Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit concluded that an unsolicited faxed invitation to participate in a market research survey in exchange for money does not constitute an "unsolicited advertisement" under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting Focus Forward's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. The court reviewed all of the remaining arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and found them to be without merit. View "Bruce Katz, M.D., P.C., v. Focus Forward, LLC" on Justia Law

Colgan, a teacher at a special education high school, attempted to break up a fight between students but either fell or was pushed into a wall, leading to serious injuries. Colgan’s injuries and symptoms persisted despite treatment from several medical sources. Her treating physician, Dr. Ward, a concussion specialist, found that Colgan satisfied the medical criteria for mild traumatic brain injury and post-concussion syndrome with persistent cognitive defects and fatigue, chronic post-traumatic headaches, sleep disturbance, and dizziness; Colgan's debilitating headaches severely hampered her ability to carry out activities of daily living and basic job-related functions.Colgan successfully applied for workers’ compensation benefits. In 2016, Colgan sought social security disability insurance benefits. An ALJ denied Colgan’s claim, concluding that she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work, subject to physical and cognitive limitations (42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1)(A)). The district court affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated. The ALJ’s factual determination with respect to Colgan’s RFC was not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ misapplied the treating physician rule to Dr. Ward’s “check-box” medical opinion, which was supported by voluminous treatment notes gathered over almost three years of clinical treatment View "Colgan v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a multidistrict litigation alleging that some of the world's largest banks and affiliated entities conspired to suppress the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Plaintiffs appeal the district court's grant of defendants' motions to dismiss antitrust claims in 23 cases based on plaintiffs' lack of antitrust standing and/or based on lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants.The Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs who purchased LIBOR‐indexed bonds from third parties lack antitrust standing. The court explained that, to have antitrust standing, plaintiff must be an "efficient enforcer" of the antitrust laws whose alleged injury was proximately caused by a defendant. In this case, the third parties' independent decisions to reference that benchmark severed the causal chain linking plaintiffs' injuries to defendants' misconduct, thereby rendering plaintiffs unsuitable as efficient enforcers.However, the court disagreed with the district court's personal jurisdiction analysis and held that jurisdiction is appropriate under the conspiracy‐based theory first articulated by the court in Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2018), which post‐dated the district court's ruling. The court concluded that the facts alleged by plaintiffs – specifically, that executives and managers for several banks were directing the suppression of LIBOR from within the United States – were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the banks under a conspiracy‐based theory of jurisdiction. View "In re LIBOR-based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), as well as United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d at 32, bars petitioner from raising his claim arguing that his consecutive ten-year sentence is invalid because attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. Applying the deferential clear standard of review, the court also concluded that the district court did not reversibly err in dismissing the petition and rejected petitioner's contention that his fifteen-year sentence as a career offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act is invalid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). View "Savoca v. United States" on Justia Law

After a shopper tripped over a metal rod at a military commissary store and sustained injuries, she filed suit against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for the store's negligence. The district court found that under New York law, no reasonable jury could have found the store liable for the shopper's injuries.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiff has established a triable issue of fact as to whether the commissary had sufficient notice (constructive or actual) of the hazard posed by the existence of an open emergency door that had an ankle-high metal bar in front of it. If she has, then the district court should have let her negligence claim reach a jury. In this case, the government, notwithstanding its spot-check policy, may still be charged with constructive notice of the hazard created by the metal bar because, as the record shows, it lacked any meaningful procedure that would have reliably and promptly notified employees of an open emergency door, and because the metal bar served no clear purpose and could have been removed altogether. Furthermore, plaintiff's evidence was not mere speculation or a general awareness of danger. Rather, the evidence showed that the commissary's manager specifically knew that these doors came open daily. The court explained that, when confronted with comparable facts, New York courts have readily found evidence of constructive or actual landowner notice sufficient to permit slip-and-fall cases to go to trial. View "Borley v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Global's request for a declaratory judgment that the policy limits of the reinsurance certificates capped Global's reinsurance obligations with respect to both losses and expenses. In this case, Global issued ten facultative reinsurance certificates to Century pursuant to which Global agreed to indemnify Century for losses and litigation expenses that Century might incur in connection with the liability policies it had issued to Caterpillar.The court held that the certificates' policy limits are not inclusive of defense costs and, in so holding, recognized that its prior decisions in Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 903 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990), and Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. North River Insurance Co., 4 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993), which concerned matters of New York law, have been undermined by an intervening decision of the New York Court of Appeals and no longer constitute the law of the circuit. Applying ordinary rules of contract interpretation, the court agreed with the district court that the reinsurance certificates' follow-form clauses require Global to pay its proportionate share of Century's defense costs in excess of the certificates' liability limits. The court's conclusion was based on the certificates' unambiguous language as well as the testimony of Century's experts confirming that a strong presumption of concurrency prevailed in the reinsurance market at the time the certificates were issued. View "Global Reinsurance Corporation of America v. Century Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Civil Practice Law and Rules section 205(a), New York's "Saving Statute," does not permit a litigant to file an otherwise untimely "new action" within six months of a prior action, where that "prior action" was, itself, only made timely by a previous application of section 205(a).The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the grounds that the complaint was time-barred. In this case, the Second Circuit dismissed the 2018 Federal Action in a summary order dated January 23, 2020; defendant filed his initial complaint in the 2020 Action on July 8, 2020; and the court rejected defendant's contention that because the 2020 Action was filed within six months of the court's dismissal of the 2018 Federal Action (which was, itself, timely based on section 205(a), having been filed within six months of the affirmance of the dismissal of the 2014 Action), the 2020 Action is timely. View "Ray v. Ray" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, which owns and operates a fine arts gallery and dealership in New York City, sought coverage under three provisions of an insurance policy issued by Sentinel for losses and extra expenses incurred when it suspended its operations in accordance with government restrictions on non-essential businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. After Sentinel denied coverage, plaintiff filed suit in district court.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment with prejudice. The court concluded that, under New York law, the policy provisions that plaintiff invokes provide coverage only where the insured suspends its operations because its property or property in its immediate area suffered physical damage. In this case, plaintiff does not plausibly allege such physical damage and thus it is not entitled to coverage under the policy. The court denied plaintiff's alternative request to certify a proposed question to the New York Court of Appeals and considered plaintiff's remaining arguments, finding them to be without merit. View "10012 Holdings, Inc. v. Sentinel Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment holding that an insurance company was not obligated under an insurance policy to defend the insureds in underlying copyright infringement suits. At issue is whether the insureds were subject to the policy exclusion for injury purportedly caused by an insured in the business of "broadcasting" or "telecasting."The court concluded that the insurance company does not owe the insureds a duty to defend under the policy because "broadcasting," as used in its Media Exclusion is not ambiguous and applies to the insureds' business. Furthermore, the insureds' argument that the plain and ordinary meaning of "broadcasting" does not apply here fails. In this case, the language of the policy does not suggest an intention to adopt a specialized definition of "broadcasting." Therefore, the court rejected the insureds' invitation to discard the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "broadcasting" in favor of its preferred definitions. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the insurance company. View "Dish Network Corp. v. Ace American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

When a district court denies a defendant's motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) in sole reliance on the applicable 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, it need not also determine whether the defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons that might (in other circumstances) justify a sentence reduction.Defendant moved to reduce his 60-month sentence to time served under section 3582(c)(1)(A), but the district court denied the motion. In considering defendant's motion, the district court recognized the health challenges he might face from the COVID-19 pandemic while incarcerated. The district court also relied on the applicable factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the seriousness of defendant's offense, the harm it had caused his community, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated criminal defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Keitt" on Justia Law