Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against a defunct photo‐finishing company and its former CEO, alleging various violations and breaches of fiduciary duties with respect to a deferred compensation plan.The Second Circuit held that the district court correctly denied defendants' invocation of ERISA's three-year statute of limitations for fiduciary claims because defendants failed to prove that all plaintiffs had knowledge of the breaches more than three years prior to the commencement of this suit; defendants waived any reliance on ERISA's six‐year statute of repose by failing to assert it any time prior to their reply brief before the court; the Plan is not exempt from ERISA's funding, fiduciary, and vesting requirements because it was not offered to a qualitatively select group of employees; the district court's decision to limit damages on plaintiffs' fiduciary claims to the Plan's projected balance as of 2004 was error, and damages must be recalculated; the district court erred in failing to assess the scope of CTC's liability, if any, for the claims asserted against it; the CEO is liable for the entire amount of the restoration award, because liability under ERISA is joint and several; although the district court's conclusion that Plaintiff Launderville is liable in contribution is supported by sufficient evidence, that liability is to the CEO, not to the Plan; there is no basis to impose liability on Launderville for her failure to comply with ERISA's reporting requirements; the district court's entry of judgment for defendants on plaintiffs' wrongful denial of benefits claims was error; the district court's order that the restoration award be distributed on a per capita basis to Plan participants risks violating those participants' vested rights and is, in any case, inconsistent with ERISA; and defendants' evidentiary challenge is meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Browe v. CTC Corp." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying defendant's motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) for relief from judgment. In 2003, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against defendant and, to resolve the matter, defendant consented to the entry of a final judgment against him, agreeing not to deny any of the factual allegations of the complaint. Almost 16 years later, defendant sought to invalidate the judgment on the basis that it incorporated a "gag order" that violated the First Amendment and his right to due process. The court agreed with the district court that defendant's motion fails on the merits because it does not allege either a jurisdictional or due process violation that would permit relief under Rule 60(b)(4). View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Romeril" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CSX, for unlawful retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), alleging that he was terminated because he engaged in protected activity by "reporting, in good faith, a hazardous safety or security condition."The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CSX, concluding that the district court erred in determining that plaintiff's belief that the subject of his report – pressure from supervisors to make false entries in work reports causing employees undue stress and distraction from their duties – concerned a "hazardous safety or security condition" was objectively unreasonable. Rather, the court concluded that the FRSA's protection of reports made "in good faith" requires only that the reporting employee subjectively believe that the matter being reported constitutes a hazardous safety or security condition, regardless of whether that belief is objectively reasonable. The district court also erred in determining that, in any event, only physical conditions subject to the railroad's control could constitute such a condition. The court explained that the statutory text suggests no reason to confine the meaning of "hazardous safety or security condition" to encompass only physical conditions. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ziparo v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for multiple drug- and gun-related counts, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions. The court rejected defendants' claims of evidentiary errors and Rehaif error.However, in failing to account for the gaps in the government's evidentiary presentation for acquitted conduct, the court concluded that the district court erred in cross-attributing the drugs found in the upper apartment when it sentenced Defendant Willis. Furthermore, the error requires a remand for resentencing and reconsideration of whether the government met its burden of proving jointly undertaken criminal activity between Willis and Pierce by a preponderance of the evidence, and if so, the scope of that activity. The court remanded Willis's sentence to the district court to expressly rule whether the sentence will run concurrently with his state sentence. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted the Board's petition for enforcement of its decision and order requiring the Companies to reinstate a former employee and to comply with their collective bargaining obligations with the Union. This case arose from a long-pending labor dispute between the Union and three closely related corporations doing business in Newark: Newark Electric, Newark 2.0, and Colacino.Although the court agreed with the Companies that the Board's original complaint was invalid, the court rejected their challenge to its ratification by the NLRB's General Counsel and concluded that the Board's order may be enforced. The court also concluded that the Board's determination that the Companies were a single employer and alter egos is supported by substantial evidence. The court found persuasive the Companies' further argument that Colacino's termination of its Letter of Assent with the Union also needed Newark Electric's obligations toward the Union. Finally, the court found that substantial credible evidence supports the Board's conclusion that Colacino Industries violated section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act when it terminated the employee. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Newark Electric Corp." on Justia Law

IWA filed a putative securities fraud class action against Textron, a manufacturer of aircraft and recreational vehicles, and two of its executives, alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The district court dismissed the action for failure to allege any actionable misstatements.The Second Circuit vacated the portion of the district court's judgment dismissing IWA's securities fraud claims arising from the inventory statements. The court concluded that IWA sufficiently alleged the materially misleading nature of the 2018 statements at issue regarding Textron's inventory, and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s demand for particularity is satisfied in this case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling as to the other categories of statements. View "IWA Forest Industry Pension Plan v. Textron Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims against two dentists, two unidentified Department of Corrections officials, and several municipal defendants for medical malpractice under state law and violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from a gum condition that he alleges that was not adequately addressed.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, concluding that plaintiff failed to plead that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against Defendant Greenman failed because he did not allege that Greenman acted with deliberate indifference. Rather, plaintiff disagreed with Greenman's assessment of the severity of plaintiff's condition and recommendation for treatment. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment against Defendant Hamilton failed for similar reasons. In this case, the allegations failed to establish that Hamilton possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind where, even if the court were to assume that a dental cleaning was inadequate and that plaintiff should have known this, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, plaintiff failed to allege that the Doe Defendants acted with deliberate indifference because he does not allege any personal involvement in alleged constitutional deprivations. View "Darby v. Greenman" on Justia Law

Hamilton filed suit against Vortic and its founder for selling wristwatches that featured restored antique pocket watch parts with Hamilton's trademark. The district court entered judgment in favor of defendants, finding that Vortic's use of the mark was not likely to cause consumer confusion.The Second Circuit confirmed that a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit bears the burden of proving that a defendant's use of its mark is likely to mislead consumers, even when Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947), is implicated, and that no particular order of analysis is required, provided that the district court considers all appropriate factors in light of the circumstances presented. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in this case, concluding that the district court properly placed the burden of proving trademark infringement on Hamilton, and correctly analyzed the relevant considerations under Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), and Champion. Furthermore, the district court correctly applied Champion and Polaroid to these factual findings to conclude that there was no likelihood of consumer confusion. Finally, the district court properly concluded that defendants were entitled to judgment on the remaining claims. View "Hamilton International Ltd. v. Vortic LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit for fraud, rescission, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, fraudulent conveyance, and unjust enrichment alleging that defendants had misrepresented that collateral managers would exercise independence in selecting assets for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.The Second Circuit affirmed and held that plaintiffs have failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, reliance on defendants' representations. In this case, plaintiffs based their investment decisions solely on the investment proposals their investment advisor developed; the advisor developed these detailed investment proposals based on offering materials defendants provided and on the advisor's own due diligence; plaintiffs premised their fraud claims on the advisor's reliance on defendants' representations; but New York law does not support this theory of third-party representations. The court also held that plaintiffs have failed to establish that defendants misrepresented or omitted material information for two of the three CDO deals at issue—the Octans II CDO and the Sagittarius CDO I. The court explained that defendants' representations that the collateral managers would exercise independence in selecting assets were not misrepresentations at all, and defendants did not have a duty to disclose their knowledge of the hedge fund's investment strategy because this information could have been discovered through the exercise of due care. View "Loreley Financing (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims as time-barred under the two year statute of limitations set forth in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention), and denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. Plaintiff filed suit against American and others, alleging that, while boarding a flight from Paris, France, to Dallas, Texas, on December 28, 2015, a flight attendant struck him, causing injury.The court concluded that, because plaintiff alleged that he was injured while boarding an international flight, his claims fall under the Montreal Convention, a multilateral treaty that "applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft." Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Cohen v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law