Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Steven M. Camburn, a former sales specialist for Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and equivalent state and municipal laws. Camburn alleged that Novartis violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by offering remuneration to physicians to induce them to prescribe its drug Gilenya, which treats multiple sclerosis. He claimed that Novartis used its peer-to-peer speaker program and other forms of illicit remuneration to influence physicians' prescribing practices.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Camburn's Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with prejudice, concluding that he had not pleaded his allegations with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) to support a strong inference of an AKS-based FCA violation. The court found that Camburn's allegations did not adequately demonstrate the existence of a kickback scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff states an AKS violation if they allege with particularity that at least one purpose of the purported scheme was to induce fraudulent conduct. The court found that Camburn had adequately pleaded certain categories of factual allegations that gave rise to a strong inference of an AKS violation. Specifically, Camburn sufficiently alleged that Novartis held sham speaker events with no legitimate attendees, excessively compensated physician speakers for canceled events, and selected and retained speakers to incentivize prescription-writing.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part but vacated the judgment and remanded the case in part. The court instructed the district court to evaluate whether Camburn had stated all the elements of an FCA claim with respect to the adequately pleaded AKS violations and to assess the adequacy of Camburn's claims under state and municipal law. View "Camburn v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation" on Justia Law

John Bradley pleaded guilty in 2013 to possessing a firearm as a felon and was sentenced to three years in prison followed by three years of supervised release. In 2023, the Probation Office reported that Bradley violated his supervised release by using marijuana, committing assault and strangulation, and leaving the judicial district without permission. Judge Sullivan, who had presided over Bradley's initial conviction and was later elevated to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, was designated to oversee the revocation proceedings.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, with Judge Sullivan presiding by designation, found Bradley had violated the terms of his supervised release. The court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Bradley had used marijuana, left the judicial district without permission, and committed assault and strangulation. Consequently, the court sentenced Bradley to 18 months in prison followed by 18 months of supervised release. Bradley appealed, challenging the constitutionality of Judge Sullivan's designation and the lack of a jury trial in the revocation proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the statute authorizing Chief Judge Livingston to designate Judge Sullivan, 28 U.S.C. § 291(b), was constitutional and that the Designation Orders conformed to the statute. The court also held that Bradley was not entitled to a jury trial during his revocation proceedings, as the proceedings did not resemble punishment for a new offense. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the revocation of Bradley's supervised release and his subsequent sentence. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

A dental hygienist brought claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, and negligence against her former employer and supervisors. She alleged that her supervisor made repeated sexual advances and harassed her throughout her employment. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the retaliation claims and allowed the other claims to proceed to trial. A jury awarded the plaintiff $575,000 in emotional distress damages and $2 million in punitive damages. However, the district court granted a motion for a new trial, finding the damages excessive and indicative of unfair prejudice. In the second trial, the court precluded certain evidence, and the jury awarded the plaintiff only $1 in nominal damages.The plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, the order granting a new trial, and the evidentiary rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the retaliation claims, agreeing that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity as required for such claims. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to grant a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the determination that the jury’s damages award was excessive and indicative of prejudice. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of the plaintiff’s psychiatric records, portions of a coworker’s deposition testimony, and an anonymous fax.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in any of its challenged rulings and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Qorrolli v. Metropolitan Dental Associates" on Justia Law

Randy Torres, Walston Owen, and Charles Ventura were involved in a street gang known as the Rollin’ 30s Crips. Following a jury trial, they were convicted of various offenses, including racketeering conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Owen and Ventura were also convicted of additional firearms and assault offenses. Torres and Owen received sentences of 475 months’ imprisonment, while Ventura was sentenced to 288 months.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York oversaw the trial. The defendants raised several arguments on appeal, including insufficient evidence to support their convictions, errors in jury instructions, improper admission of co-conspirator statements, and issues related to jury impartiality. They also challenged the district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure in Ventura’s sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, including the special sentencing factors related to the murders of Victor Chaffa and Nestor Suazo. The court also held that the district court did not err in its jury instructions or in its handling of the juror impartiality issues. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the admission of co-conspirator statements.The Second Circuit dismissed Ventura’s claim regarding the district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the judgments of the district court in all other respects. The court concluded that the defendants’ arguments were without merit and upheld their convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

Phhhoto Inc. filed a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc., alleging that Meta engaged in anticompetitive practices that harmed Phhhoto's business. Phhhoto claimed that Meta's introduction of an algorithmic feed on Instagram in March 2016 suppressed Phhhoto's content, leading to a significant decline in user engagement and new registrations. Phhhoto argued that Meta's actions, including withdrawing access to Instagram's Find Friends API, terminating a joint project, and releasing a competing app called Boomerang, were part of a scheme to monopolize the market and eliminate Phhhoto as a competitor.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Phhhoto's claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ruling that it was time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations under the Sherman Act. The court found that Phhhoto's claim accrued outside the limitations period and that equitable tolling did not apply because Phhhoto failed to demonstrate fraudulent concealment by Meta.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and concluded that Phhhoto sufficiently alleged that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to Meta's fraudulent concealment. The court found that Meta's public statements about the algorithmic feed were misleading and constituted affirmative acts of concealment. The court also determined that Phhhoto did not have actual or inquiry notice of its antitrust claim until October 25, 2017, when it discovered evidence suggesting Meta's anticompetitive behavior. The court held that Phhhoto's continued ignorance of the claim was not due to a lack of diligence.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Phhhoto's antitrust claim to proceed. View "Phhhoto Inc. v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

Participants in Deloitte LLP’s 401(k) retirement plan filed a class action lawsuit against the plan fiduciaries, alleging that they breached their fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by allowing excessive administrative and recordkeeping fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the fees were higher than those of comparable plans and that the fiduciaries failed to obtain lower fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the fees were excessive relative to the services provided. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint, deeming it futile as the proposed amendments did not cure the deficiencies in the original complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible inference that the defendants breached their duty of prudence. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not adequately compare the services provided by the plan to those of the comparator plans, nor did they provide context to show that the fees were excessive. The court also upheld the dismissal of the derivative claim for failure to monitor, as it was dependent on the primary claim of breach of fiduciary duty. View "Singh v. Deloitte LLP" on Justia Law

Two Connecticut attorneys, Mario Cerame and Timothy Moynahan, challenged Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(7), which prohibits harassment or discrimination by lawyers based on fifteen protected categories. They argued that the rule violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments by imposing content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech and being unconstitutionally vague. They claimed that the rule's broad language could potentially sanction their speech on controversial topics, thus chilling their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed their complaint, ruling that Cerame and Moynahan lacked standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. The court found that they did not demonstrate a "real and imminent fear" of enforcement under Rule 8.4(7) and that their allegations were too general to establish a credible threat of enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Cerame and Moynahan have standing to seek pre-enforcement relief. The court held that they had sufficiently alleged an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by Rule 8.4(7) and faced a credible threat of enforcement. The court noted that the rule's broad language and the lack of clear guidelines for enforcement created a substantial risk of disciplinary action, which was sufficient to establish an injury in fact. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiffs' claims. View "Cerame v. Slack" on Justia Law

Andrew Davis was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Davis trafficked large quantities of marijuana in Bridgeport, Connecticut, using a method involving shipping marijuana from California via FedEx. Upon his arrest, he was found with over 136 pounds of marijuana, numerous handguns, and approximately $412,000 in cash. A co-conspirator cooperated with the government, leading to Davis's conviction.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut sentenced Davis to 295 months’ imprisonment. Davis appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. He also raised ten additional arguments in pro se supplemental briefs, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for his other convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Davis’s conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court found that the government provided ample circumstantial evidence linking the cash used in financial transactions to Davis's drug trafficking operations. The court also determined that Davis's pro se arguments either lacked merit, were forfeited, or were premature. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 2016, James E. Moore, Jr., also known as Kevin Thompson, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against corrections officer Troy Booth and four other officers at Fishkill Correctional Facility, alleging excessive force. The officers, represented by the New York State Attorney General, claimed Thompson failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). In 2020, the Attorney General withdrew as Booth's counsel due to his non-participation. Booth subsequently failed to appear for a deposition and a pre-motion conference, leading the district court to strike his answer as a sanction. The district court dismissed the claims against the other officers for failure to exhaust administrative remedies but granted a default judgment against Booth, awarding $50,000 in damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the claims against the four other officers on the grounds that Thompson had not exhausted administrative remedies. However, it granted a default judgment against Booth because his answer, which included the exhaustion defense, had been struck due to his non-participation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court abused its discretion by granting a default judgment against Booth while dismissing the claims against the other officers on the merits. The appellate court held that, according to the principle set forth in Frow v. De La Vega, once the district court determined that Thompson could not maintain his claims against the litigating defendants due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it should have dismissed the claims against Booth for the same reason. The Second Circuit vacated the default judgment and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of Booth. View "Thompson v. Booth" on Justia Law

Gordon Clark, acting on his own behalf and as the executor of his late wife’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo, Santander Bank, and other defendants, alleging various tort claims and violations of federal law related to the foreclosure of his wife’s home. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ordered Clark to obtain outside counsel to represent the estate, as it had other beneficiaries and creditors besides Clark.The district court reviewed the probate records and concluded that Clark, a pro se litigant, could not represent the estate due to the presence of other beneficiaries and creditors, including Santander Bank. The court directed Clark to retain counsel for the estate by a specific date, failing which his claims on behalf of the estate would be dismissed. Clark’s motion for reconsideration was granted, but the court adhered to its decision. Clark’s second motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the district court’s rulings denying an estate representative’s motion to proceed pro se. The standard of review for such decisions was determined to be de novo, as they involve the application of law to the facts of a given dispute. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motion to proceed pro se, as the estate had other beneficiaries and creditors. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. View "Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law