affected the jury’s decision to convict Zhong on the three forced-labor counts. The court allowed testimony about 2001-2002 preindictment conduct, preventing Zhong’s attempts to impeach a witness by offering evidence of the witness’s reputation for truthfulness, and permitting expert witness testimony that exceeded its proper scope. .Those errors were unconnected to Zhong’s other two counts. The government presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to convict him on the alien smuggling and visa fraud counts. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give an “adverse but legitimate consequences” jury instruction regarding threats made to the workers. View "United States v. Zhong" on Justia Law

Ferreiras became a lawful permanent resident in 2011. On three separate occasions in 2017, he was convicted of New York petit larceny. Ferreiras was charged as removable as a noncitizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The IJ found that Ferreiras’s petit larceny convictions were CIMT. The BIA affirmed.The Second Circuit certified to the New York State Court of Appeals the question: Does an intent to "appropriate" property under New York Penal Law 155.00(4)(b) require an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded?The New York Court of Appeals declined to answer the question. The Second Circuit then denied the petition for review. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, New York petit larceny requires an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner’s property rights are substantially eroded and is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Ferreiras v. Garland" on Justia Law

Soto, a former Disney employee, alleged that Disney improperly denied her severance benefits upon her termination for physical illness that rendered her unable to work. Soto, a longtime employee had experienced a severe stroke and other medical problems, which left her unable to work. Disney formally terminated Soto’s employment, paid Soto sick pay, short-term illness benefits, and long-term disability benefits but did not pay her severance benefits. She filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B); (a)(3), alleging that the Plan Administrator improperly determined that she did not experience a qualifying “Layoff” as required for severance benefits.The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her case. Her complaint does not plausibly allege that the interpretation of “Layoff” and resulting denial of severance benefits to Soto were arbitrary and capricious. The Plan Administrator had reasoned bases, relating to taxation, for its interpretation of “Layoff” and consequent denial of severance benefits. The court noted an IRS regulation that defines an “involuntary” “termination of employment” as one arising from “the independent exercise of the unilateral authority of the [employer] to terminate to [employee’s] services, . . . where the [employee] was willing and able to continue performing services.” View "Soto v. Disney Severance Pay Plan" on Justia Law