Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Soto, a former Disney employee, alleged that Disney improperly denied her severance benefits upon her termination for physical illness that rendered her unable to work. Soto, a longtime employee had experienced a severe stroke and other medical problems, which left her unable to work. Disney formally terminated Soto’s employment, paid Soto sick pay, short-term illness benefits, and long-term disability benefits but did not pay her severance benefits. She filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B); (a)(3), alleging that the Plan Administrator improperly determined that she did not experience a qualifying “Layoff” as required for severance benefits.The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her case. Her complaint does not plausibly allege that the interpretation of “Layoff” and resulting denial of severance benefits to Soto were arbitrary and capricious. The Plan Administrator had reasoned bases, relating to taxation, for its interpretation of “Layoff” and consequent denial of severance benefits. The court noted an IRS regulation that defines an “involuntary” “termination of employment” as one arising from “the independent exercise of the unilateral authority of the [employer] to terminate to [employee’s] services, . . . where the [employee] was willing and able to continue performing services.” View "Soto v. Disney Severance Pay Plan" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted the petition for review and vacated the agency's denial of petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because those determinations were permeated with several legal and procedural errors.Insofar as petitioner's request for asylum was rejected as untimely, the court concluded that the agency applied the wrong legal standard to his claim of changed circumstances and the agency's alternative discretionary determination failed to indicate the requisite examination of the totality of the circumstances. In regard to petitioner's application for withholding of removal, the court concluded that the agency erred when it incorrectly categorized his federal conviction for wire fraud and identity theft as "crimes against persons," and concluded that they fell within the ambit of "particularly serious crimes" without evaluating the elements of the offenses as required under the agency's own precedent. Finally, in regard to petitioner's CAT claim, the court concluded that the agency erred in determining that petitioner lacked a reasonable fear of future persecution or torture in Nigeria due to his status as a criminal deportee without even addressing the declaration of his expert supporting his claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ojo v. Garland" on Justia Law

At a gas station, police detained the vehicle that Patterson was driving because it fit the description of a car whose occupants had reportedly menaced a woman with a firearm in a nearby supermarket parking lot. They discovered a gun. Patterson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The district court granted Patterson’s motion to suppress the firearm, stating that the degree of force used in detaining Patterson’s vehicle and its occupants—pointing firearms at, shouting orders toward, and blocking an exit route for the vehicle—exceeded that permissible for a reasonable investigatory stop and had to be viewed as a de facto arrest; the arrest was unlawful because, when first effected, it was not supported by probable cause; and the firearm seized from the car’s glove compartment after Patterson fled the scene had to be suppressed as a fruit of the unlawful arrest.The Second Circuit reversed. Patterson’s initial detention in the vehicle was not an arrest but an investigatory stop supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion. Pointing firearms at, shouting toward, and blocking an exit route for the vehicle driven by Patterson, were reasonable safety precautions given that the officers were investigating a report of menacing with a firearm. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor. The court held that acceptance of a guilty plea must be reviewed de novo. The court also concluded that although the district court's use of the term "provisional" was imprecise, the totality of the record reflects that the district court did accept defendant's guilty plea prior to his motion to withdraw that plea. Therefore, the district court correctly applied the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2) standard in considering defendant's motion to withdraw his plea after determining that he had not established a Brady violation, and the district court committed no error in denying the motion to withdraw. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's ineffective assistance claim, based on counsel's failure to adequately address the issues that defendant now raises, fails for lack of prejudice. View "United States v. Overton" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order vacating its earlier grant of Nigeria's application for discovery from VR under 28 U.S.C. 1782, holding that the district court's decision was based on an error of law, and thus amounted to an abuse of discretion as it effectively erected an impermissible extra-statutory barrier to discovery under section 1782. The court explained that the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters by its plain terms does not restrict Nigeria's use of other lawful means to access evidence in the United States for use in criminal matters. Rather, it expands such access, supplementing rather than replacing other evidence-gathering tools such as section 1782. Therefore, Nigeria does not circumvent the Treaty by applying directly to the district court for discovery under section 1782.The court also concluded that the district court erred by concluding that Nigeria's potential use of the discovery materials sought in a related proceeding challenging an arbitration award before an English court would be "improper" and by considering such potential use as a negative factor in addressing Nigeria's section 1782 application. Accordingly, the court remanded for further consideration. View "Federal Republic of Nigeria v. VR Advisory Services, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven inmates in Connecticut state prison facilities, filed suit against DOC alleging that the 2012 revised Administrative Directive, which limits access by inmates to pictorial sexually explicit materials, violates their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also allege that the prison regulation's exception for material that qualifies as "literary, artistic, educational or scientific in nature" is unconstitutionally vague.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of the DOC, discerning no clear error as to the district court's factual findings in light of the trial record. The court also concluded that the district court, based upon its factual findings, properly held that A.D. 10.7 is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives—namely, promoting a non-hostile work environment for DOC staff, enhancing the safety and security of DOC facilities, and facilitating the rehabilitation of sex offender inmates—and does not violate the First Amendment. Furthermore, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the regulation, including the exception, is neither unconstitutionally vague on its face, nor unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs. View "Reynolds v. Quiros" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen and resident of France charged with violating the Commodity Exchange Act, appealed the district court's memorandum order applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and denying her motions to dismiss the indictment on grounds of extraterritoriality and due process.After determining that it has jurisdiction to review the order disentitling defendant, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to consider or reconsider the merits of her motions to dismiss. The court agreed with defendant that it has jurisdiction to review the fugitive disentitlement ruling pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. The court held that defendant is not a fugitive, and that, even if she were, the district court abused its discretion in concluding that disentitlement was justified. The court explained that fugitivity implies some action by defendant to distance herself from the United States or frustrate arrest, but she took no such action. The court concluded, however, that it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the extraterritoriality and due process challenges and dismissed the appeal to that extent. View "United States v. Sindzingre" on Justia Law

The CIA appealed the district court's amended judgment ordering it to make public certain information contained in a draft summary of the CIA's former detention and interrogation program, as well as the transcript of certain ex parte proceedings before the district court. In a partially redacted opinion, the Second Circuit agreed with the CIA that certain information was properly withheld under Exemption 1 of the Freedom of Information Act. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union v. Central Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals issues arising from his 2017 amended judgment of conviction for Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses in the Southern District of New York.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment as to two issues and addressed the remaining arguments in a separate summary order filed concurrently with this opinion. The court concluded that the order of forfeiture entered against him should be vacated because the district court failed to enter a preliminary order prior to sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B). The court also concluded that defendant was improperly convicted of possessing firearms as a felon, Counts Twelve through Fourteen, because the government did not prove that he knew that he was a felon. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial in part of the law firm's motion for attorney's fees in a Social Security disability case. The court held that for a court to find an attorney's agreed-upon contingency fee unreasonable under 42 U.S.C. 406(b) on the sole ground that it constitutes a windfall, it must be truly clear that the high fee represents a sum unearned by counsel. In this case, the requested fee was not such a windfall and there is no other reason to think that the fee requested is unreasonable. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions to order the Social Security Administration to release the requested fee to the law firm. View "Fields v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law