Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Levy and Nordlicht were convicted of securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff; conspiracy to commit securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371; and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their participation in a fraudulent scheme to defraud bondholders of an oil and gas company, Black Elk, from the proceeds of a lucrative asset sale. Defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. The district court granted Levy's motion for a judgment of acquittal and conditionally granted his motion for a new trial in the event the judgment of acquittal was later vacated or reversed. The district court denied Nordlicht's motion for a judgment of acquittal, but granted his motion for a new trial.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order and judgment granting defendants' post-trial motions. The court concluded that a rational jury could have concluded that Levy participated in the Black Elk scheme with criminal intent. The court applied the preponderates heavily standard and concluded that letting the verdict stand as to Nordlicht would not result in manifest injustice. In this case, the district court's factual findings in connection with Nordlicht's Rule 29 motion, as well as the ample record evidence illustrating Nordlicht's knowledge and intent, undermine the district court's conclusions in the Rule 33 context and demonstrate that the evidence did not preponderate heavily against the verdict. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion granting the motion for a new trial. The court considered the parties' arguments on appeal and concluded that they are without merit. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Levy" on Justia Law

New York’s “Prevention of COVID-19 transmission” Rule, issued in August 2021, directs hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, adult care facilities, and other healthcare entities to “continuously require” certain employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19. It establishes a medical exemption to the requirement, but—consistent with New York’s prior vaccination requirements for healthcare workers—does not include an exemption based on religious belief. The Rule permits, but does not require, employers to make other accommodations for individuals who choose not to be vaccinated based on their sincere religious beliefs.The plaintiffs, primarily healthcare workers, challenged the Rule, claiming that being vaccinated would violate their religious beliefs because the vaccines were developed or produced using cell lines derived from cells obtained from voluntarily aborted fetuses. One district court enjoined the Rule insofar as it prevented healthcare workers from being eligible for a religious exemption; the other denied relief.The Second Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs’ claims. With respect to the Free Exercise claim, they have not established that they are likely to prove that the Rule is not a neutral law of general applicability or that it does not satisfy rational basis review. Nor have they demonstrated a likelihood of success on their Supremacy Clause claim; they have not shown that it would likely be impossible for employers to comply with both the Rule and Title VII. The Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim that the Rule contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment. View "We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea to a narcotics conspiracy charge, alleging that the district court misstated the applicable mandatory minimum term of supervised release in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the Rule 11 error was harmless. In this case, because both parties wrongly assume that the defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that the Rule 11 error affected his substantial rights, the court clarified that where a defendant moved to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing based on a Rule 11 error, it is the government's burden on appeal to show that such error was harmless. Nonetheless, the court found that plaintiff's substantial rights were not violated by the error in his plea agreement and colloquy. The court concluded that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary and he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and probation officers who were involved in his criminal case and confinement. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the dismissal of one claim, which relates to the probation officer defendants' public disclosure of sensitive information about his substance abuse treatment.The court held that 42 U.S.C. 290dd-2(a) does not itself confer upon patients who receive substance abuse treatment a personal right to confidentiality enforceable in an action under section 1983. The court explained that the confidentiality provision "encourages voluntary participation in such programs" on the part of drug users and benefits the public, but it does not create a personal right to privacy. Furthermore, while personal rights could in principle be derived from criminal statutes, courts normally infer a private right of action from a criminal statute only if the relevant factors weigh with force in that direction. In this case, they do not. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. View "Schlosser v. Kwak" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim, procedural due process claim, and equal protection claim against the DOE and UFT for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).In regard to the fair representation claim, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice but clarified that the claim should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has not limited the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. It has defined the requirements of a cause of action under the National Labor Relations Act to extend only to circumstances in which the employer is not a state or a political subdivision of a state. In this case, because plaintiff cannot allege that he worked for an "employer" under the Act, he fails to state a claim against UFT for violating its duty of fair representation, and his complaint is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).In regard to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the DOE, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support the inference that the alleged racial discrimination and First Amendment retaliation resulted from an official custom or policy. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the DOE deviated from New York Education Law 3020-a procedures and this amounted to a constitutional due process violation. Furthermore, plaintiff's argument that the arbitrator was biased fails because due process does not require that pre-termination hearings occur before a neutral adjudicator. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim of discrimination against public school teachers in New York City based on different procedures for selecting disciplinary hearing arbitrators. Finally, to the extent that plaintiff asserts a new equal protection claim on appeal due to treatment of public school employees represented by a different union, that claim is not properly before the court. View "Green v. Department of Education of the City of New York" on Justia Law

In May 2020, at the height of the pandemic, New York City amended its Residential and Non-Residential Harassment Laws, to prohibit “threatening” tenants based on their “status as a person or business impacted by COVID-19, or . . . receipt of a rent concession or forbearance for any rent owed during the COVID-19 period,” and added the “Guaranty Law,” which renders permanently unenforceable personal liability guarantees of commercial lease obligations for businesses that were required to cease or limit operations pursuant to a government order. For rent arrears arising during March 7, 2020-June 30, 2021, the Guaranty Law extinguishes a landlord’s ability to enforce a personal guaranty.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the plaintiffs alleged that the Harassment Amendments violated the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions by impermissibly restricting commercial speech in the ordinary collection of rents and by failing to provide fair notice of what constitutes threatening conduct. Plaintiffs further alleged that the Guaranty Law violated the Contracts Clause, which prohibits “State . . . Law[s] impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” The district court dismissed the suit.The Second Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the plaintiffs failed to allege plausible free speech and due process claims. The court reinstated the challenge to the Guaranty Law. The Guaranty Law significantly impairs personal guaranty agreements; there are at least five serious concerns about that law being a reasonable and appropriate means to pursue the professed public purpose. View "Melendez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law, alleging that she was entitled to unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals a question regarding what preclusive effect a judgment of the small claims court has on a subsequent wage-and-hour action. Guided by the Court of Appeals' ruling that traditional claim preclusion principles apply to judgments of the small claims court, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit on claim-preclusion grounds. The court also held that claim preclusion is a valid defense to an action brought under the FLSA. View "Simmons v. Trans Express Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal challenging his new sentence, holding that the Government can invoke the appeal waiver despite having earlier consented to defendant's habeas petition. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiring to commit a Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Although an appeal waiver provision in the agreement barred defendant from challenging his conviction or sentence, the Government consented to his request to vacate the 18 U.S.C. 924(c) conviction as unconstitutional in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 32 (2019). The district court then vacated defendant's conviction and resentenced him on the remaining Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy count.The court held that "partial enforcement" or "partial invocation" of a plea agreement's waiver provision is permitted under limited circumstances, including those present here. Therefore, the valid appeal waiver in this case requires that the court dismiss defendant's appeal rather than address his challenge. View "United States v. Borden" on Justia Law

Halkbank, a commercial bank that is majority-owned by the Government of Turkey, was charged with crimes related to its participation in a multi-year scheme to launder billions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil and natural gas proceeds in violation of U.S. sanctions against the Government of Iran and Iranian entities and persons. Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment but the district court denied the motionThe Second Circuit held that it has jurisdiction over the instant appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The court also held that, even assuming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) applies in criminal cases—an issue that the court need not, and did not, decide today—the commercial activity exception to FSIA would nevertheless apply to Halkbank's charged offense conduct. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Halkbank’s motion to dismiss the Indictment. The court further concluded that Halkbank, an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign, is not entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution at common law. View "United States v. Bankasi" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction directing defendant officials of the DOCCS to rescind changes in the scheduling of certain regularly-held Quaker religious gatherings at Green Haven Correctional Facility. The court agreed with the district court that a preliminary injunction is not warranted because plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.After determining that it has jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal, the court concluded that, at least insofar as they challenge substantive restrictions on their ability to conduct religious services and meetings in accordance with their beliefs, plaintiffs have established that any violation of their religious liberties would satisfy the irreparable injury standard. However, the court concluded that the claims of Green Haven Meeting, as well as those of the Incarcerated Plaintiffs suing in their own names, must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In regard to the Non-Incarcerated Plaintiffs, the court concluded that the changes in the times of the Quarterly Meetings, and the eventual cancellation of those meetings, did not infringe their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court found persuasive defendants' contention that plaintiffs failed to clearly establish that defendants' actions concerning Quarterly Meetings substantially burden plaintiffs' exercise of religion since defendants rescheduled the meetings for Friday evenings and did not terminate them. Furthermore, the record reinforces the district court's conclusion that defendants' rescheduling decision was supported by legitimate concerns. Finally, the court concluded that the balance of equities and the public interest do not tip in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. View "Green Haven Prison Preparative Meeting v. New York State Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law